894.00/467: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 23—7:42 a.m.]
45. Consideration should be given to the following factors in estimating the situation in the Far East:
Japan has prepared—by the Cabinet’s decision to leave the League of Nations—to destroy her most important link with other countries, thereby indicating a fundamental defeat for the moderate elements in Japan and the complete supremacy of the military. In order to demonstrate her independence of and disregard for Western interference with what she conceives to be her own vital interests, Japan has forestalled or followed by a fait accompli every important step made by the League of Nations. Japan’s attitude is entirely free of bluff. Rather than surrender to moral or other pressure from the West, the military themselves, and the public through military propaganda, are fully prepared to fight. At present their determination is not modified but only strengthened by the moral obloquy of the rest of the world. Further assassinations, if not internal revolution, would almost certainly follow any tendency on the part of the Government to compromise.
[Page 111]The following factors have their place in the national temper:
The determination of the military to brook no interference whatever and its desire to maintain prestige;
The saving of face which permits no step backward and which is of essential importance;
The belief, which has been carefully nurtured, that the “life line” of Japan is Manchuria;
The intense exasperation with the failure of the Chinese to fulfill their treaty obligations and with the former chaotic conditions of Manchuria;
The military’s complete disregard of future financial difficulties arising out of the huge expenses which the Manchurian campaign entails;
The fundamental inability of the Japanese to comprehend, when opposed to their own Far East interest, the sanctity of contractual obligations.
It is believed that, with regard to the advance into Jehol, special measures have been taken to avoid going south of the Great Wall even though the campaign may be rendered considerably more costly and difficult by this decision. It would not be wise, however, to disregard the possibility that the taking of the Peiping-Tientsin line might eventuate from unforeseen developments or incidents. The occupation of North China would very likely be Japan’s reply to the application of active sanctions by the League of Nations. This constitutes the greatest future potential danger. It would, of course, bring foreign interests into direct conflict with Japan.
Military propaganda, it may be said, has caused a large section of the public and the army to regard as inevitable war between Russia and Japan or between the United States and Japan or with both countries. The naval and military machines are rapidly being strengthened and are in a high state of efficiency, possessing complete self-confidence and arrogance, while the bellicosity of the Navy is increasing. There is always the risk that, in the present temper of the Navy and the Army and the public, Japan might be led to radical steps, without counting the cost thereof, by any serious incident which tended to inflame public opinion. The conditions described in my telegram No. 224, September 3, noon, are still precisely the same in this respect.
The opinion of most of the diplomats and other foreigners in Tokyo and of the principal members of my staff is represented in the foregoing brief summary.
The Embassy is without information with regard to military developments in Jehol because strict press bans prevent the publication of any information about the present operations in Jehol.
The Legation at Peiping has been sent a copy of this telegram.