As stated in my telegram, my information is that while this document does not
accurately set forth all that Count Uchida said
[Page 96]
to the Commission while it was in Tokyo, it is
nevertheless believed to be a clear and accurate statement of the policy
which Count Uchida as Minister of Foreign Affairs will follow in dealing
with the Manchurian situation.
[Enclosure]
Epitomized Record of Statements Made by Count Uchida
at Interviews With the League of Nations Commission in Dairen and
Tokyo
1. Some time ago at Dairen I had occasion to state frankly to Your
Excellencies my personal views based upon my experience in connection
with Manchuria, acquired in varied capacities during the past quarter of
a century. To-day as Minister for Foreign Affairs I can discover no
ground whatsoever for modifying those views on any essential point.
2. All the international disputes which have occurred in recent years in
the Far East may be chiefly attributed in the first place to the fact
that China disunited and destitute of control does not, taken as a
whole, constitute a duly organized state, and in the second place to the
revolutionary foreign policy of the Nationalist Government, strongly
influenced as it is by communist doctrine imported from abroad. And it
is not Japan alone, but all the Powers which possess important interests
in China, that must suffer from such state of affairs now existing in
China.
3. Unfortunately extreme difficulties are encountered in any attempt to
repair the injuries thus sustained by the various Powers, through any
appeal to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty,
the Anti-War Pact, or any other existing treaty intended for the
maintenance of international peace. In fact, it has been the practice
among the principal Powers to rely upon their own resources whenever
their rights and interests in China were actually, or were in danger of
being, seriously impaired. The recent history of China is full of
examples of such cases, in which reparation for, or the prevention of,
damage to their interests was effectuated by foreign Powers upon their
own account.
4. Japan, as a country more intimately connected with China both
historically and geographically, than any other, and possessing by far
the greatest interests in China, has had to suffer more than other
countries from the anomalous situation in China as I described above. As
far as Japan was concerned, she naturally hoped to see China experience
a re-birth and come to realize her true role in maintaining the peace of
the Far East. For more than twenty years, especially as a sequel to the
Conference of Washington, we have exercised the
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greatest patience and self-control, but conditions
in China have failed to show any trace of improvement; on the contrary,
they grew notably worse. It was at a moment when the feeling of our
people was running high in face of the ever increasing Chinese
provocations, that in Manchuria, Japan’s first bulwark, where, staking
the fortunes of our country, we fought two great wars with China and
with Russia in order to repel their aggressions and, where our country’s
vital interests on the Continent of Asia are centered, the sudden
incident of September 18th occurred. We had no other course than to take
decisive measures of self-defence.
5. As a consequence of Japan’s action, the power of General Chang
Hsueh-liang in Manchuria was extinguished. Influential people of
Manchuria, who had long chafed under the misrule of the Changs and were
opposed to their policy of dragging Manchuria into the turmoil of
Chinese civil war south of the Great Wall, seized the opportunity to set
up an independent state.
Manchuria is a country quite apart from China Proper, geographically and
in psychological characteristics. The population, though mostly of
Chinese origin is composed largely of these Chinese who, driven out of
their homes in China Proper by famine and flood, by tyranny and
oppression, fled to Manchuria seeking to start a new life in that land
where they could enjoy comparative security and abundance owing to
Japan’s vigilance and enterprise. Moreover, historically viewed,
Manchuria has never constituted a purely integral part of China.
Especially during recent decades has it been demonstrated on’
innumerable occasions that the authority of no government in China
Proper extended to Manchuria.
The founding of Manchukuo was only an outcome of the subterranean
revolutionary movement of many years’ standing, which has opened to come
to the surface as a sequel to Japan’s actions of selfdefence, and which
proved successful owing to the peculiar characteristics which separate
Manchuria from China Proper. The independence of Manchuria should,
therefore, be regarded as essentially a phenomenon of the political
disintegration in China.
6. There may be more than one plan for the solution of the Manchurian
problem. The Japanese Government believe that the problem should be
solved with the aim in view of ensuring the security and stability of
Manchuria as well as the permanent peace of the Far East, and that at
all events the mistake should not be made of rendering the situation
uncertain and so perpetuating occasions for future disputes. It would be
intolerable if, as the result of any temporizing measure of expediency
or compromise, there should be resuscitated in Manchuria conditions
analogous to those that prevailed there prior to the incident of 18th
September last. In that sense I cannot agree to any plan which would
contemplate the inauguration of the rule
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of an anti-Japanese and disorganized China over
Manchuria. Moreover, the authorities of Manchukuo, who have repeatedly
declared their intention completely to separate themselves from the
corrupt and foul politics of China Proper and to set up an honest and
able government, would not consent to a plan which would utterly defeat
their ideal and aspirations.
I believe that any plan which might be formulated, in which no account is
taken of the existence of Manchukuo as an international state, will fail
to bring order and stability to Manchuria and tranquility to the Far
East.
7. The recognition of a new state or government is not a matter for the
exercise of the choice or fancy of other states. It is a step imposed
upon them by the necessities of international intercourse. It is rightly
felt intolerable that a country should be compelled for any length of
time to regard the government which actually controls its nearest
neighbor as devoid of all substantial authority and title, and as
incompetent to represent it abroad. As Manchukuo is the outcome of a
local movement of self-determination on the part of the inhabitants, who
have undoubtedly been much oppressed in the past, as above observed,
there can be no question, in recognizing its existence, of any
inconsistency with the Nine Power Treaty of Washington whose provisions
Japan is most anxious to observe. The object of the Treaty was not to
exempt that region from the usual and normal operation of the law of
nations which legitimizes de facto governments,
nor to perpetuate an integrity of discord. It would be directly contrary
to its terms to hold that China must forever seethe in anarchy and that
no part of the ancient Chinese territory can ever be allowed to erect
itself as an island of peace and security, but must be forced down into
the morass of discord and disorganization by eight civilized Powers. In
short, the Nine Power Treaty does not forbid Chinese in any part of
China to establish of their own free will an independent state, and it
does not, therefore, constitute a violation of the Treaty to accord
recognition to a new state so founded. There is no doubt that Manchukuo,
if given fair and untrammelled opportunity by Japan and other Powers,
will quickly develop into a strong and stable nation, and so given a
much needed lead to the establishment of a strong and stable government
in China.
