793.94/3319: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:55 p.m.]
278. Department’s 273, December 23 [22], 6 [9] p.m. I saw Inukai in person at 12 o’clock today and read him your message. It was interpreted passage by passage as I read. I left a written copy in accordance with your instructions. I read through all the messages referred to before going. I advised Inukai that I had on several occasions made representations, some of them similar in purport, to Baron Shidehara and to Mr. Nagai. He replied that these military operations were wholly aimed at the bandits and that there was no intention of attacking regular Chinese troops; that it was his earnest hope that a clash could be avoided and that the Chinese Foreign Office could be persuaded by negotiation to withdraw behind the Great Wall. He said that newspaper reports were misleading and that the Japanese had indisputable evidence, some of it in documentary form—taken from prisoners or from dead bodies of bandits—that the bandits were acting upon orders from regular officers with headquarters in Chinchow. He stated that the difference between the regular soldier and the bandit was a line very difficult to draw because the regular soldier became a bandit as soon as he stopped getting pay. At this point I asked how these regulars could become other than bandits, the Japanese having taken away the sources of revenue; to which he replied that Chang Hsueh-liang had other sources of revenue. He first tried to say that the Japanese had not seized the funds; I told him I knew they had taken possession of the salt tax and balances in certain banks. Then he corrected his statement but said that the funds were being devoted to the ordinary uses of the Government. He pointed out the extremely difficult position in which the Japanese troops would find themselves if the marauding bands whom they were driving out of the country could get back and join the regular forces in Chinchow; that under the circumstances it would be very difficult for the Japanese Army to refrain from attacking and driving the Chinese out; that while these bands were operating in Manchuria there could be no possibility of beginning the orderly conduct of civil government. Once the Chinese regular troops were withdrawn behind the Great Wall, he said that work could be found for the bandits who could then be persuaded to discontinue their disorderly practices. He referred sympathetically to the chagrin and disappointment of young Chang Hsueh-liang whom he described as a hot-headed young man who, having been practically king of Manchuria, now found himself deprived of his power; he had [Page 68] pointed this out to the Chinese Minister who recently left here for Nanking and requested him to take up with the Nanking Government the matter of trying to persuade Chang Hsueh-liang to abandon his efforts to harass the Japanese Armies and to withdraw his troops peaceably in the interests of an amicable settlement of the whole Manchurian situation; this he said the Chinese Minister had promised to do. He expressed great hope that the whole situation could be cleared up without further clashes between Japanese and Chinese soldiers, but expressed fear that if they found themselves face to face it would be extremely difficult to prevent fighting. At this point I reiterated the unfortunate effect upon world opinion that would ensue; to which he quite agreed that that would be the case.
I took occasion to discuss with the Minister the economic situation, and commented briefly on the interferences with neutral business—always to the advantage of Japanese-owned enterprises—which seemed to be the regular policy of the military officers in power. He asked if these were authentic cases. I told him there was no question about that and cited the diversion of railroad freight, the closing of power stations, and the transferring of business to Japanese-owned concerns, and also interference with bank payments. He assured me that this was merely temporary; that Japan had no design upon the integrity or sovereignty of Manchuria and was absolutely committed to the open-door policy as, he said, this vast territory was in need of foreign capital and the principles of the open-door policy would be strictly respected as soon as civil conditions were restored.
Repeated to Peiping.