793.94/3178c: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Forbes)
262. Embassy’s 256, December 9, 9 p.m. I wish that you be informed as follows regarding the question of the alleged promises of the Chinese to withdraw from Chinchow.
- 1.
- The American Minister at Nanking telegraphed Department on November 24
as follows:82
“In view of alarming reports current as to imminent Japanese action at Chinchow Dr. Wellington Koo, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, has this evening told me and my British and French colleagues that his Government wished to sound our Governments out and if feasible make a formal proposition along following lines:
‘In order to avoid any clash China is prepared as a temporary measure pending a general settlement of the Manchuria question, if Japan insists on withdrawal of troops in the Chinchow area to do so up to Shanhaikwan, provided Japan gives guarantees satisfactory to Great Britain, the United States and France, not to go into that zone leaving the Chinese civil administration intact including police.’
“In view of critical situation we undertook to commend this to our respective Governments and to ask for a speedy reply.”
- 2.
- On December 8, the American Minister at Nanking cabled the following:
“Chinchow situation. The suggestion made tentatively by Koo regarding Chinchow transmitted to the Department in my telegram of November 24, midnight, was apparently communicated by the French Ambassador to the Japanese Government which seems to have received it as a firm offer on the part of the Chinese. In spite of the fact that Koo’s intention was merely to sound out the American, British, and French Governments, and that he made his offer contingent upon Japan’s giving guarantees to those Governments, the Japanese have chosen to take this stand and now insist stoutly that if the Chinese fail to evacuate Chinchow, they will be guilty of breach [Page 63] of faith as the Japanese have withdrawn their military forces east of Liao. It is the contention of the Chinese that no such offer was ever made on their part and therefore they are under no obligation to evacuate Chinchow, last stand in the Manchurian area of the Nationalist Government. It is my understanding that the Japanese maintain their withdrawal was due to the offer by the Chinese, and I have been told that the Chinese Government through Shigemitsu has been informed by the Japanese Government that the situation will become difficult unless the Chinese withdraw their troops.”
- 3.
- I telegraphed the above to Dawes on December 8 and gave him the
following instructions:
“It is my desire that you see Briand and bring to his attention the discrepancy between the tentative proposal which Dr. Koo put forward for consideration and the contention which the Japanese Government now makes that because of the promise the Chinese made to withdraw their armed forces from Chinchow, the Japanese withdrew their forces east of the Liao River, and that if the Chinese now fail to evacuate Chinchow they will be guilty of a breach of faith.”
- 4.
- Dawes sent me a lengthy telegram on December 9,82a quoting a statement with regard to the entire transaction. The statement had been made to him in Paris on good authority83 whose identity I do not feel it advisable to disclose. It appears from this statement that, as is stated in paragraph 1 above, Dr. Koo submitted a tentative project to the British, French, and American Ministers at Nanking. This project contained the suggestion that, provided Japan gave satisfactory guarantees to Great Britain, the United States, and France, Chinese troops might be withdrawn from the Chinchow area; that this project tentatively proposed was communicated to Baron Shidehara by go-betweens; that the impression Baron Shidehara gained was that the proposal was a definite offer on the part of Koo; that the reply of Shidehara to the go-betweens was acceptance in principle but with the declaration that the Japanese Government could not give guarantees to the three powers but would be willing to give a guarantee to the Council of the League of Nations; and that subsequently in various quarters the matter has been discussed but without there having been achieved an acceptance either by the Japanese Government of the original proposal made by Dr. Koo or by the Chinese Government of the counter-proposal made by Baron Shidehara.
The charge, however, that by virtue of not having withdrawn their troops south of Chinchow the Chinese have acted in bad faith, would seem not to be justified.
[Page 64]It is evident at the same time that a serious misunderstanding has arisen and that the impression the people of Japan have acquired is that after offering to withdraw her troops, China now refuses to do so; on the other hand the Chinese people have gained the impression that Koo’s tentative effort is being misrepresented by Japan and that she is using as a pretext for contemplated further military action against Chinchow the failure of China to act on an alleged promise.
One or more of the parties who undertook to act as go-betweens, according to my information from Paris, have fully explained to the Japanese the misunderstanding in relation to Dr. Koo’s tentative project. According to my latest information the Council has decided that with regard to the neutral zone project it will not press negotiations further.
Such is the situation now, regardless of fiction or fact as to the antecedents, and all reports indicate that (a) at Chinchow the Chinese troops are standing quiet on the defensive, (b) their withdrawal either cannot or will not be ordered or effected by the Chinese Government, and (c) the Japanese troops are threatening an attack on Chinchow.
In my opinion, this being the situation, it is imperative that I reaflirm the view which has been expressed by me repeatedly that if the Japanese Army attacks Chinchow, it would be most unfortunate for all concerned and especially for Japan.
It is clear that there has been misunderstanding concerning Dr. Koo’s project which he suggested tentatively two weeks ago. I find, however, no evidence of bad faith in any quarter. Whether the Chinese troops should or should not withdraw from Chinchow voluntarily is a question which involves considerations of expediency and practicability rather than of obligation. For the Chinese authorities to withdraw these troops without some definite and satisfactory agreement first having been concluded, it is easy to understand, would be difficult and perhaps politically impossible. They are, after all, on their own soil and we do not have any evidence that aggressive action against Japan is contemplated or could be taken by the Chinese. An attack on Chinchow by the Japanese Army under these circumstances would be regarded as unjustified by the world.
Now the resolution of the Council has been adopted, I feel that some agreement which will ensure against hostilities at or in relation to Chinchow could be negotiated by the Japanese and the Chinese.
You will please talk this matter over with Baron Shidehara and explain my views as indicated. Inform him that in regard to his absolute sincerity in the whole matter I have no doubt whatever, and that I am not unaware of and regret the use which is being made of the incident by his political opponents and detractors; that to prevent ill-advised action by the Japanese Army I am confident he is doing [Page 65] his utmost; that it is my hope he will be successful; and that as either the fact or the appearance of lack of self-restraint would have a decidedly bad effect on world opinion, I am willing that he inform his colleagues that the Government of the United States urges upon Japan the utmost self-restraint with regard to any further military activity.