Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/11672

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] November 16, 1937.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening asked me to come to see him at his official residence at 9:30 this morning and he talked to me along the following lines:

1. Reports received from the Brussels Nine-Power Conference indicate that the draft resolution submitted to the Conference provides for united action against Japan. The Minister does not know whether the draft which he has seen was passed by the Conference without alteration or amendment. If the clause for united action remained in the resolution as passed he fears that it will have a very unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion. He interprets the term “united action” as envisaging some sort of economic boycott or other sanctions. He said that any such united action, far from helping to terminate the hostilities, would actually result in prolonging them indefinitely.

2. The Minister said that according to the information which he has received through the diplomatic representative of “a certain Power” the United States Government not only took the initiative in convoking the conference but is also taking the lead in Brussels (I here interrupted the Minister to interpolate the information which we had received from the Department and also the gist of the statement made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons to the effect that the initiative for calling the Conference had been taken by a group within the League of Nations of which the United States is not a member and that the United States, when asked where it felt the Conference should be held, had merely suggested Brussels as the rendezvous. The Minister repeated nevertheless that his information was to the effect that the United States had been the real leader from the start). Mr. Hirota said that he hoped that I would bring the views in paragraph 1 to the attention of our representatives in Brussels.

3. Mr. Hirota then said that these rumors of American initiative were bound to appear soon in the Japanese press and that this would have a most unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion. The Japanese public hitherto has felt that Great Britain is the country which has been foremost in endeavoring to develop a solid front against Japan but that if the Japanese press now reported the United States as taking the leadership in Brussels the onus would be largely transferred to the United States.

4. The Minister said that good relations with the United States, as he had often told me, was his fundamental policy and that he greatly “feared” the results of such a change in Japanese public opinion.

5. Up to the moment of the President’s speech in Chicago on October 5 the Japanese public had felt that the United States was the only country which had been genuinely impartial during the Sino-Japanese hostilities. All of the other countries, he said, for one reason or another had special interests in China and their impartiality was therefore doubted. The position of the United States in the estimation of the Japanese public, however, was such that it was generally felt that the United States might play the same role in helping to terminate the present hostilities as it had played in the Russo-Japanese war as being the most impartial of all Japan’s friends. The President’s Chicago speech had temporarily modified this view but the fact that in his recent speech opening Congress the President had made no reference to the Far Eastern situation made the Japanese public feel that perhaps the United States is not so rigid in its attitude as had been feared.

6. Mr. Hirota then said that the Japanese military movements in China are progressing favorably and there is no need for the Army to go much further than it has already gone although they will be perfectly capable of doing so if they consider it necessary. In China’s own interests now is the time to bring about peace. The Chinese Government is considering evacuating Nanking to some other capital and this, the Minister said, will be a very foolish move. As a matter of fact Chiang Kai-shek’s position is far from secure and some of the principal generals are already forming an opposition. If peace is made now the Japanese demands will be “reasonable” and not a foot of Chinese territory will be taken by Japan. If, however, the warfare continues the present attitude of the Japanese Government may no longer apply and more drastic terms may result in view of the increased sacrifices involved.

7. If the United States wishes to help, the best thing it can do is to persuade the Chinese Government to open negotiations with Japan. As soon as there is some indication that such negotiations will be acceptable to the Chinese Government Mr. Hirota would send a representative to Shanghai to talk with a representative of the Chinese Government either in public or in strict secrecy as the Chinese Government might wish. (Mr. Hirota, having mentioned the continued presence of the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, I took this occasion to inquire whether diplomatic channels would not therefore exist which could be utilized along the lines of Mr. Hirota’s suggestion. Mr. Hirota merely assented that these channels did exist but made no further comment thereon.)

8. When Mr. Hirota had finished the foregoing statement, I repeated it to him, point by point, and inquired whether I had correctly understood everything that he had said. The Minister assented. I said that I would promptly report the conversation to Washington. I then said to the Minister that I hoped that he would do his best to prevent the Japanese press from publishing unconfirmed rumors concerning the attitude of the United States and, in any case, that he would endeavor to calm such adverse press reactions against the United States as might occur, especially until my Government’s reaction to our present conversation had been ascertained. The Minister replied that he agreed with me as to the importance of this and that he would do his best.

J[oseph] C. G[rew]