Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/10668

First Report Adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on October 6, 1937⁵⁰

October 6, 1937

The Sub-Committee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchuria affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan, which, since March 28th, 1935, is no longer a member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are in conflict.

It has, accordingly, been possible—in the time available to trace the main development of events—to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

I

At the beginning of July 1937, there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 (and its annexes), concluded between China and the Powers having legations at Peking. Under these Agreements, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the legations quarter at Peking and to occupy twelve specified points^* for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. Under the terms of a supplementary Agreement of July 15th–18th, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had “the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc. … without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of feux de guerre”.

The Powers other than Japan which at present^† maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking), and certain of the points specified in the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, only have very small detachments there. The number of British troops stationed in North China at the beginning of July this year was 1,007; that figure includes the 252 members of the Legation guard. Similarly, the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei varies between 1,700 and 1,900, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin. The rest are divided among the garrisons of Shan-hai-Kuan, Chin-wang tao, Tongku and Peking, the detachment in the latter town forming the Embassy guard. At present, the total strength of those troops is 1,600 men and 60 officers; the Embassy guard consists of 120 men.

In addition to the events and developments in Manchuria and Jehol, Japan’s political activity in North China, the presence of Japanese effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other Powers, and the frequency of their exercises and manoeuvres^‡ disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7th last an incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which was the occasion from which flow the Japanese army’s present operations in Northern China.

This initial incident occurred at Loukouchiao, thirteen kilometres to the south-west of Peiping (Peking), between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night manoeuvres in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

According to the Japanese version, it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire; a temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8th by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities—this was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident; the Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops; this aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered vain the agreement^§ concluded on July 11th for the settlement of the incident by the Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other.

According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops which were carrying out manoeuvres in the night of July 7th asked permission to enter Wanping (Loukouchiao) in order to make investigations; this having been refused, Wanping (Loukouchiao) was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery; the Chinese garrison resisted; the situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the Wanping (Loukouchiao) zone, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping; the Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement; moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while these discussions between local authorities for local settlement were going on, and while communications were passing between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, the former insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12th, according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese Air Force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7th, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops towards the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31st, 1933,⁵¹ and the Umezu-Ho-Ying-ching Agreement of June 10th, 1935, an agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with Central China. A new Government which favoured the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-yuen through Kalgan and Ta-tung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some 80 kilometres north-west of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into Inner Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. By the declarations of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokio, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, the Government and the people of China were led to the conclusion that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

They were confirmed in this conviction, when at the end of the second Week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

It will be remembered that, in 1932, the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, of which Article II stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this Agreement. The Chinese delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement, declared in particular that it was understood that “nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory”.

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

“… on August 9th, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito, of the landing party, were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

“Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

“Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city.”

After describing the efforts of the Powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, M. Hirota said that “in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive”.

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government’s statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows:

“One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men’s attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings.”

Recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese Delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the Agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words:

“Within less than forty-eight hours, Japan concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident.”

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July, the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of 38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over 100,000 men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action, not only in the Yangtse valley, where, inter alia, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior, where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and the cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to co-operate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk.^‖

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its resolution of September 27th, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this resolution.^¶

II

For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extra-territorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose—namely, the Final Protocol of September 7th, 1901, the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928, to which may be added the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907,^** which has a somewhat different character. There are, in addition to these, an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact terms, the scope, the interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above.

Under the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, and annexed instruments, Japan, together with certain other Powers, is entitled to station troops at certain points in the province of Hopei, along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, for the purpose of keeping open communications between the legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops “will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of feux de guerre”.

Under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed, inter alia, to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government. The contracting Powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which, in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the contracting Powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928, the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be, which might arise among them, should never be sought except by pacific means.

III

Prima facie, the events described in the first part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is prima facie inconsistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and also with the obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China, of whatever origin or character, except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defence (including the defence of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan’s treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the Parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the President of the Executive Yuan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech made on July 17th, 1937, in which he emphasised that national existence and international co-existence were the twin aims of the external policy of the Chinese National Government. … China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand, she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movements and activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution could be sought. These points were:

(1) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China’s sovereign rights and territorial integrity;

(2) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed;

(3) The removal of the provincial officers appointed by the Central Government, … through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and

(4) No restrictions should be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Route Army.

In the memorandum presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 19th, the Chinese Government “renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on a date to be agreed upon by both parties”. It also unequivocally stated that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration.

The general attitude of the Japanese Government towards the dispute was set forth in a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister on July 27th, when, in answer to a question in the Diet, he said:

“Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever in China. If she had such designs as the Chinese professed, the army might already have occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the Powers realise this. Japan wants Chinese co-operation, not Chinese territory. By co-operation, I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far-Eastern culture and prosperity.”

In his speech before the Diet of September 5th, M. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that the policy of the Japanese Government had been one of local settlement and non-aggravation and that the Japanese Government had exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution.

On September 15th, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office declared that the Japanese Government, in accordance with the policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, had done everything to arrive at a speedy settlement.

Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localised and a pacific solution found. This result, however, proved unattainable.

It is noteworthy that Japanese official statements declare that it was the movements of Chinese troops and the aggressive intentions of the Chinese Government which frustrated the pacific intentions of the Japanese Government. Chinese official statements, on the other hand, bring exactly the same charge against Japan—namely, that it is the invasion of Japanese troops and the aggressive intentions of the Japanese Government that have swelled a local incident into a great catastrophe.

At a comparatively early stage, it began to appear that Japan, in addition to reaching a local settlement, was also determined to obtain a settlement of all the questions at issue between China and Japan.

On the evening of July 11th, a statement prepared at the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. The effect of the statement was that, though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, the Japanese Government intended to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to that region.

On July 27th, Prince Konoye made a speech in which the following statement occurred:

“I think that not only must problems with China be settled locally but also we must go a step farther and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations.”

M. Hirota said in the Diet on September 5th that “it is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilisation of relations between Japan, ‘Manchukuo’ and China, for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilised her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilisation by force of arms. … We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defence as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China), so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways. … The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army, so that it may lose completely its will to fight.”

On the Chinese side, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement on July 30th, containing the following observations:

“The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum four conditions laid down by me for the settlement of the Loukouchiao affair are unalterable. It is out of the question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we could still consider the situation of Peiping and Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the North or to set up another pupper government there. The only course open to us now is to lead the masses of the nation, under a single national plan, to struggle to the last. In short, the Government’s policy vis-à-vis Japanese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It is to preserve China’s territorial integrity and political independence.”

The Japanese Government has on a number of occasions stated its desire for a peaceful settlement and for harmonious co-operation between Japan and China. It has, however, insisted throughout that this result must be achieved by China and Japan alone, without any interference from third parties. Thus, in reply to a suggestion in the Budget Committee of July 29th that the Governments should make a firm statement to forestall the intervention of third Powers, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did not anticipate intervention, and that were any such proposals to be made, the Government would not fail to reject them.

Further, in his telegram of September 25th declining the Advisory Committee’s invitation to take part in its work, M. Hirota declared that as regards the settlement of the present affair the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

As regards the attitude of China, reference may be made to the statements made by the Assembly and the Committee by the Chinese Delegation. There seems no reason to doubt that the memorandum of July 19th, which has already been quoted, continues to represent the policy of the Chinese Government.

IV

Conclusions

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it is in contravention of Japan’s obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

50. This text of the “First Report of the Sub-Committee of the Far-East Advisory Committee adopted by the Committee on October 5th, 1937,” is reprinted from League of Nations document, A.78.1937.VII, Geneva, October 5, 1937. Footnotes designated throughout by symbols appear in the original.
51. The points are Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Tang-tsun, Tientsin, Chunliang Ch’eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch’in-wang tao, Shanhai kuan.
52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having from 1924 onwards given up Russia’s right to maintain troops in China in virtue of the 1901 Protocol, now keeps no military contingent there.
53. In point of fact, the Japanese Embassy guard carried out manoeuvres every summer in the country to the west of Peking. The other foreign guards do not seem to have been in the habit of engaging in manoeuvres in the strict sense of the term; they confined themselves to musketry exercises on the rifle-range and route-marches in the country-side.

54. This Japanese version is to be found in the dispatches of the Domei Newsagency. The agreement of July 11th consisted of three points:

    (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible;

    (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Loukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese;

    (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

51. See p. 120.

52. On August 25th, 1937, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces, published the following proclamation at Shanghai:

    “A blockade of the Chinese coasts from 32°4′ North and 121°44′ East to 23° 14′ North and 116°48′ East on and after 6 p.m., on August 25th, against Chinese vessels, is hereby proclaimed.

    “Vessels of a third party and also Japanese vessels are free to pass the blockaded area.”

    On September 5th, the Tokio Navy Office announced that, from noon of that day, the entire coast of China would be closed to Chinese vessels. The port of Tsingtao and the leased territories of third Powers are excluded.

53. The Assembly, at its meeting of September 30th, adopted a report of the Sixth Committee whereby the said Committee, having heard a statement from the Chinese delegate, urged that in armed conflicts artistic monuments and cultural institutions representing the high-water mark of civilizations should be spared.
54. China and Japan have signed and ratified the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907. Under Article i of that Convention, the contracting Powers, “with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States”, agreed “to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences”. The Convention recommends recourse, according to the case, to mediation, arbitration, or international commissions of inquiry.