793.94/10157
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
Called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs by appointment at his official residence at 5 o’clock.
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Tsingtao
The Minister then handed me his written reply accompanied by an official translation37 to the note which I had written and delivered to the Foreign Office on August 23, appealing for the avoidance of Japanese military operations in Tsingtao where many Americans and other foreigners are gathered. He said that practically all the Japanese residents in Tsingtao had now been evacuated and that this step had been taken for the specific purpose of avoiding hostilities and injury to foreign lives and property, but that since the evacuation there had been much looting of Japanese property by the Chinese and the Japanese Consul General and such other Japanese as had had to remain behind were in serious danger. The attitude of the Mayor of Tsingtao was far from satisfactory. The Minister said that he therefore hoped that the Powers which were now appealing to him would also make representations in Nanking with a view to restraining Chinese aggression and protecting Japanese lives and property in that city. I said that I would bring the matter to the attention of my Government and Ambassador Johnson.
[Page 360]Sino-Soviet Relations
The Minister then turned to Sino-Soviet relations and said that the Chinese Ambassador had yesterday explained to him the nature of the recently concluded Sino-Soviet Pact. Two attempts on my part to draw him out as to the nature of the pact were unsuccessful. The Minister said that it seemed to him unfortunate that the Soviet Union and China, which could have concluded this pact at any time during recent years, had chosen this particular moment and situation to do so. He said he felt that there was grave danger of the communists getting control in China, that Chiang Kai-shek was weak and that the virile young men of the nation were at the front where they were fighting most bravely. In the meantime some 20,000 communist troops were moving towards Outer Mongolia. He felt that the communist menace was very real and that the communists undoubtedly aim to take over eventual complete control of the Government and country.
Outlook for Peace
The Minister then said that he had explained Japan’s precise aims to the Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Hirota said to me, “if Chiang Kai-shek will accept these conditions I can stop the war immediately”. These conditions, he said, are three in number: (1) Good relations with Manchuria. I said does that mean China’s recognition of “Manchukuo”. Mr. Hirota replied that juridical recognition might be very difficult for China and that it was not necessary. What Japan desired was good factual relations and the avoidance of the constant friction and trouble which China was creating. I said, “Then do you mean de facto recognition?” The Minister smiled and said he thought that that was about it. He wanted China to recognize “Manchukuo’s” existence. (2) The withdrawal of Chinese troops from North China. If the Chinese troops should withdraw from that area Mr. Hirota said that most of the Japanese troops would likewise withdraw. They simply wanted to ensure a zone of peace and quiet on the frontier of “Manchukuo”. I said, “Does that mean Japanese control of North China?” The Minister said, “No, it does not,” and he added that Japan visualized no political control but merely a state of peace and quiet. (3) The development of good relations between China and Japan. I asked him if by this he meant a cessation of anti-Japanese activities and propaganda. He replied that this was precisely what Japan wanted. “Chiang Kai-shek is weak” he said, “and he is in a very difficult position. If China possessed a single strong statesman today our troubles could be quickly solved. If Chiang Kai-shek will accept my conditions I can stop the war immediately.”