Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on August 17, 1937

August 17, 1937

The Secretary, at his press conference this afternoon, announced that Congress was being asked for an appropriation of $500,000 for the emergency relief and evacuation expenses necessitated by the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary said that the Government of the United States had been repeatedly urging the Governments of Japan and China not to conduct military operations or establish military bases in the Shanghai area. Furthermore since some outbreaks had occurred, the Government of the United States and some other governments had very earnestly expressed the opinion to both of the Governments involved that both alike would be considered responsible by the nations of the world for any hurtful or destructive or serious military activities that take place in the Shanghai area. The Secretary explained that this was in some respects an unusual locality, a great city with a population of three million in and about it, built up more or less by the nationals of many countries of the world, as well as by China, and that for destructive or major or serious military activities to be instituted there or carried on would be calculated to result in unthinkable injuries and dangers both to persons and property, and that there could not be any justification for military activities there.

On August 16 Admiral Yarnell, in command of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, requested that 1,200 marines located at San Diego be sent to Shanghai. The Secretary said that it would require perhaps ten days for the preliminary preparations and would be about five weeks before they could reach Shanghai. Of course, he continued, we were hopeful that by that time there would be no real need for these marines at Shanghai. They might be needed for relief and the replacement of those located there at present, because of the strain on them of keeping guard over an indefinite period of time. The question might, in the judgment of some, come up as to why we should have any guards over there, or why we should send additional forces over there at this time. The Secretary said that it would be recalled that for some time past China had not had, in parts of the country, that full measure of political stability that it once had, and that it was steadily approaching now. The result had been the Boxer attack on the Legations in 1900, and when, in 1912, another outbreak occurred, all the Governments having nationals over there sent additional guards. It was at that time that we had sent a regiment to Tientsin. In 1927 there had been an extreme nationalistic movement, and the United States chartered a ship and sent from San Diego to Shanghai a regiment of marines. In 1932 we had had some similar experiences over there, as had other governments and other nations. Several countries had substantial numbers of nationals in this area.

The question of what degree of protection, if any, this Government, as a policy, proposed to give its nationals abroad under given circumstances, the Secretary said, was one that was more or less misunderstood, and perhaps one about which some people might differ either in degree or in toto. He said that as far as this Government was concerned, the general and very definite principles governing normal and ordinary international relationships were embodied in a statement he had issued to the press on July 16 and he thought that more than fifty governments definitely and in writing had expressed their approval of those principles. We, of course, stood on them so far as our general relationships with other nations were concerned. In this connection we sought at all times to promote and safeguard our standing and our influence from every standpoint of human progress and human welfare, and to promote desirable relations—economic, educational, social, cultural, political—with all other nations.

Whenever American nationals in any part of the world might be denied equal protection of laws in countries where they were, or were being unfairly treated, the Secretary said that this Government came to their assistance by making earnest representations under international law as it is universally recognized, and in support of the reasonable and rightful claims of our nationals. This applied to every square foot of the world’s surface. But, he continued, we always undertook to carry forward this policy of cooperative international relations peacefully, and in a manner mutually acceptable and mutually advantageous. The question of force was entirely out of mind. In the case of Spain the United States had sent its vessels to any and every port, and where necessary had assembled its nationals who desired to escape from danger and had carried them to places of safety, or at least away from immediate danger zones.

In countries where mob violence, or violence of disordered and unorganized groups, constituting no part of any organized military force of any government, was likely to sweep across thickly populated localities, it had been the policy of the United States to send vessels to remove its nationals from danger zones. For the purpose of dealing with special conditions such as the Secretary had referred to, the United States had had guards at three points in China, just as several other governments had guards in the same places, to protect nationals against mob movements or from violence on the part of any disorganized group or groups of persons. The Secretary said he thought that was thoroughly understood. All the nations having nationals in that area were in harmony with each other so far as protecting international areas allotted to the nationals of foreign countries as a place of safety was concerned, especially at times of threatened violence. There was no occasion for any clash between organized military forces of any country; any differences that might arise among them would be referred back to the capitals of their respective governments’ It was solely to protect nationals against the kind of disorders referred to that this and other countries had had guards stationed at these three points in China.

The Secretary said that we naturally found ourselves in between two extreme views. One was the view of extreme internationalism, which rested upon an idea of political commitments. We kept entirely away from that in our thoughts and views and policies, just as we sought, on the other hand, to keep entirely away from the extreme nationalists who would tell all Americans that they must stay here at home and that if they went abroad anywhere for any purpose—tourist, urgent business, or otherwise—and trouble overtook them and violence threatened, they must not expect any protection from their government. We could today order our guards to walk out of Shanghai and leave our 3,000 and more nationals who had not yet escaped to the mercy of a mob that was actually reported as threatening danger there today. That would mean that we would leave the British guards and the French guards and the guards of other nationals who were there, as were ours, on legitimate business in this great metropolitan city, to protect their nationals and ours while we moved out lock, stock and barrel and hastened back to within the water’s edge of this country. That viewpoint meant in the first place that we could very easily, by our own action, create the definite impression in the mind of every other government in the world that we would get out gradually, from this time forward, in toto, and then it would be found that Americans who were left behind there, as well as Americans in every part of the world, would probably be insulted with impunity by any and every nation.

The apprehension was arising, the Secretary said, that somebody might get hurt if our nationals did not get out immediately and stay out. Of course, something like that might occur, and in fact had occurred within the last forty-eight hours. We were a nation of 130,000,000 people, the Secretary continued. We had nationals in every part of the world, living their lives abroad and at the same time proud of their home country and their contacts with it. It was not our purpose in any sense, in our efforts to protect our nationals against mob and other similar kinds of violence, to overlook a single thing that would contribute to the fullest understanding with every other government, and among all the diplomatic and consular representatives of each government on the ground, as well as the various commandants of their guards. We in no sense contemplated any belligerent attitude toward anybody as regards the orderly functioning of the diplomatic and consular services of all the governments concerned, or so far as the organized troops or guards of any government are concerned. On the other hand, we frankly did not feel disposed, by leaning back too far the other way, to give other countries a chance to suppose or to suggest that we were cowardly. If we wanted to be insulted fifty times a week, we only needed to let the impression be gained that we did not protect our nationals and that in no circumstances would we be disposed to protect them.

The Secretary said he was trying to avoid both the extremes he had previously described. Our policies were intended to reduce to the very minimum the occurrence of undesirable experiences on the part of this Government in its foreign affairs, or of any experiences that would in the least be calculated to lead to misunderstanding or ill feeling as between us and other governments. Whether this middle course was the wisest and most practical was for the country to judge. We at least, the Secretary said, stood for these policies and for their application in the manner he had indicated, and for protection of our nationals under the circumstances and to the specific extent that he had described. It was for this reason this Government was, as a matter of precaution, ordering 1,200 marines to make preparations to sail for Shanghai. Of course, at any time if the threatened danger or real occasion for assistance there should disappear, they could be notified on the high seas by wireless to turn back.

The Secretary said that there could be no more perfect illustration of the need for foreign guards in China than the situation now existing. The most exhaustive plans for the maximum protection of our nationals against whatever disorders might arise were worked out by the various ambassadors, consular officers, military, naval and commercial attachés in cooperation with the commandants of the guards of each nation. When uprisings and mob violence were apparent or imminent, the Department of State sent out special instructions regarding every phase of the precautions to be taken or steps toward perfecting the protection of our nationals. The protection included warning our nationals in advance to leave the danger zones, and protection by the guards when they were proceeding to ports, such as Tientsin or Shanghai. From day to day, almost from hour to hour, these officials of ours, who had had the widest experience in the Far East and in dealing with conditions of this kind, were in conference with a view to meeting every emergency as it arose, and of course the Department could not give them instructions on such matters at this distance. They were the ones, the Secretary said, who knew exactly from what direction danger threatened, when our nationals should get out, when to order them out, and we left the question of immediate action to them while the emergency lasted.