793.94/9432: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 16—3:18 p.m.]
272. Department’s 146, August 13, midnight, and 149, August 14, 10 p.m.29
1. This afternoon I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence and handed to him an informal note the text of which is set forth in paragraph 8 of this telegram.
2. The situation today at Shanghai is such that, whatever the contributory causes, the Japanese Government is now confronted equally with neutral governments with the problem of protecting the lives of great numbers of their nationals at Shanghai. Even if neutral governments were prepared to assume by delegation responsibility for protection of Japanese nationals, it is not to be expected in the present state of affairs that the Japanese Government would be willing to delegate such responsibility. The Chinese bombings have of course rendered the situation infinitely more difficult and the probability of any Japanese [initiative] towards withdrawal seems hardly to be expected.
3. Nevertheless, realizing the profoundly grave aspects of the present situation, [I] availed myself of the authorization granted me in the last paragraph of Department’s 149. My note was formulated in such language as would, in our opinion, hold out some perhaps slender prospect of a solution.
4. In my conversation with the Minister I spoke to him of your grave concern over the safety of American nationals in Shanghai and of your feeling that the only way of now avoiding more serious destruction and possible loss of life was for the withdrawal of one or both combatants. I also told him of what had been done in Shanghai. [Page 348] I then read to him my informal note, pausing to render completely clear and to emphasize each separate point.
5. The Minister listened carefully and courteously and then said that he knew of the approach by the foreign consuls to the Japanese but he had not heard of their approach to the Chinese. He deeply regretted the loss of American life. He said that the Japanese Consulate General had been bombed today and that two persons therein had been seriously injured. He mentioned the Japanese decision to send reenforcements. I asked him whether these reenforcements could not be withheld until adequate time had been afforded for consideration and action on the proposals of the consuls and urged the great importance of such delay. The Minister said that these decisions now lay exclusively in the hands of Admiral Hasegawa.
6. The Minister referred to his previous comment concerning the Kawagoe–Kao conversations and to Kao’s promise to return to Shanghai with Nanking’s reply. Hirota added significantly that Kao had not returned.
7. The Minister said that Hidaka and other Japanese Embassy officials in Nanking had requested the consuls [American Navy] for transportation to some safe spot. He emphasized the fact that this does not constitute a breach of diplomatic relations and that Hidaka will probably eventually go to Shanghai to join Kawagoe.
Following is the text of my informal note:
8: “Tokyo, August 16, 1937. My Dear Minister: The initiation at Shanghai of hostilities between armed Japanese and Chinese forces has given rise on the part of my Government, which had looked forward with lively hope to a speedy adjustment of matters at issue between the Governments of Japan and of China, to a feeling of alarm over the safety of the lives and property of its nationals residing in Shanghai. I make no reference on this occasion to the broader issues over which controversy has arisen between the two powers with which the United States has long maintained ties of friendship: I now refer to the incalculable hazards to which combat operations at Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese forces are subjecting American nationals along with other nationals in no way involved in the creation of the military situation now existing in that area.
My colleague in Nanking has expressed to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope that some means may be found whereby the two Governments may get together and bring about a cessation of hostilities in the neighborhood of Shanghai, a hope which I earnestly share. My Government has urged upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. The important issue at the present moment is not a question of determining the initial responsibility for the outbreak, but there can be no doubt that if the Shanghai region continues to be made the theatre of battle, neither side can divest itself of responsibility.
There now appears to be but one hope of averting further destruction [destructive] and dangerous military operations at Shanghai, and [Page 349] that lies in the withdrawal by one or both sides of its armed forces from Shanghai and from the environs of that city. The dangers imposed upon noncombatants of all nations and upon their property are so great that my Government feels warranted in entertaining the confident hope that the Japanese Government will contribute toward restoration of conditions of peace in and around Shanghai by giving speedy and favorable consideration to plans, of which Your Excellency is no doubt aware, calculated to bring about cessation of hostilities in the concerned area, that have been formulated by representatives at Shanghai of the interested powers.
I am, my dear Minister, with high respect, sincerely yours, Joseph C. Grew.”
Repeated to Nanking.
- Neither printed.↩