861.77 Chinese Eastern/426
Manifesto of the Chinese Government on the Sino-Soviet Situation3
The authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria unearthed on the 27th of May, 1929, a dastardly plot within the Soviet Consulate-General at Harbin to overthrow the National Government and destroy the Chinese Eastern Railway. In pursuance of the Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924, the said authorities began to adopt on the 11th of July, 1929, necessary precautionary measures for the protection of the said railway. Circumstances leading to the above state of affairs were set forth in a manifesto of the National Government on 19th July, 1929,4 together with a statement showing how the Soviet Government had juggled with the actual facts, how it had misrepresented the true intent contained in China’s reply [Page 334] of the 17th of July, 1929, to the Soviet communications, and how it had brought about the present critical situation. In addition, the manifesto invited the attention of the friendly powers to the incriminating evidence of Soviet overt acts and attempts to conduct propaganda and create trouble within Chinese territory and declared that the National Government would nevertheless persevere in its effort to preserve peace and live up to the spirit of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War.
Having been apprised by the Soviet Consul-General in Harbin, Mr. Melnikoff, that his Government was prepared to settle the dispute independently with China, the National Government in accordance with its reply of July 17th instructed Mr. Chu Shao-Yang, then embarking for Moscow to assume his post as Chargé d’Affaires, to proceed to Manchuli to meet the Soviet representative. Upon Mr. Chu’s arrival, the Soviet government failed to appoint such a representative.
The Soviet Ambassador in Germany next expressed the desire to open direct negotiations. Having informally secured the assent of both parties in advance, the German Government suggested the following formula in the form of a joint statement for the settlement of the dispute.
- 1.
- Both parties are prepared to settle all the outstanding questions
in accordance with the Sino–Soviet agreements of 1924, particularly
the Chinese Eastern Railway questions in accordance with Article IX,
paragraph 2, which reads as follows:
“The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the Railway.”
- 2.
- Both parties agree to readjust the conditions prevailing in the Chinese Eastern Railway since the inception of the dispute in accordance with the agreements of 1924 on the one hand between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, on the other, between the governments of the autonomous Three Eastern Provinces and Soviet Russia. Such readjustments shall be however first agreed upon at a conference of the two plenipotentiary delegates.
- 3.
- The Soviet Government may recommend new Manager and Assistant
Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, who shall be appointed by
the Board of Directors of the said Railway. The Soviet Government
shall instruct its nationals employed on said Railway to observe
faithfully the provisions of Article VI of the agreements of 1924,
which reads as follows:
[Page 335]
“The Government of the two contracting parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories, the existence and/or activities of any organization or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either contracting party.”
- 4.
- Both parties shall forthwith release the prisoners arrested or detained in connection with the dispute.
On the 27th of August, 1929, the above formula was formally submitted to both sides. The Soviet Government repudiated its previous assent and declined to accept it. Instead it insisted that, in clause 3 of the above formula, the word “new” shall be deleted and the word “immediately” inserted before “recommend”. Moreover it declared that the Manager should be appointed simultaneously with the joint statement and that the two Governments should simultaneously instruct their nationals to observe the provisions of the abovecited Article VI.
The National Government took note of this breach of faith on the part of the Soviet Government and rejoined as follows:
- 1.
- The National Government having repeatedly indicated its readiness to negotiate with the Soviet Government for an equitable settlement, it is exceedingly happy to note that the Soviet Government is prepared to issue a joint statement. It therefore declares its perfect agreement with Soviet Government’s proposal that negotiations be commenced speedily for a permanent solution of all the outstanding questions.
- 2.
- While the National Government has no objection to the proposed insertion of the word “immediately” before “recommend” it cannot accede to the proposition that the appointment of a new Manager shall be a condition precedent to the signing of a joint statement or the commencement of formal negotiations between the two plenipotentiary delegates. This latter proposition will be inconsistent with clause 2 of the formula already accepted by the Soviet Government.
- 3.
- If further amendments are desired by the Soviet Government, they may be left to the two plenipotentiary delegates, and the latter decision will be endorsed by the National Government.
The Soviet Government refused to yield and declared that the failure of the National Government to agree to its counter-proposal, which must be accepted as condition precedent to the commencement of formal negotiations, would be taken to mean that China had of its own accord withdrawn the original proposition and made up its mind not to settle the dispute at all.
Undeterred by repeated rebuffs to its untiring efforts at conciliation, the National Government explored every reasonable and honourable avenue for reaching an agreement. On the 9th of October, 1929, on receipt of a suggestion from the German Government that there [Page 336] might be mutual exchange of prisoners by way of easing the situation and facilitating peaceful settlement, the National Government pointed out that such a suggestion was included in the proposed joint statement agreed upon by the Soviet Government, and consequently could be effected simultaneously with the joint statement as long as the Soviet Government was sincere. The German Government concurred. Thereupon the proposed joint statement already adopted was revised to include provisions in favour of the mutual appointment of plenipotentiary delegates to settle all outstanding questions and readjust the prevailing conditions of the Chinese Eastern Railway in accordance with the agreements of 1924, respectively, for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions and the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the mutual exchange of prisoners and the discontinuance of military movements along the Sino-Soviet borders in order to accommodate the wishes of both parties.
On the other hand, the Soviet Government formally rejected the German suggestion for the exchange of prisoners on the pretext that China had no intention to respect its treaty obligations. In addition the German Ambassador in Moscow was given to understand that no Soviet national would be permitted to negotiate with the National Government, nor would mediation by any third parties be accepted, unless the demands contained in Mr. Karakhan’s communication were first complied with.
Since the National Government is unable to persuade the Soviet Government to come to an amicable settlement, it is constrained to invite the attention of the world to the numerous acts of aggression perpetrated by the Soviet Government within Chinese territory. There was no formal declaration of war and the aggressions were perpetrated while responsible spokesmen on both sides were consulting a third party and striving to reach an agreement. Notwithstanding contrary reports fabricated by Soviet propagandists, no Chinese soldier, or aeroplane or war vessel has crossed the frontier or invaded Soviet territory. On the other hand, it was the Soviet side that commenced the offensive, while hostilities always occurred within Chinese territory. If any Chinese gun had been fired, it was fired in self-protection. If the invader could not be dissuaded from crossing into Chinese territory, attacks were at least repelled effectively.
The National Government must therefore hold the Soviet Government responsible for all the losses and damages caused to Chinese life and property. And if a state of war should eventuate from the Soviet Government’s incessant provocation, the responsibility for violating the peace of the Far East must be borne by the Soviet Government.