861.77 Chinese Eastern/273
The British Ambassador (Howard) to
the Secretary of State
Washington, August 26, 1929.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: In accordance with your
wish I enclose herewith copy of the telegram which I have despatched to
the Foreign Office today regarding our conversations of this morning and
this afternoon.
Yours very truly,
[Page 305]
[Enclosure]
Copy of Telegram From the British
Ambassador (Howard) to the British Foreign Office on August 26,
1929
Secretary of State told me this morning that reports of military
preparations by Russia against China were causing him and the
President the most serious concern. The President felt that
something should be done to maintain the sanctity of the Kellogg
Pact which, if Russia, one of the signatories thereto, were now to
violate it, would clearly lose much of its weight and importance in
the opinion of the world on which it really rested. The question was
what should be done? He understood that when he originally proposed
suggesting to both parties a procedure similar to that adopted in
the Bolivia Paraguay dispute, other governments felt that the moment
was not ripe as Russia and China seemed to be getting together. Now,
however, the situation was very threatening and he would like to
know whether His Majesty’s Government did not agree that some action
was not required in order to avert if possible a great disaster for
which, if they remained passive, original signatories of the Kellogg
Pact might be blamed. The situation as he saw it was this. The
Chinese Government by expelling Russian Officials of the Eastern
Railway had committed a first offence and by refusing the Russian
preliminary conditions for negotiations that Russian officials
should be reinstated according to Treaty, they had committed a
second, but; neither of these would justify Russia, who had declared
herself determined under the Kellogg Pact to renounce war and settle
all disputes by peaceful means, in resorting to arms. It seemed
therefore to the Secretary of State that if China were to offer not
indeed to reinstate the late Russian Manager and other officials who
were under the imputation of having abused their position, but to
permit other Russians, who are not under suspicion, to take up these
appointments, Russia would be certainly condemned by world opinion
if she resorted to war and it would then be open for the signatories
of the Pact to discuss what further measures should be taken. In any
case, however, world opinion on which the Kellogg Pact rested would
have been definitely mobilized against the country which first
committed an act of war. Secretary of State was very anxious to have
your views.
Since writing the above the Secretary of State has informed me that
he had just received encouraging reports tending to show that China
seemed inclined to be less intransigeant and
to offer to reinstate Russian officials though not the same ones. He
had also heard that negotiations had been begun in Berlin.
Nevertheless he would be very glad to have your views on points
above referred to in case these reports do not turn out to be
correct.
