861.77 Chinese Eastern/259
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at my request and I had a long talk with him on the subject of the Chinese-Russian situation. I asked him if he could tell me what he had heard from his Government in regard to our former discussion on July 25.70 He told me that he had only had a telegram to the effect that they thought that no answer to my aide memoire71 was necessary because the conferences between China and Russia immediately commenced and also because they feared that the two nations, particularly Russia, would resent any suggestion of a neutral manager of the railroad. He said that Russia felt so alone and separated from every one else that his Government felt she would resent any outside mediation.
We then discussed the historical situation, working it out in the course of a long conversation. I told him I had sent for him not with the idea of having any message sent to his Government but to get such views and information as he could give me in working out my own opinion as to a difficult situation. I told him that it looked now as if Russia was making up her mind toward the eventuality of war; that this course might be wrong but that it was the sum total of the news which we could gather from both ends of the line, not only from our representatives in Manchuria but from the reports of observations picked up in regard to the attitude of Moscow both from the press and from statements of our representatives in surrounding countries, particularly Germany and France. In summing up the actions of the two parties, we agreed (1) that China had been guilty of an initial wrong in her action toward the railroad; (2) she had been also wrong in afterwards refusing to make amends and restoring the status quo, but (3) that neither of these actions would justify an act of war upon China, particularly after she had solemnly sworn in the Kellogg Pact to settle such controversies only by pacific means. I told him of my efforts through Wu to persuade China to make amends. Sir Esme suggested that if Russia should go to war and invade Manchuria, particularly if China could be persuaded to offer to restore the status quo, Russia would be so clearly in the wrong that it would probably be easy to eventually rally public [Page 304] opinion of the other nations of the world to put an embargo on trade with her and thus check her military operations. I asked him if there was any way by which, without formality but in the manner which he and I had discussed here, we could find out whether his Government felt as we did on the three propositions above and if they had any suggestions as to what we could do in the situation, particularly in regard to getting China to take any step which would clarify the situation. He finally said that he would try to draft a message for his Government and bring it around to me this evening about 3:30 to see whether I had any suggestions or corrections to make in it.