Henry L. Stimson Private Papers
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador came today and told me that he wished to offer the views of his Government verbally and that they should be considered verbal although for the sake of easier mutual communication he had written them out himself and he asked that they be treated as verbal and confidential. He then handed me a paper which reads as follows:
“The Japanese Government deeply appreciate the suggestion made by the Secretary of State with a view to bringing about an amicable solution of the pending controversy between China and the Soviet Union. They are sincerely willing to cooperate with the United States and other interested Powers in any move that may lead to the desired end. It only remains for them to consider whether the suggested plan of a Commission of Conciliation may be reasonably expected to secure acceptance by the two parties in dispute.
[Page 260]“All official reports which have been reaching Tokio from various sources tend to strengthen the impression that both China and the Soviet Union are anxious to compose their differences relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway by direct negotiations between themselves.
“If the Japanese Government are correctly informed, neither side is likely to welcome any initiative of a third Power or a group of third Powers,—still less any participation by the Governments or nationals,—in the settlement of the present difficulty. It is particularly apprehended that the plan under which a national of a third Power is to be appointed, however temporarily, as President and general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, or to take part in the machinery for conciliation, will be resented both in China and in the Soviet Union.
“Should the plan in question be rejected by either or both of the two contending parties, the Powers will find themselves in a peculiarly embarrassing position. It is presumed that none of the Powers have any intention of exercising material and effective pressure upon the unwilling parties to force acceptance of the plan. The Japanese Government, while deeply impressed with the fair and disinterested motives of the suggestion made by the Secretary of State, are unable to dismiss from their mind the possibility of unfavourable reaction which the proposed measure of the Powers may produce in China and in the Soviet Union.
“In this situation, they desire to be informed whether the reports in the possession of the American Government are of such a nature as to put at rest the apprehension now entertained by the Japanese Government, and what further action the Secretary of State has in contemplation, in the event of the plan under review being rejected by either or both of the two parties.
“The Japanese Government, most directly interested in the preservation of peace in the Far East, have been watching with profound anxiety the development of the issues between China and the Soviet Union. Fortunately recent reports at hand are more reassuring, and the actual situation does not seem to call for any immediate action on the part of the Powers.”
I told him after I had read the statement that I appreciated it and was grateful for the friendliness and the frankness of Japan in this situation. I recalled to him that last Thursday when I presented my views to the four ambassadors and the German Chargé that I had made it very clear that this suggestion was not in the nature of a mediation by any power or group of powers, but was intended as a suggestion of what was to be voluntary action by China and Russia; that the neutral national whose appointment was suggested in the aide memoire, to be chosen not by the neutral countries but by Russia and China themselves. He said he understood that perfectly. I told him my Government had decided to make this suggestion only in case China and Russia seemed to be unable to get together through negotiation by their own efforts and that on the morning of last Thursday after [Page 261] I had called the ambassadors when the press despatches indicated the first rumors that Russia and China might get together I had seriously thought of cancelling the call, but I decided to go on with it in view of the fact that these were mere rumors and might prove false. I felt that in such circumstances it was important to have the preliminary consultation so that all of the powers who had been so friendly in the previous consultations over the crisis might be informed of the views of my own Government and we might be informed of theirs, and we thus might be ready in case the need for such a suggestion arose afterwards; that I had made it clear in my aide mémoire that if Russia and China should be able to get together we would be most happy. He said he understood this fully.
I told him that if the negotiations between Russia and China continued to go on I should take no further steps, but should reserve such action for any emergency which might occur on their failure to go on. He said he understood that. We then had a little talk on the recent news. I asked him what his information was and he told me that they had heard that the Russian Consul General at Harbin, Mr. Melnikoff, who had left his post for Russia and had gone across the boundary, had since returned towards Manchuli and that the Chinese diplomatic representative of Foreign Affairs in Manchuria was starting to meet him. His Government thought that this was the beginning of the negotiations and that there was nothing to the report of the proposed Berlin conference. He asked me what my news was from Dr. Wu and I told him of Dr. Wu’s telephone call. As we parted he asked me what our plans were for the future and I told him my plan was to do nothing unless some change in the situation occurred which would make it seem advisable, but that so long as Russia and China seemed to be making progress towards direct negotiation I did not intend to make any suggestion.