Henry L. Stimson Private Papers
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
After the ceremonies at the depositing of the ratification of Japan to the Kellogg Pact, the Japanese Ambassador said that he wanted to see me for a few minutes and asked me whether I had received a personal message from Baron Shidehara which had been sent directly to me instead of through the Embassy. I said that I had and showed to him the telegram of congratulations in regard to the Pact which I had received.
I then showed him a memorandum that I had received from Mr. McDermott16 through the Associated Press Bureau at Tokyo saying: [Page 238]
“Here the Foreign Office categorically denied Japan had been asked to associate herself with the American demarche, and it again emphasized that Japan knew nothing officially regarding the formal diplomatic action on the part of the Washington Government.
“At the same time it was admitted the United States had requested Japan, through Ambassador Debuchi, at Washington, to contribute an expression of opinion as to the best solution of the Chinese Soviet trouble. It was said that the Japanese Government might comply with this request after the return of the Premier from Kyoto.”
I said I hoped that did not mean there was any misunderstanding between his Government and mine. He at once protested that of course there was nothing of that sort and he said that he had at once telegraphed to his Government what I had said to him on Thursday, July 18th, and he said something about the Prime Minister leaving town that day so that he did not receive the message as promptly as he otherwise would, but he said that the whole difficulty arose from the newspaper reporters in Japan who had misrepresented what had been said and also possibly he said from the “slowness of my Government”, i. e., the slowness of his Government in making public its action. He said “you know my Government is very slow”. He added that there was no misunderstanding whatever between them, as his report to me on Monday17 conclusively showed. He said whatever had been intimated as to any disagreement between the two Governments was solely a matter of newspaper report and had no foundation in fact in any attitude of his Government. I repeated to him that of course he knew that I had spoken to him as soon as I had spoken to any of the other representatives of the nations that same day, and he at once acquiesced and said he knew it—“the very same time”, to use his expression; and I said I should be very sorry if any unintentional action on my part had given offense to his Government and he said “not the slightest.”
Throughout the interview he was most friendly and assured me that he had understood me perfectly from the beginning and that his Government understood the whole situation.
In the course of the conversation I referred to the report I had received that “Wang” had seen Shidehara and asked who that Wang was and he said that he is the Chinese Minister at Tokyo. He said that Wang had said to Shidehara that China was on the point of sending two envoys to Russia. I asked whether they had been sent. He said that was left a little doubtful from the Chinese message but he understood they were contemplating sending two and that they had not been sent. I discussed a little with him the question of whether any further steps were in contemplation or could be taken by anybody and he said that he thought the Chinese and Russians were by nature inclined to settle this by themselves. He referred again to the policy [Page 239] of watchful waiting. I spoke of the possible danger of a clash of subordinates on the border and told him that I would feel easier when the parties were sitting down at a table in consultation, mentioning the Paraguayan-Bolivian matter. He agreed. I said I saw difficulties about any nation going in on account of the mutual jealousies. He said he saw that and he agreed with that, but I said that was the advantage of having a commission, like the Bolivian-Paraguayan Commission, which acted as individuals and he said he understood this perfectly.