Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume II

861.77 Chinese Eastern/110: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (MacMurray)

[Paraphrase]

Washington, July 24, 1929—2 p.m.

245. Department’s 241, July 22, 7 p.m. The substance of my conversations with foreign diplomatic representatives here follows:

(1) On July 22 the Chinese Minister, Dr. C. C. Wu, called on me and I asked him if he had had any reply from the Chinese Government regarding what I had said to him. He said two cables had been received, by which he had been informed that his Government had no intention, in removing the Chinese Eastern Railway’s Soviet officials, to “seize” the railroad and that China had taken no hostile action against Russia. Should Russia take hostile action, upon Russia would rest responsibility for the consequences. I pointed out that an unfavorable public opinion had been produced in this country by China’s actions; and that the Chinese Government should be willing to offer leaving the propriety of the action it had taken to impartial mediation. The Chinese Minister replied that there was lacking an international organization, such as the Pan American Union, to act in this case. Any neutral country, I observed, could serve to bring together China and Russia.

(2) On July 22 the French Ambassador, M. Claudel, likewise called and said that M. Briand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had reminded the Chinese Minister at Paris on July 20, in the course of a conversation, of China’s obligations resulting from signing the Pact of Geneva and the Paris Pact. M. Briand had invited the Chinese Government’s attention to the necessity of observing a most, cautious attitude during the present conflict, which, he hoped, would not lead to an armed one, and suggested it would be well for China publicly to proclaim its intention of having recourse to a pacific, arbitral settlement. The Chinese Minister in France promised he would telegraph in this sense to his Government. M. Briand also saw the Soviet Ambassador at Paris, and the latter assured him that the Soviet Government did not wish war but was obliged to adopt measures for its protection following China’s intolerable activities which constituted a violation of engagements made by China. M. Briand observed that the application of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War had been impatiently desired by the Soviet Government, which would find itself to be in a most difficult position should it have recourse to a policy of force. He asked the Soviet Ambassador whether his Government was giving consideration to a settlement through legal means and was told in reply that the Soviet Government has proposed settling the various Sino-Russian difficulties at a conference and that, if China were willing, the dispute would be on the way to a settlement. The French Government’s special interest in a peaceful solution of the dispute was emphasized by M. Briand, who added he was ready to use every means possible to this end. I was told also by M. Claudel that the French Ambassador in Moscow in a telegram had reported that Soviet press articles indicated the preparation of public opinion for an eventual conflict. The danger which might result from the Soviet Government suddenly demonstrating strength in Manchuria, which, if successful, would powerfully influence communist propaganda elsewhere, was pointed out by the French Ambassador in Moscow.

(3) On July 22 the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Debuchi, called and said that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Shidehara, on July 19 had sent for the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, conveying to him a similar message to the one sent by me. The Ambassador emphatically stated that Russia did not wish war, but was preparing merely for self-defense. Russia desired to see a restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the status quo ante. Baron Shidehara called attention to Russia’s promises in the Pact for the Renunciation of War, and the Soviet Ambassador said he understood the pact’s spirit but added that self-defense, necessarily, was excepted from the pact’s obligations. It was suggested to the Russian Ambassador that the dispute with China be settled by friendly means, and he was informed of Japan’s sincere wish for the two countries to meet in the spirit of friendly accommodation. Baron Shidehara on July 19 was informed, during a conversation with the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, of his Government’s discovery of evidence that Russia was directing propaganda against the Government of China and was not carrying out the 1924 agreement. The Chinese Minister stated that China does not wish to make war and is preparing merely for selfdefense. He was informed by Baron Shidehara of Japan’s deep concern, and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs urged consideration by both China and Russia of friendly measures. I was informed by Mr. Debuchi that both the Chinese Minister and the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo had made tentative inquiries of Baron Shidehara as to whether Japan would act as a “bridge” between Russia and China.

(4) On July 23 I sent for the Secretary of the German Embassy, as the German Ambassador was away, and informed him that on July 18 I had taken advantage of its being the diplomatic reception day to speak about the crisis between China and Russia to the representatives of Great Britain, France, Japan, and Italy who had called on me. I said that I pointed out to them the tragedy it would be for two powers signatory to the Pact for the Renunciation of War to go to war when the pact was going into final effect; that, finding my views heartily supported, I had talked with Dr. C. C. Wu and had asked M. Claudel to suggest that M. Briand speak to the Russian Ambassador in France; that now I had received assurances from China and Russia that neither would fight except in self-defense, nor would they attack each other. I informed the German Secretary that nevertheless the situation remained dangerous so long as it was possible for irresponsible people to provoke a clash and that I was anxious for all possible moral support, including especially that of Germany, to be brought to bear. I said I hoped the German Government would be informed by him of what I had said and be told that I should be very glad to have Germany’s moral support and approval of what had been done and would welcome receiving any views the German Government might care to express or any measure Germany might care to take in the present situation to promote peace. I explained to him that the only American interest was to prevent war, and I said I had suggested to the Chinese (and I quoted the words used in the Pact of Paris) that many ways are provided for solution by pacific means of the difficulty. I said I had, for example, suggested the procedure which Paraguay and Bolivia followed in a somewhat similar situation¹⁴ or, again, that jurisdiction of dispute could be taken by the League of Nations between a member and a nonmember thereof, the chief thing being that any fighting be stopped. I asked the German Secretary to convey my message to the German Government and to inform me of their sentiments respecting it.

(5) Repeat the above as No. 70 to the Embassy in Japan.

Stimson

14. See vol. i, pp. 818 ff.