861.77 Chinese Eastern/70: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:12 p.m.]
611. (1) May I comment as follows regarding the present crisis between China and Russia: It seems to me, in the first place, that neither side wishes or counts on hostilities. Following the act of aggression by the Chinese against Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway—this step having for a considerable time been under discussion at Mukden and with a view to which troops apparently have been distributed at least three weeks ago to frontier posts—the Chinese have now assumed, in rather spectacular fashion, an air of unconcern regarding the accomplished fact. The Chinese feel the greater assurance in carrying out their bluff, which is of the passive type, because of the complaisance shown by the world at large in tolerating previous [Page 227] violations of Chinese obligations and because of Russia’s difficulty in retaliating with any forceful means without the general antiwar sentiment of the world being antagonized and also without arousing the specific Japanese apprehensions regarding Russian influence being extended in Manchuria. On the other hand, the Russians have found themselves obliged to adopt a positive type of bluff by arraying their military forces on the Chinese border as a threat. Both sides, I believe, are hoping that, following preliminary moves which are calculated to determine the price at which a bargain finally will be struck, the result will be the sort of compromise at which both Chinese and Russians are adept and which, at any rate, will lead to a temporary solution, deciding nothing in principle but saving the face of both sides.
(2) The obvious danger is, however, that in the last resort Russia could not afford being ousted entirely from the Chinese Eastern Railway, the primary and single dependable link connecting with Vladivostok and the Pacific maritime region. (I am confidentially informed by one of my colleagues that, according to secret service information, the Soviet Government has resolved as a last resort upon the necessity of war, the Soviet War Minister having reported the Soviet Army to be ready for such contingency.) On the other hand, the Chinese, although apparently entirely unprepared for conflict, entertain in general a belief so overweening of their great military power, enjoying prestige as such, and are carried away so by their diplomatic triumphs from whittling away the existing treaty system that in the valor of their ignorance, it is to be feared, they may overplay their hand to create a situation which will prevent either side from withdrawing without hostilities.
(3) Whatever may be the Soviet’s responsibility in originally having inculcated into the political thought of China the doctrine of repudiating obligations, and whatever may have been the Russian fault or provocation respecting subversive propaganda here, the fact remains that the Chinese did force the present issue by what unquestionably is intended as an act of confiscation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. General Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist Government officials, furthermore, have linked this Russian phase of “rights recovery” with the general problem of getting rid altogether of the unequal treaties.
(4) It seems, to those of us in touch with conditions in China and especially with political tendencies today of Chinese thought, that in order to prevent the Chinese from rushing to destruction they must be impressed with the seriousness of disregarding the rights of others as shown by them, not only in respect of Russia but of other countries also. My present impression is that the Chinese are beginning to feel taken aback somewhat by the lack of sympathy, if not indeed by the reproach, with which neutral countries have greeted their present [Page 228] action. It appears to me, therefore, that the surest means of averting a possible actual clash is to follow up your conversation on July 18 with the Chinese Minister to the point of making plain that in this matter Chinese intractability would alienate the sympathy they have enjoyed thus far and involves essentially the same question, namely, responsibility for the observance of international undertakings. May I urge the collateral helpfulness at this time of making it clear in advance that we are unwilling for them to deprive us of our treaty rights respecting extraterritoriality.9 It would be most opportune, therefore, for us now to submit our reply on the lines hitherto recommended by me to the Chinese note on this subject. Extraterritoriality and the Chinese Eastern Railway being inter-related, the delay by the United States and other governments in replying as to the former tends to encourage the Chinese authorities in a dangerously truculent attitude toward Russia in the latter, while any tactical success the Chinese might have in dealing with Russia would encourage their forcing upon us the extraterritoriality issue.