791.003/26
The Minister in Persia (Philip) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 15.]
Sir: I have the honor to confirm my cable messages Nos. 26, 27 and 28 of May 10—7 p.m., May 13—11 p.m. and May 14—3 p.m., respectively, in relation to the action taken by the Persian Government in denouncing all its treaties with foreign powers which provide for the exercise of consular jurisdiction and extra-territorial privileges on behalf of foreign nationals in Persia. In this connection I beg to transmit herewith a translation of the note received by me from the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of the 10th instant (No. 1845/74), which was forwarded to the Department in my above cable No. 26.
The receipt of this note was not fore shadowed by any advance intimations to the foreign representatives and came as a decided surprise, in spite of the public utterance by the Shah on the 26th of April last (My No. 19 of April 27—12 noon). Although a number of my colleagues appeared to anticipate early action by the Persian Government, following the Shah’s statement, I had reason to suppose that this would not be taken without mature consideration and a more thorough attempt to establish a judiciary better calculated to inspire confidence than that now existing.
However, it would appear that the conversation with Abdul Hussein Teimourtache, Minister of the Court, reported in my despatch No. 329 of April 30th last, was more authoritative than I had judged at the time. My British colleague, indeed, seems to be of the opinion that Teimourtache has been chiefly instrumental in bringing about this decisive step by the Government toward the abolition of the capitulations. Others also believe his advice in this and many other matters to have great effect upon the Shah’s decisions.
On the 11th instant I had a talk with Mirza Fat’hollah Khan [Page 578] Pakrevan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, a memorandum of which I have also the honor to transmit herewith.34
With regard to Mr. Pakrevan’s statements respecting the desire here for an abrupt and immediate termination of all capitulatory treaties (page 2 paragraph 1 of enclosure), I infer that such a step may have been favored among the more violent politicians here and, possibly, by the Shah also. Although the action taken by the Government in denouncing the treaties has been received with unanimous approval by the press of Teheran, there has been little indication of any particular enthusiasm on the subject in the provinces, or outside of political circles.
Several references have been made to me in conversations with various people in regard to the probability of assurances having been given by Persia, both to the Soviet and to Turkey, at the time of initial agreements for the renunciation of the capitulatory privileges of their nationals, that Persia would follow their lead at an early date, and would abolish such rights for all foreigners.
Although I have been unable as yet to ascertain that such assurances were given officially, my information points to the probability that Persia has been urged to this step by the Soviet and by the Turkish Governments.
In all probability the Shah has found in it a most welcome gesture by which to demonstrate his patriotic zeal for the welfare of his country and, at the same time, to create a favorable impression upon the Soviet.
In the first case the enhancement of his prestige will result and, in the second, added force possibly acquired in connection with the Persian demands in the pending negotiations with the Russians—through the ability to point to this independent gesture toward the capitalistic powers.
Among other causes which might be cited as possibly having led up to the decision taken by the Persian Government are the recent conclusion of the Persian-Polish Treaty of Friendship and Commerce35 which eliminates the question of consular jurisdiction; the pending negotiations for a treaty with Japan, in connection with which that Government is believed to have insisted upon the extension of capitulatory rights to Japanese subjects, the successful examples of Afghanistan and Turkey, … and the actual events now taking place in China.
While it cannot be said, I think, that any one of these circumstances has given rise to the Persian action, doubtless all have had an influence upon it, one way or another.
[Page 579]As an immediate result of the denunciation of the treaties of the most favored nations, a diplomatic meeting of the representatives of those nations was held at the German Legation on the 13th instant. There were present the Ministers of Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the United States; the Chargés d’Affaires of France and Holland. I understand that these representatives, among them, are in charge of the interests of practically all of the treaty powers concerned.
The British Minister handed to each of those present a translation of a note he had received from the Persian Foreign Office, dated the 12th instant, a copy of which I have the honor to transmit to the Department herewith.36
This note informs the British Minister of the action taken by the Persian Government in denouncing all treaties which carry with them capitulatory privileges and states its willingness to enter into negotiations for new treaties during the year ending May 10, 1928. It goes on to state that the Government had notified the French Legation that its treaties with France and Spain, being in perpetuity, could be abrogated at any time by either party, and that it had cancelled those treaties on the same date as those of other powers. The note concludes with the statement that, as consular jurisdiction and privileges hitherto enjoyed by foreign nationals in Persia will cease to exist on May 10, 1928, the nationals of the British and other Governments who only enjoy them on the principle of “most-favored-nation treatment [”] will not benefit by them after that date.
The business of the diplomatic meeting was chiefly limited to a discussion of the situation resulting from the action taken by the Persian Government. It was generally conceded by all those present that there was no occasion for action in the matter by the foreign representatives here unless under instructions from their governments.
The Italian Minister stated that in his opinion there were three means of meeting the situation open to the foreign powers enjoying capitulatory rights in Persia. These were: (1) a refusal to accept the decision by the Persian Government, (2) a complete acquiescence and (3) the expression of a friendly desire to take the question under consideration. All agreed with this, and all expressed themselves in favor of the course last mentioned.
The question was then raised as to the propriety of acknowledging the notes from the Persian Foreign Office which announced the abolition of the capitulations. Some of my colleagues proposed 0the drawing up of an identical note to the Persian Government to be submitted to the approval of all Governments concerned. I said that I was disinclined to join this proposal, but intimated that I desired to obtain the consensus of opinion among all my colleagues, and that I would [Page 580] take part in a joint preliminary recommendation to the powers as a means of indicating that opinion. …
Apart from this, my colleagues appeared to consider that no serious disadvantages seemed to be involved by the determination of Persia to get rid of the capitulations.
The French Chargé d’Affaires did not appear disposed to accept the view of the Persian Government as to its right to denounce the French Treaty of 1855 at any time, … I gathered from the attitude of my French and British colleagues respecting this question that they anticipated some protest by the French Government on this point. The French Chargé d’Affaires mentioned also that he, as being in charge of the interests of the Spanish Government in Persia, had received the Foreign Office note addressed to that Power. No one was able to cite a precedent to establish the Persian attitude in the matter of “perpetual” treaties, though the Chargé d’Affaires of the Netherlands expressed the belief that Turkey had at a recent date summarily denounced a treaty of this category with his Government.
It was suggested, as a means of informing the powers interested as to the general attitude of the foreign representatives in Teheran, to draw up a joint, tentative recommendation upon which a preliminary acknowledgment of the note of the 10th instant, be based. This draft, of which I have the honor to transmit a translation and a copy herewith,37 was approved by all those present, myself included. It was unanimously agreed that a request for precise information as to new codes of justice and the organization of the courts destined to replace foreign consular jurisdiction would be necessary as a prelude to a serious consideration of the question. At the same time it was thought by the representatives that the rendering of such pertinent information will be a most difficult matter for the Persian Government, and will in all probability involve a salutary delay.
The French Chargé d’Affaires remarked that, while he entirely concurred in the proposal and would submit it to his Government, it was quite possible under the circumstances that a different form of acknowledgment of the note received by him might be decided upon.
I have been not a little surprised at the philosophical calm with which this denouncement of existing treaties has been received by the representatives of European powers in Teheran, as well as among the nationals of those powers. I find in this an indication that such [Page 581] a change would bring about little fundamental change in or disturbance of the trend of foreign business intercourse with Persia.
It is true that many obvious hypothetical sources of inconvenience and of undesirable situations as regards the interests of foreigners might be cited as likely to arise from the abolition of the capitulations. It is most unlikely, in my opinion, that Great Britain, for instance, is prepared to submit to this change without the strongest protest, unless some special protection is guaranteed to the many British subjects in Persia.
From our own view point, the missionary interests in the country and the immunity from Persian methods of justice of the members of the Financial Mission are perhaps the most impressive at this time. I have not heard any positive expressions of adverse opinion on the part of our Missionaries as yet. In a talk with Doctor Millspaugh shortly after the announcement of the Persian Government’s decision, he expressed some dissatisfaction with the proposal. He inferred that it might conceivably render it possible for the enemies of the Mission to attack it, … I asked him if he thought it would be possible to have included in a new contract some provision for such immunity from arrest as that extended to the deputies, or other chief officials of the Government. He did not seem to think such a suggestion would be accepted. The remarks mentioned here were entirely informal and were made without any prior consideration of the subject.
On the whole, I am inclined to the opinion that there is very little to be done by us to alter the outcome of the chief question at issue. The Persian Government has acted in conformity with its legal rights in denouncing its treaty with the United States. Also, it can be admitted, I think, that our Government will be heartily inclined to sympathize with the ambitions of Persia in this connection. It may likewise be remarked that the conditions in other countries, in the Balkans and elsewhere, which afford types of judiciaries no more admirable than does Persia, and where the advantages of consular jurisdiction do not exist, are not such as to discourage international relations on that account alone.
I would therefore be of the opinion that our Government should stand ready to take the lead in demonstrating its desire to bring about the end desired by Persia, and its readiness to open negotiations for a new understanding, as soon as it becomes clear that the present movement in Persia is an entirely serious one. I beg to mention that the absence of comment and demonstration among the people as a result of the Government’s action up to the present [Page 582] seems to me to border on the uncanny. No real popular enthusiasm has been occasioned by this important gesture as yet. On the other hand, there seems to be a growing sense of doubt as to the efficacy of the reforms instituted in the judiciary by Mirza Ali Akbar Khan Davar.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I am told that Davar proposes to engage the services of four foreign legal experts (preferably French) whose duty it will be to supervise and perfect the administration of the judiciary throughout the country. I do not understand that any definite steps have been taken to this end as yet, and possibly it is contemplated as a means of demonstrating an earnest desire to bring about real improvements, and as a preliminary to a refusal to contemplate the establishment of a mixed court in Persia.
The subject of probable negotiations for a new treaty with Persia is an interesting one. I have gathered that the Persian Government has the intention of deleting the “most favored nation” clause from its future treaties with foreign governments. One point that suggests itself to me as requiring attention in connection with any new pact arranged with this Government is that of the recognition by Persia of the nationality of American naturalized citizens of Persian origin. The existing situation in that respect is very unsatisfactory.
The policy adopted by Persia in the matter of the denunciation of the treaties appears to be as follows: All foreign treaties providing for capitulatory rights and most favored nation treatment to be denounced—excepting those with Great Britain. The Treaty of Peace of 1857 between this Power and Persia38 is, amicably, non-denounceable—also it provides for extension of “Most-Favored-Nation-Treatment”, but not for consular jurisdiction, etc. Therefore the Persian Government believes that, by abrogating all other treaties which grant such rights, Great Britain will “ipso facto” be deprived of them. The argument that Persia has not at the present time a dependable and organized establishment for the administration of justice is met by the reply that the Government is using every means at its disposal to bring about such reforms, but that it is quite within its rights in taking steps to abolish the capitulations. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Great Britain will strongly advise France to protest against the denouncing of the French Treaty on the grounds of its being “in perpetuity”. The Persian Government insists that its action in regard to the French Treaty is entirely justifiable.
I have [etc.]