500.A15 a 1/324: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 24—4:50 p.m.]
31. Bridgeman stated at this morning’s session of the executive committee that he was eager that an early plenary session be held for the purpose of debating the British suggestions regarding battleships and aircraft carriers and asked at what time the other delegates would be prepared to enter upon such debate. In reply I informed him that our instructions did not cover such proposals and were further definitely against any reopening of matters which the Washington treaty had already settled. I added, however, that I had reported fully to my Government which would doubtless instruct me in the premises. Viscount Ishii declared that the position of the Japanese delegates was similar to ours and they were prevented by their instructions from undertaking conversations regarding any revision of the Washington treaty, but that he himself thought certain features of the British suggestions desirable. He had telegraphed to Tokyo accordingly but did not expect a reply within less than a week and until then could not take any stand in the matter. It was proposed by Bridgeman to state in a communication to the press that discussion had been postponed pending receipt of instructions from these Governments but he withdrew the suggestion when opposition thereto developed.
Bridgeman expressed the hope to me, after the meeting, that although he realized that no replacement would occur before 1931, we could yet come to an agreement as regards capital ships, since he thought that public opinion would be very favorably influenced if a diminution in maximum tonnages, even if it should only take effect in 1931, were agreed to at this time. He admitted that such a step presented some difficulties and pointed to the fact that the British Navy included two new vessels which considerably surpassed the maximum tonnage which they desired us to accept, but that the possibility of other countries constructing the larger ships had to be reckoned with. He promised to submit to me a proposal which he was engaged in drafting and which he trusted might be acceptable to all concerned.
Dulles and Cecil were discussing this matter almost simultaneously. The former felt that it would be unfortunate to engage in a public discussion of the question, inasmuch as we would be forced to give publicity to the fact that under the Washington treaty the British [Page 55] Navy pending replacements had a tonnage considerably superior to the 5–5 ratio and also had more modern battleships and, further, that were their proposals to be adopted this inequality would be continued beyond the space of time stipulated in the treaty. While the British apparently desire to gain public approbation for having advocated this kind of proposition and wish to make us bear the responsibility for blocking measures they have heralded as being prime requisites to economy and peace, they will probably be satisfied with this move and will not insist rigidly on favorable action on their proposals. We think that, subject to your instructions, this question should be treated in accordance with my telegram No. 25, June 23, 7 p.m., and firmly believe that it is highly important to avoid any move at this time which might pledge us in advance to favorable consideration in 1931 of the British proposition.
It will take several days for Tokyo to consider the British proposals, according to Ishii; but you may concur with me that the decision of the Japanese Government might be considerably influenced if the possibility of serious consequences arising from reopening the Washington treaty were impressed upon Matsudaira.