Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, Volume I

500.A15/242b

Memorandum by the Department of State⁹⁰

undated

consideration of the seven questions submitted with the invitation of the council of the league of nations of december 12, 1925

Question I

“What is to be understood by the expression ‘armaments’?”

• “(a) Definition of the various factors—military, economic, geographical, etc.—upon which the power of a country in the time of war depends.
• “(b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments (military, naval and air), the methods of recruiting, training, organizations capable of immediate military employment, etc.”

“What is to be understood by the expression ‘Armaments’?”

For the purpose of the Preparatory Commission on the Limitation of Armaments, the expression “armaments” should be defined as the organized military (Army, Navy and Air) forces of a country, with their materiel and installations actually in being.

In the foregoing definition the term “organized military forces” should be construed to mean persons equipped and formed into groups under the direction and control of a central authority to maintain and protect national rights through force of arms.

The term “materiel” should be construed to embrace generally the arms of various calibers, ammunition, means of transportation and communication, supplies, accessories, et cetera, necessary to the operation of the forces.

The term “installations” should be construed to include fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, plants and accessories, et cetera, designed or employed for specific use in connection with the accomplishment of a military purpose.

“(a) Definition of the various factors—military, economic, geographical, etc.—upon which the power of a country, in time of war, depends.”

The various factors upon which the power of a country in time of war depends include the following:

(1) Geography, topography and climate.

(2) Population and social conditions.

(3) Political situation.

(4) Economic situation—

a. Material resources, food and raw materials.

b. Manufacture and munitioning capacity.

c. Transportation and communications.

d. Foreign commerce.

e. Finance.

(5) Military and naval establishments; reserves of materiel, etc.

Of the above factors, point (5) is the only one capable of a satisfactory evaluation; an attempt to evaluate the other factors would lead into such a maze of speculative elements, diversity of opinions and differing formulae as to serve no useful end from the point of view of a consideration of the question of the Limitation of Armaments.

“(b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments (military, naval and air), the methods of recruiting, training, organizations capable of immediate military employment, etc.”

The armaments of this country are separated into the Army and Navy; each branch including, in the United States, its air service.

The Army is divided into combatant and non-combatant branches.

The organization of the Army varies in different countries in accordance with national conditions, which are determined by varying factors such as distances, terrain, weather, resources and population, physical and social conditions, morale, communications, sources of supplies, etc.

The details or manner of training and organization cannot be profitably discussed because such matters are primarily of domestic concern. However, in regard to the definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armament of a country in time of peace, particularly with reference to organizations capable of immediate military employment, the general subject of character of service might be discussed with the idea of placing all peace time military forces on the voluntary basis. In this connection, it should be noted that the abolition of conscription would be the most effective step which could be taken toward the material reduction of peace time armed forces. In addition, a general abolition of conscription and the consequent reduction of the number of reserves would tend to render more nearly equal the length of time necessary for various nations to put their armies into the field at full war strength. It should be noted, however, that this government, because of difficulty in recruitment, would oppose any general requirement which provided for voluntary service for periods greater than a three year enlistment.

The discussion of the various factors which constitute the Naval armaments of a country in time of peace should be restricted to a consideration of the tangible and material units of naval strength capable of physical measurement.

At the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, held in Washington, November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922, one of the general principles laid down by Mr. Hughes and accepted by the delegates of all the powers represented was:

“The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength for navies and the proportional allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.”

It will be seen from this that the term “armament” as applied to navies was construed as applying to tonnage primarily as a basis for comparison of naval strength. In the general discussion and final agreement certain other factors, such as maximum caliber of guns, maximum tonnage of individual units, and other characteristics pertaining essentially to ships and equipment actually carried on ships were included. But all of the factors that were accepted as contributory to the desired end, related solely to tangible and material characteristics of combatant units capable of actual physical measurement. It must be remembered that when the ship of whatever class it may be is disabled or sunk, the whole unit including all of her personnel is out of the battle and can be replaced only by another unit which can not be immediately constructed or organized. Thus, the personnel of Naval Armaments is regulated in numbers largely by the tonnage of such armaments, and the consideration of methods of recruiting and of training and of organization does not properly enter into a discussion of limitation of naval peace strength.

Question II

• “(a) Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?
• “(b) What is to be understood by the expression ‘reduction and limitation of armaments’?

“The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods; for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.”

(a) “Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?”

It is not practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of any country because that strength is, in the last analysis, determined by its wealth, its population, its resources, its industries of every kind that enter into its economic life, the character of its people, and many other elements to which it is impossible to apply a standard of definitive measurement.

Under no circumstances is it conceivable that any country would accept for a moment any suggestion of a limitation on or reduction of its resources, its industries, or any other factor which is entirely bound up with the economic life of its people. Therefore, it is evident that only the peace strength in combatant units is susceptible of reduction and limitation by mutual agreement.

(b) “What is to be understood by the expression ‘reduction and limitation of armaments’?

“The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods; for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.”

The expression, “reduction and limitation of armaments” is understood to mean the reduction of, or the placing of a limitation on, (1) the forces organized in time of peace, for the carrying on of war, and/or (2) the materiel of such forces.

In regard to the army, such reduction or limitation may be applied to either personnel or materiel. Its application to personnel must be primarily in the form of a limitation upon numbers in service, whether that reduction be applied to forces on a voluntary or a conscriptive basis. But in prescribing such a limitation the class of troops, whether regular, national guard, or militia, must be taken into consideration. In regard to materiel, such limitations may involve the elimination of designated weapons, or prescriptions upon the size, character and amount of armament in service or in reserve, or prescriptions upon the number and character of military and naval aircraft, as well as upon the number or location of air bases.

Any limitation based primarily upon a comparison of budgets for national defense purposes would be totally unacceptable to this government.

In the case of the Navy the various forms which reduction or limitation may take are:—

1. Maintaining the present size of individual units and reducing the numbers of units.

2. Reducing the size of individual units in replacements and maintaining the numbers of units.

3. Reducing both size and numbers in units in replacements.

4. Extending the lives of the different types, thereby deferring replacements.

5. Reducing the caliber of major battery guns.

The method set forth in No. 1 offers a basis for discussion as it admits of definite physical measurement by which to make comparison of relative naval strength. It should be borne in mind, however, that there is a minimum tonnage for each power below which it is unsafe to go in reduction.

The method set forth in No. 2 likewise admits of definite physical measurement and to that extent may constitute a basis of comparison of naval strength. While reducing the size of units in replacements and retaining the numbers will reduce the cost of such replacements and incidentally the maintenance to some extent, there are objections to such a method. Reduction in size tends to reduction in the efficiency of defense against air and under-water attack. It also reduces the sea endurance and therefore the ability to operate in areas distant from home bases where operations may be necessary to insure integrity of lines of communication.

The method set forth in No. 3 combines the advantages and disadvantages of Nos. 1 and 2.

The method set forth in No. 4 merely puts off expenditures and in the long run does not reduce. This method has a disadvantage from an internal economical standpoint in that it tends to disrupt shipbuilding industries and break up organizations devoted to this art.

The method set forth in No. 5 merely reduces the expenditure for offensive ordnance material but has no other effect on general reduction.

While the reduction of expenditures for national defense purposes is highly desirable, it should be constantly borne in mind that a comparison of expenditures for such purposes does not form a true basis for comparison of national armaments.

Question III

“By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, e. g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?”

In the case of the land forces, there is no entirely satisfactory unit which is applicable to all elements, but in regard to personnel a manday unit appears to be the most satisfactory unit of measure in comparing the total force, that is, both active and reserve components; in regard to materiel, fire power may be satisfactorily measured by foot-tons energy; for tanks or motor transportation, a mile-ton-hour may be employed and for aircraft a lift tonnage standard might be employed.

The limitation of land armament as it now exists involves different and more complicated factors than the limitation of naval armament, because no two armies are organized in the same way nor have they fixed elements which can be compared in the manner that the war ships of one nation can be compared with those of another. Infantry divisions in different countries vary in strength from 7,000 to 20,000 and the types of military service include conscription, militia and voluntary. There is no unit in an army which can be satisfactorily used as a yardstick. Any plan for the limitation of armament, to be successful, must contain within itself the elements of simplicity and facility of determination. Limitations can be placed upon the strength of the Regular Army, upon the number of reserves, upon the militia, which is partly trained, and upon those reserves which are trained still less.

It is considered that the only equitable standard by which it is possible to measure the naval armaments of one country against the naval armaments of another is either (1) the amount of tonnage possessed or allowed to be possessed in each type of combatant vessel, or (2) the total tonnage of all types combined.

Under method (1), each type should be considered separately and unrelated to the tonnages of other types, although it may be pleaded that geographical location, outlying bases, overseas possessions, interests, etc., and extraneous political or economic considerations might tend to stress the need for one type over another type and therefore demand greater allowances of tonnage in one type and lesser tonnage in another, for comparison in total strength. The fixing of such relationship would be almost impossible, therefore it would seem imperative that the comparison rest in tonnages of types—considered each by itself—rather than in any attempt to deal with tactical and strategic employment of the various types.

In arriving at the value of the tonnage already possessed, consideration should be given to the ages of the individual units in each type in order to arrive at an equitable agreement as to immediate scrapping and replacements.

The life of the unit of each type, that is, period when replacements may begin, should be uniform and fixed by agreement between the powers concerned.

The actual numbers of units in any type should be left to the discretion of the powers, only prescribing the maximum limit of tonnage of an individual unit and the total tonnage allowed.

Under method (2), the total allowable tonnage should be fixed and each nation might build, within that tonnage, the numbers of units of each type considered advisable according to her peculiar conditions. But the maximum tonnage of a unit of each type should be prescribed and also the maximum caliber of guns to be allowed each type.

It should be recognized that possession of fortified bases, properly located on lines of communication, constitutes a decided element of strength.

The question of equipment is one which should concern only the maximum caliber of gun carried. The standard by which the tonnage of the individual unit is measured should be prescribed; that is, what should be considered standard tonnage of the ship. In this connection, in the Washington Limitation of Armament Conference it was accepted that fuel and extra feed water were not included in the tonnage weight of the ship.

The complement in personnel of each unit, the speed, cruising radius, amount of ammunition carried and other essentially unit characteristics should be left to the discretion of each power except as noted above in regard to limitation on the maximum caliber of gun.

The question of protection in the shape of armor, both as to thickness and arrangement, and underwater subdivision should be left to the individual powers, only with the proviso that the maximum tonnage of each unit should not be exceeded.

Expenditure on the military establishments does not afford any true measure of armaments.

It is idle to attempt to formulate a plan for the limitation of armament which attempts to change economic or natural laws, by taking into account deficiencies of weaker nations, in men, money, or munitions, on the theory of making the war potential of all nations adequate to meet all possible cases of aggression. Such an artificial effort to equalize what is not and can not be made equal is foredoomed to failure.

Question IV

“Can there be said to be ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ armaments?

“Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organized for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established for the purposes of aggression?”

It would be very difficult if not practically impossible to say whether a particular armament is per se offensive or defensive. From a technical point of view, the terms “offensive” and “defensive” are employed as applying to the use of [or?] disposition of armaments rather than to armaments themselves. It is generally accepted by American military and naval authorities that a vigorous offense is the best defense. An inferior force may be used offensively and thereby obtain an initial advantage with a view to accomplishing a more efficient defense. It is quite conceivable that a nation considering her rights or her honor violated, although her armament may be no greater than would be generally considered necessary for the defense of her territory, would launch an offensive that would in reality be entirely in defense of her sovereign rights.

Defensive peace armaments in the non-technical sense may be considered as those which are created and maintained solely for the internal and external security of the homeland and outlying possessions or dominions, and for the protection of the national rights throughout the world. Such armaments must not be confused with a police force, which is created and maintained to deal with domestic crime and disorder, and has no relation to national defense. As to the specific types of armament which may be considered defensive rather than offensive, it may be stated that under general conditions the following partake rather of a defensive than of an offensive character: (1) Coastal fortifications; (2) land fortifications at a reasonable distance from the frontier.

But it should be remembered that land fortifications may be offensive or defensive, depending upon their location or probable use.

Although it may be called a peace armament by the nation possessing it, an armament may partake of aggressive character if apparently created and maintained by a State to secure or maintain political, military or economic dominance or preponderance over territory not under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, or protection, whether by invasion or threat of invasion.

Question V

(a) On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

• Population;
• Resources;
• Geographical situation;
• Length and nature of maritime communications;
• Density and character of the railways;
• Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centers near the frontiers;
• The time required, varying with different States, to transformpeace armaments into war armaments;
• The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?

(b) Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant, shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?

(a) This Government believes that no useful end can be attained by the consideration of the subject of war potential which would be involved in the attempted application of most of the points enumerated above. From the standpoint of the limitation of land armament it appears that the only factor which might form a basis for a formula for the limitation of land armament is a limitation on the basis of population or area, providing such a limitation is taken as a direct ratio preferably applied only to metropolitan^* area or population. However, it is possible to place an arbitrary limitation on the size of the peace-time military establishment, including equipment and trained reserves without reference to war potential. Factors in the establishment of this arbitrary limitation might include the standardization of the character and term of service, preferably through the abolition of conscription for peace-time procurement.

In regard to naval armament, the factors listed in this question likewise cannot usefully be considered in arriving at a scale of naval armaments permissible to the various countries, whether one takes into account the separate factors mentioned under this head or all of them combined. Any attempt to apply any or all of these factors to a scale of naval armament permissible to the various countries would lead to endless confusion and serve no useful purpose.

Substantial progress has already been made toward the limitation of naval armament by fixing a definite tonnage ratio on certain classes of vessels for various countries. This ratio was not reached by the consideration of unrelated and for the most part indeterminate factors such as those listed in Question V. Any departure from the principle already established at the Washington Conference would only tend to jeopardize the progress toward further limitation of naval armament.

Among the factors which appear to give no promise of usefulness in arriving at a limitation of either land or naval armament are:

1. The ultimate war strength or potential war armament of a nation;

2. Monetary expenditure for the support of peace-time armaments.

In so far as the United States is concerned the degree of security which a state might receive under the provisions of the Covenant of the League or separate supplementary agreements is a matter into which this country would not enter as it is not a party to any such agreements.

From a practical standpoint it will be seen that most of the factors listed in Question V are too indeterminate to give any promise of usefulness as a basis for the establishment of any acceptable formula for the limitation of land or naval armament. The same would be true of any attempted combination of these factors.

(b)

“Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant, shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?”

The United States is not a member of the League of Nations and hence this question does not apply to this country.

Question VI

• “(a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?
• “(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?
• “(c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?”

(a) Commercial aeronautics, with the attendant development of an aeronautical industry and a personnel skilled in the manufacture, operation and maintenance of aircraft, does furnish a basis for the determination of air power. The development of commercial aeronautics and the development of a nation’s military air power are to a certain extent inseparable and inter-dependent.

All aircraft may be of military value no matter what restrictions may be placed upon their character. Some can probably be converted with but few changes into military aircraft; others can be designed so that with major or minor alterations or even with none at all they can be employed for military purposes.

The war value of an airplane may be said to lie in a combination of two or more of the following characteristics:

(1) Suitability for offensive and defensive equipment;

(2) Radius of action;

(3) Speed;

(4) Lift tonnage;

(5) Height it can attain. (Ceiling)

While it may be possible to evolve formulae defining the inter-relationship of the above factors in such a way as to limit to some extent the war value of a commercially-built machine, it is practically impossible to insure that war equipment may not be mounted in a commercial plane. Thus it will be seen that definite rules can not be laid down strictly prescribing whether machines are purely war machines or commercial machines that may be quickly converted to war machines.

The most practicable and accurate method for computation of the value of commercial aircraft in estimating the air strength of a country is lift-tonnage. However, in attempting to arrive at a formula for the purpose of limitation of armament, only aircraft designed and constructed for military purposes should be included in any figure establishing a maximum for military aircraft, because no limitation should be placed on the development or construction of commercial aircraft.

“(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?”

The same conclusions arrived at in (a) above should apply to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines.

“(c)Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?”

It is possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armament of a country. However, it does not seem advisable to permit the military value of commercial fleets to enter into calculation for the limitation of naval armaments because it is recognized that there should be no limitation upon either the development of commerce or the construction of commercial fleets.

Question VII

“Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?”

It appears that the crux of the question lies in the interpretation to be placed upon the word security. If the term security means a reasonable degree of protection against the danger of probable aggression, then it would appear that substantial progress might be made toward the desired end. If, however, the term security be interpreted to mean absolute protection against any or all possible aggression from any country, then it appears that in this day and generation there is no answer to the question and discussion of the same might well be closed.

Assuming, however, that the first interpretation above given be accepted, then it would appear that security may have a very determining effect upon the extent to which any country will agree to limit its armament and further that such limitation will probably be in direct ratio to the degree of security which that country considers to be assured. Regional security should lead to regional limitation of armament but complete regional security probably will not result in the regional limitation of armament to the extent required solely for the maintenance of internal law and order, as long as a possible threat exists of aggression from one or more states outside of the region in which mutual regional security has been provided for. It appears, however, that the most practicable approach to the limitation or reduction of armaments is through the development of regional security pacts where such are necessary. Such pacts, to be absolutely effective, should include all powers within a given region. It is further believed that regional disarmament is a logical and practicable forerunner of general disarmament.

Mutual confidence in the good faith of countries of a given region may render the conclusion of specific security pacts an unnecessary preliminary to the limitation or reduction of armaments. A striking case in point is that of the relations between the United States and Canada, which resulted from the Convention of 1817⁹¹ by which the naval forces permitted the signatories on the Great Lakes, were specifically limited without any provision for security. The convention for the limitation of armaments concluded by the Central American republics on November 20, 1924,⁹² is a further illustration of the possibility of the existence and successful operation of a disarmament pact without prior specific agreements for security.

90. Transmitted to the Chargé in Switzerland, Apr. 29, 1926, for the use of the American representative on the Preparatory Commission.
91. The term “metropolitan” is used to distinguish homeland or mother country from the colonies of [or ?] overseas possessions. [Footnote in the original.]
91. For text of the convention, see Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, vol. 2, p. 645.
92. Presumably the convention signed Feb. 7, 1923, at Washington; see Conference on Central American Affairs, Washington, December 4, 1922–February 7, 1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 339.