Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, Volume I

500.A15/242a

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Gibson)

Washington, April 23, 1926.

Sir: The President has instructed me to inform you of his desire that you should be in charge of the American representation on the Preparatory Commission which is to meet in Geneva on May 18, 1926 to consider questions relating to the limitation of armaments. You will be assisted by:

• From the Department of State:
  • Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
  • Mr. Dorsey Richardson;
• From the War Department:
  • Major General Dennis E. Nolan,
  • Brigadier General H. A. Smith,
  • Major George V. Strong;
• From the Navy Department:
  • Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones,
  • Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long,
  • Captain Adolphus Andrews.

Mr. Alan F. Winslow, Secretary of the American Legation at Berne, will act as Secretary to the American Representation.

In case additional military or naval personnel should be required to deal with the questions before the Commission, the Department will arrange for such personnel either from Washington or from the offices of military or naval attaches in Europe.

I desire to leave it to your discretion to make such arrangements for the organization of the American representation as circumstances may require.

Purpose of American Representation.

The purpose of American representation was indicated by the President in his message to Congress of January 4th of which the full text is annexed.⁸⁶

In dealing with the question of the further limitation of armaments this country should be helpful within the limits of its traditional policy, and where questions arise which do not fall within the scope of this policy you should not of course object to efforts by others to reach agreements which they may consider desirable in dealing with the special conditions existing elsewhere.

Character and Extent of American Participation in the Deliberations of the Preparatory Commission.

A consideration of the various questions which will be submitted to the Commission indicates that the discussions will bear upon a broad range of problems.

In the consideration of these problems it is obvious that the United States would be directly interested in questions relating to the further limitation of naval armament; it would likewise be directly interested in questions which might affect our land armament. The United States is concerned only in a general way in the question of the limitation of European land armament as that question is deemed largely regional in character. On the other hand, we must decline to become involved in such questions as those relating to the application of European security pacts whether resulting from Articles of the League Covenant or European treaties or agreements.

This Government appreciates, however, that a general informal discussion of the problems involved in the limitation of armaments may be considered important before an attempt is made to formulate concrete agenda for future conferences, but it desires you, while furthering in any way the purposes for which the Commission was convoked, to avoid taking a leading part in the debate on questions with which we are not properly concerned. You should, of course, refrain from any action which might create an impression that the United States was disposed to hamper full and free discussion of such problems among the interested powers.

It is noted that the third paragraph of the League Invitation of December 12⁸⁷ states:

“The Commission will have at its disposition the advice of the technical (military and civilian) organizations of the League as well as that of any other qualified authorities which in the opinion of the Commission it may be advisable to consult on any of the subjects which may come under its consideration.”

It is considered that questions of direct concern to the United States should be referred to committees to be formed from the personnel attached to the main Preparatory Commission or to committees on which we may be appropriately represented. There would appear to be no obstacle to such a course inasmuch as it is understood that the Preparatory Commission is competent to determine its own procedure.

In the documentation submitted with the League invitation it is stated that “the Preparatory Commission will decide on the proposals for the Conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments to be submitted to the Council.” In so far as the United States is concerned you will appreciate that this Government would not participate in the submission of a report to the Council of the League of Nations, although it could not properly offer objection if States members of the League should desire individually or collectively to do so. In this connection you will recall the statement in the President’s message of January 4, that representation on the Preparatory Commission involves no commitment with respect to attendance upon any future conference, or conferences, on the reduction or limitation of armaments.

Outline of the American Viewpoint and Policy.

The American position with respect to the limitation of “armaments was set forth in the President’s Messages of December 8, 1925⁸⁸ and January 4, 1926 to the Congress and in my address of April 20. In these statements it was pointed out that in the opinion of this Government the need for great armaments has been diminished by agreements such as the Locarno treaties and that “the natural corollary to these treaties should be further international contracts for the limitation of armaments.” It was further pointed out that the general policy of this Government in favor of the limitation of armaments could not be emphasized too frequently or too strongly and that in accordance with that policy any measure having a reasonable tendency to bring about these results should receive our sympathy and support. The President added, “the conviction that competitive armaments constitute a powerful factor in the promotion of war is more widely and justifiably held than ever before and the necessity for lifting the burden of taxation from the peoples of the world by limiting armaments is becoming daily more imperative.”

It was this conviction which led to the calling of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 and which prompts this Government to give its cordial support to any efforts which may lead to further limitation of armaments wherever and whenever it is felt that the circumstances are such as to hold out a reasonable prospect of success.

General Considerations.

It is the opinion of this Government that the practical approach to the question of the limitation of armaments is through dealing with visible armaments at peace strength.^*

In order to arrive at a working basis for determining the strength of the armaments of any nation it is felt that such a determination should include, in the case of the army, only the military strength, including both personnel and materiel (equipment, munitions and supplies) which can be mobilized at the outbreak of war and, in the case of the navy, existing naval tonnage.

The Problem of the Limitation of hand Armament.^**

In considering this question the President, in his message of December 8th, stated:

“The question of disarming upon land is so peculiarly European in its practical aspects that our country would look with particular gratitude upon any action which those countries might take to reduce their own military forces. This is in accordance with our policy of not intervening unless the European powers are unable to agree and make request for our assistance. Whenever they are able to agree of their own accord it is especially gratifying to us, and such agreement may be sure of our sympathetic support.”

The United States has not only already reduced its land forces from a war strength of over 4,000,000 by successive steps to an authorized peace strength of the Regular Army of about 280,000, but has also further limited that strength to an actual strength of about 118,000 men. When this latter figure is compared with that of the forces of other great powers, it will be clear that this country has already taken the lead in the reduction of land forces and it could hardly be expected to make any further reduction. Nor would it be reasonable to expect this Government to forego the right to maintain forces fully commensurate with those of other great powers. It seems unlikely that any formula would be considered which might have the effect of limiting the army of the United States to a figure lower than its authorized strength or that any other great power would be likely to accept a limitation approaching in any way the present reduced strength of our own army.

In view of the present reduced state of our land forces and since the question of the limitation of land armament is primarily a European problem, it is not felt that you should take the initiative in the discussion of this matter unless your assistance is sought. In this event, however, you will of course endeavor to exert a helpful influence in assisting informally to aid in reaching an agreement in case an impasse should be reached. The following paragraphs may offer a basis for profitable discussion.

The conditions prevailing in different regions of the world are so varied and the factors entering into the situation are so divergent that constructive achievement in the matter of the limitation of land armament appears to lie in regional agreements rather than in an effort to work out a general plan for the limitation of land armament applicable to the whole world.

In considering the limitation of land armament it is recognized that it is impossible to deprive a nation of the strength which it may derive from the past military training of its inhabitants. It is, however, possible for nations to agree upon the number of men who will receive military training each year, the amount (length, degree, nature) of training they shall undergo, and the reserve equipment which shall be maintained.

In this connection it should be noted that the placing of all peacetime military forces on a common ground as to procurement, would facilitate an accurate estimate of the relative size of the armies of the various countries as a basis for the limitation of armaments.

In connection with the discussion of mobilization stocks or reserve equipment, it must be borne in mind that on the outbreak of war, the military power of any nation, from the point of view of the army, is determined largely by two factors, the active army, including trained reservists; and war reserves of materiel.

It is desirable that a limitation be placed upon the size of active armies, and it is equally desirable that a limitation be placed upon the peace-time reserves of materiel. It should be borne in mind that consideration of the size and composition of these reserves of materiel might lead to an effort to bring in the consideration of the industrial power and resources of a country unless the discussion were limited, as it should be, to actual and tangible reserves of materiel maintained as such under national control.

Limitation of Naval Armament.

The 5–5–3 ratio (Washington Treaty 1922⁸⁹) should be firmly maintained as applicable to all types of combatant naval units so far as the United States, Great Britain and Japan are concerned. The United States is interested in a general way in the limitation of the naval armament of other countries. Such limitation may properly be a matter of negotiation in so far as not already determined by the Washington Conference and provided the Washington agreements are not disturbed.

This Government would welcome any practical steps which might tend toward the limitation of competitive naval construction. In this connection it should be borne in mind that while a substantial part of the program presented to the Washington Conference by the American Delegation was realized, no agreement was reached as to the limitation of competitive building of naval craft other than capital ships and aircraft carriers. This Government would welcome an agreement which would complete the work begun at Washington.

Separation of the Problems Involved in the Limitation of Land Armament from those Involved in the Limitation of Naval Armament.

It is appreciated that the scope of the work of the Preparatory Commission will include the consideration of problems relating to the limitation of both land and naval armaments. It is believed, however, that you should endeavor to arrange for the consideration of these problems by separate committees of the main Commission with a view to the eventual preparation of separate agenda for conferences which may be called later. The ultimate success of any effort toward the limitation of armaments seems to lie along the line of isolating from the general problem as many concrete questions as possible and it is therefore felt that the consideration of the limitation of both land and naval armaments jointly at the same conference would tend to render more difficult definite achievement along either line.

Five nations are particularly interested in the question of the limitation of naval armament: the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and the success of any program would depend primarily upon an agreement between those five powers. There are, however, other nations which may be concerned to a certain extent in the limitation of naval armament. Regional agreements between certain South American countries, between the powers of the Eastern Mediterranean, and between certain northern European powers, might facilitate a general reduction in naval armament and such regional agreements should be encouraged. The success of the further limitation of naval armament along the lines of the Washington Treaty might be imperiled if powers not parties to that treaty should undertake a considerable program of naval armament and it might therefore be very desirable, while working toward the regional agreements mentioned, to correlate such agreements with the standards fixed at Washington by the five principal Naval Powers.

In this connection it should be noted that certain powers have undertaken “not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign power.” It is felt that it would be a useful addition to any further program for the limitation of naval armament to secure from other naval powers not bound by the Washington Conference Treaty an undertaking of a similar character.

Readiness to Call a Naval Conference.

In his message of December 8, the President referred to the fact that the United States has constantly, through its Executive and through repeated acts of Congress, indicated its willingness to call a conference for the consideration of the further limitation of naval armament. The President, in his message of December 8, said:

“The general policy of our country is for disarmament and it ought not to hesitate to adopt any practical plan which might reasonably be expected to succeed but it would not care to attend a conference which from its location or constituency would in all probability prove futile.”

This Government believes that the greatest assurance of success in limiting naval armament could be obtained by a conference of the five naval Powers which attended the Washington Conference and which would be practically a continuation of that Conference involving the limitation in construction of other naval craft such as cruisers and submarines. It is the opinion of this Government that a naval conference confined to practical lines could make substantial progress in further limiting naval armament.

Consideration of Certain Criteria which do not afford an acceptable Basis for the Reduction of Armaments.

Any attempt to limit the ultimate war strength of a nation would be futile. The factors which enter into the potential war strength of a nation are in many respects the same as those which form an essential part of the normal activities of a State in time of peace. No country would agree to curtail or limit its natural resources or its capacity to prepare for a national emergency. It follows from the foregoing that the United States representation should not agree to the application to this country of any formula for the limitation of armaments which is based upon an estimate of the potential war strength of a nation.

You should likewise under no circumstances concur in the adoption of any formula for the limitation of armaments which is based upon expenditure. Any comparison on this basis is apt to be extremely misleading. For example, the item of base pay varies largely with the character of service, whether voluntary, militia, or conscriptive. The base pay of the lowest rating in the United States Army is fifty-eight times the minimum base pay of the lowest rating in the forces of one of the great powers whose service is based on conscription. The effect of this on comparative expenditures is obvious. In addition, it costs more to feed, clothe, and shelter an American soldier or sailor than one of any other nationality. Monetary expenditure for the creation and maintenance of military establishments does not afford either a true measure of armaments or a fair basis of comparison for limitation of armaments.

Further, an attempt to limit armaments on the basis of an inverse ratio to national wealth or population, or an attempt to equalize the military power of nations by allotting to smaller and weaker nations forces equal to or greater than those possessed by larger and more powerful nations, is an artificial effort to equalize that which is not and cannot be made equal, and, in consequence, would be totally impracticable.

No International Supervision of the Limitation of Armaments.

In case the question should arise you should make it clear that the United States would not agree to place the supervision of its armaments or the carrying out of any program for the limitation of armaments in the hands of the League of Nations or any other international body. The execution of any international agreement for the limitation of armaments must depend in so far as the United States is concerned upon international good faith and respect for treaties. The United States will not tolerate the supervision of any outside body in this matter nor be subject to inspection or supervision by foreign agencies or individuals.

In case the other powers desire to make such a regime of inspection or of control applicable to themselves, this is not, of course, a matter which concerns the United States and you should not oppose it, on the clear understanding of course that we would not even consider the extension of such a régime to this country.

You will, of course, bear in mind that it is contrary to the traditional policy of this Government to enter into commitments as to the application of a régime of sanctions for the enforcement of Treaty obligations. The application of sanctions of either an economic or military character must, under our constitutional organization, depend upon the approval of the Executive and Legislative action in the Congress. In consequence of this policy of this Government you should not make any commitments in the matter of sanctions.

In view of what you have learned of this Government’s policies through full and frank discussion during your stay in Washington, I am confident that you will understand that the reservations contained in the foregoing instructions are in no sense to be construed as evidence of an obstructive attitude on the part of this Government. Quite the contrary is the case and this Government hopes that you will be able to play a helpful and a constructive part in the deliberations of the Commission. However, the questions which have been submitted to the preliminary commission are so general and so sweeping in character that until there has been some discussion it is impossible to determine what definite proposals can most profitably be advanced. Consequently this Government has indicated certain limitations beyond which you should not go. These limitations have been laid down as a matter of prudence and merely for your guidance in estimating the practical value of suggestions which may be presented from time to time. Quite apart, however, from the instructions which it has been possible at this time to reduce to written form the President desires to impress upon you his deep interest in any sincere effort to deal with the problem of armaments. He is confident that with mutual good-will progress can be made and it will be a matter of gratification to him if the American representation can in some measure contribute to this progress. As the discussion develops and brings out the nature of the questions which can effectively be considered the President trusts that it will be possible to send you further instructions to present proposals in regard to specific problems and for your further guidance in exercising a helpful influence in bringing about agreement among the interested powers. In connection with each proposal as it arises you should bear in mind the sincere desire of this Government to cooperate, within the limits of its traditional policy, in any serious effort toward the further reduction of the burden of armaments.

I am [etc.]

Frank B. Kellogg

86. Ante, p. 42.
87. Ante, p. 40.
88. Foreign Relations, 1925, vol. i, pp. vii, xii.
89. By the phrase “peace strength” is meant that armament which is maintained in time of peace, that is, in the absence of a declared state of war between two or more powers or the actual carrying on of hostilities against a recognized belligerent. [Footnote in the original.]
90. The terms “land armament” and “naval armament” as used in this instruction include the aviation units which form a part of the land and naval forces of the United States. [Footnote in the original.]
89. For text of treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247.