893.00/5901: Telegram
The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:50 p.m.]
1. 1. Conditions both military and political are unsettled and obscure. The autumn’s fighting eliminated Tsao Kun, Wu Pei-fu1 and last week also Chi Hsieh-yuan;2 but the Chihli Party which is not a political but a military group is, though disorganized, still a power in the Yangtze Valley and must either be overcome or conciliated by Chang Tso-lin3 if he is to unify even North China. I am reliably informed that Chang himself has completed plans to return to Mukden but that Minister of Communications, who as I know positively has gone to Tientsin, was sent there by Chief Executive to persuade Chang to remain, Chang’s forces have been moving through Tsinanfu during the last week and 22 troop trains have continued southwards beyond Houchowfu [Hsüchowfu], destination unknown.
2. Chang flushed with his first victory snubbed and alienated Feng Yu-hsiang4 whose strength he underestimated. Feng is sulking in the Western Hills, sending in repeated resignations to the Chief Executive proclaiming pacific intentions, but remaining a military and political mystery. He controls Peking and has under him 60,000 troops of whom half according to military attaché are well equipped and supplied. Feng and the undefeated Yangtze Tuchuns today share the military power of North China with Chang.
3. If Chang does not support Chief Executive with adequate military forces the Provisional Government cannot long endure. That Government represents the triumph of Japan in Chinese politics, as [Page 589] the Government resulting from coup d’état of October 23 though nominally Kuomintang may be regarded as a triumph for Soviet Russia. If Marshal Tuan5 should be forced out, the next regime would probably be headed by Sun Yat-sen6 and supported by Feng with a platform denouncing “unequal treaties” which would commend it to Karakhan.7
4. Sun Yat-sen after a long delay in Tientsin arrived in Peking December 31st afternoon by special train. He was met at the railway station by officials and by a crowd of his followers. It is agreed by all who saw him that his sickness has been real and not feigned. He issued at the station a short announcement in the dialect of the common people, which the Chinese secretary translates as follows:
“To the masters of the Republic of China. I am certainly gratified for the welcome accorded me by all you gentlemen on my arrival. This time I have not come to fight for a position for myself nor for power. I have come especially to save the country in cooperation with you gentlemen. Thirteen years ago I with all you gentlemen overthrew the Manchu Government. This was done in order to obtain freedom and equality for the people of China but the freedom and equality of the people of China had already been sold to the different nations by the Manchu Government through the unequal treaties. As a result we still occupy the position of a secondary colony. Therefore we must save the nation. The principles involved in saving the country are numerous and there are many methods. It will be very easy to accomplish it. I had the intention of speaking to you gentlemen about these things in detail but as I am now sick it will be best to defer this until I am well. I wish to thank you for your kindness. (Signed) Sun Wen.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Chief Executive issued mandate December 24th promulgating regulations for the reorganization conference whose purpose is stated to be the solution of the complicated situation and the discussion of constructive plans including the organization of a second citizens’ conference, reforms of the military system, financial liquidation, et cetera. This reorganization conference will, it is believed, be composed of militarists and politicians and the scheme receives little popular support and arouses little interest. Sun Yat-sen has made political capital for himself by demanding a popular conference and is sending emissaries to the provinces to explain his views.
7. It is expected that Sun will now hold conferences directly or indirectly not only with Chief Executive but also with Feng and the other leaders of the coup d’état and also with Karakhan. Sun will want to be foremost and will not be particular about platform. He would find great opposition if he should attempt to return to Canton.
[Page 590]Consul at Swatow telegraphed December 30th:
“December 30th, 9 a.m. Referring to my telegram of December 5, 3 p.m. General Chen Chiung-ming resumed office on December 27 as commander in chief [of] the Kwangtung armies promising to take field at once against Red troops in Canton. Chen alleges he has been promised strong financial support by the Cantonese merchants and has raised $400,000 locally. General Lin Fu has apparently finally agreed to support campaign against Sun Wen but it is believed his allegiance to Chen remains very doubtful. General Lin reported to be opening hostilities against Sun forces in Kiangsi.”
[8?] Soviet propaganda seems to have taken an anti-Christian turn during these Christmas holidays.
Consul General at Canton telegraphs as follows December 29:
“December 29, 4 p.m. Considerable anti-Christian propaganda in Canton during the holidays including speeches by former governor and other politicians. Several American mission schools annoyed by agitators but no serious disturbance. Report follows by post. Department was not informed.”
9. Similar agitation against Christianity in Chekiang Province; in Hangchow one anti-Christian demonstration was held in which churches were denounced as tools of foreign imperialism and capitalism; at Ningpo there was a violent campaign organized by an “anti-Christian committee” of which the following is typical:
“Since the invasion of Christianity in China thousands of men and guns have followed on the heels of the missionaries who come to us clad in black gowns and carrying banners of evangelistic volunteers. Many ports have been yielded; concessions have been granted and millions of dollars of indemnity have been paid. So we must stand against Christianity because of its relation to imperialism.”
10. If there has been any increase of antiforeign feeling there is no evidence of any hostility to foreigners. Train robbers (see my telegram number 506, December 31, 3 p.m.)9 probably confined themselves to foreigners to secure nonintervention of Chinese and in expectation of larger funds, though Military Governor Chihli Province tells consul general at Tientsin robbery was an attempt to discredit Fengtien regime. Governor declares every effort is being made to apprehend culprits and if not successful he will make himself personally responsible for the losses besides punishing responsible officers in the section where the robbery occurred.
Repeated to Tokyo.
- For the defeat of Wu Pei-fu and overthrow of President Tsao Kun, see Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. i, pp. 361 ff.↩
- See telegram No. 480, Dec. 13, 1924, from the Chargé in China, and footnote, ibid., p. 408.↩
- Virtual ruler of Manchuria, who had estahlished his headquarters at Tientsin following the civil war in the autumn of 1924.↩
- Inspector General of the Chinese Army, who seized Peking in October 1924 and ended civil war between forces of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.↩
- Provisional Chief Executive and Prime Minister of China.↩
- Leader of the Kuomintang Party.↩
- Soviet Ambassador in China.↩
- Not printed.↩