393.1123 Lincheng/191

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Chilton)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the British Chargé d’Affaires, and is pleased to state his general concurrence in the principles set forth in the Embassy’s memorandum (No. 546) of June 30, 1923, in reference to the draft note prepared by the committee of the Diplomatic Body at Peking with a view to its presentation to the Chinese Government in connection with the recent bandit outrage on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

The American Government regards with the utmost anxiety the situation of danger, not only to the just treaty rights and interests of its nationals, but to the personal security of its citizens resident in China, which has come to exist in consequence of the breakdown of governmental authority in that country, and the weakening of the sense of responsibility on the part of those elements to which the Treaty Powers are entitled to look for the protection of foreign lives and interests. In the recent Conference at Washington, the various Powers possessing interests in China found themselves unanimous in the policy of affording her the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, and to that end pledged themselves to certain action in specific matters. The course of political development in China since the Conference has thus far, however, been a disappointment to those who had hoped that a fuller measure of opportunity for independent development would hasten the evolution of a more normal and orderly internal administration of the country and make possible the establishment of a governmental entity capable of fulfilling the international obligations correlative to the rights of sovereignty which the Conference had recognized and sought to safeguard for China. The recent bandit outrage at Lincheng affords evidence such as cannot be ignored, that the present unfortunate political disintegration in China involves a failure of appreciation, on the part of the Chinese officials, of their definite responsibilities with respect to the safety and the interests of those sojourning in China under the protection of the Treaties. And it appears to this Government, as to the British Government, necessary that measures should be adopted by the Powers to recall those officials to a sense of their obligation and responsibility in this regard.

With reference to the four proposed demands for the settlement of Shanghai questions, this Government is gratified to note that the British Government recognizes the irrelevancy of these matters to the main question at issue—the security of foreign life and property in China—and the likelihood that the presentation of such demands [Page 676] would confuse that issue and arouse suspicion of the sincerity of the Powers. Instructions of substantially identical tenor with the views set forth in the Embassy’s memorandum had already been transmitted to the American Minister in Peking.

This Government is also in full agreement with the view that the Powers should not expose themselves to a rebuff from the Chinese Government, and that they must be prepared to take such measures as will insure the acceptance of their minimum demands. It appears, in fact, to this Government that the elaboration of a definite program of action in the event of the Chinese Government proving unresponsive to the demands which will be made is fully as important as the formulation of those demands, as the situation would be aggravated unless the Powers were in a position to exert prompt and effective pressure upon the Chinese Government.

With reference to the choice of method for the purpose of achieving the desired end, this Government frankly doubts the efficacy of a naval demonstration as suggested in the Embassy’s memorandum: the familiarity of the Chinese with the presence of foreign vessels of war in their ports, coupled with the necessary limitations and the vagueness of action involved in such a course, appear to this Government likely to render such a demonstration ineffective as a means of obtaining the acquiescence of the Peking Government in such demands as may be made. In expressing this view, however, it is not intended to close the door to the discussion of any more concrete plan of concerted naval movements which might appear feasible and suitable to the purpose of impressing upon the Chinese the seriousness with which the foreign Powers regard the state of affairs which has come to exist in China. This Government, moreover, has not yet abandoned the hope that, out of the discussions now taking place in the Diplomatic Body, some plan may be devised which will commend itself for the purpose in view by its relevancy to the principal issue, its practicability, and its promise of exerting the requisite pressure upon the Chinese.

As regards possible methods of exerting financial or economic pressure, this Government has inquired the views of its Minister in Peking as to the possible advisability of the withdrawal of recognition of the present Chinese Government, or the withholding of recognition from any new Government that may seek to assume power in the present political crisis, in the event of a refusal to acquiesce in any such demands as may be agreed to by the Powers—such non-recognition to involve a suspension of releases of customs and salt surpluses. While hopeful that other means may suffice to induce the Chinese authorities to take the steps requisite to bring about normal conditions of order and security, without necessitating recourse to so [Page 677] drastic a form of international action, the American Government suggests that the possibility of the eventual discontinuance of recognition to the Chinese Government should be explored with a view to determining whether it would in the final resort prove effective as a means of pressure; and it would be pleased to learn the views of the British Government upon this subject.