Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I

500.A4a/162

Memorandum by the Technical Adviser of the American Delegation (Blakeslee) of a Conversation at the Home of the Secretary of State, December 8, 1921, 3 p.m.

December 8, 1921, 3 p.m.

• Present
  • american delegation
    • Secretary Hughes
    • John V. A. MacMurray
    • George H. Blakeslee
  • british delegation
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
    • Sir Maurice Hankey
    • H. W. Malkin

Secretary Hughes: Secretary Hughes presented the mandate issue, as it affected the pending Four Power Treaty, as follows:

Shortly after he assumed the office of Secretary, he had sent an identic note to the Powers,¹⁶ stating in general terms the American position: The United States, due to its participation in the War, had obtained certain rights in the territories won from the Central Powers as a result of the War, and the fact that it did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles had not divested it of these rights. Favorable replies to this note were made by France and Italy, but none had been received from Great Britain. Somewhat later, in response to the suggestion that the United States should point out changes which it desired in the Mandate, he had sent to the Powers, early in August, a note on this subject, identic except as to the paragraphs dealing with the “C” Mandates, these being included only in the note to Great Britain.¹⁷ In this communication he had suggested that, since the United States was not a member of the League of Nations and therefore had no assurance of equal treatment in the Mandated Territories, it should be given the benefit of the provisions set forth in the Mandates. Further suggestions, as to the “C” Mandates, expressive of the views of the United States, were:

Article 5, in the “C” Mandates, relating to missionaries to embrace nationals of the United States; Article 8 of the British “B” Mandate for East Africa to be inserted, in order to avoid ambiguity as to the educational and charitable activities of missionaries, an assurance to be given to the United States of most favored nation treatment, the special treaty rights of the United States in Samoa under the Convention of 1899¹⁸ to be reserved; monopolistic concessions to be prohibited or the monopolizing of natural resources by the Mandatory itself; and a provision to be added that, modifications of the Mandate should be subject to the assent of the United States.

As to the islands north of the Equator, he had been carrying on negotiations with Japan, which now were apparently near completion.¹⁹ Since there was in force between the United States and Japan a treaty of commerce and navigation which applied to all Japanese territory,²⁰ he had asked that this treaty should be recognized as extending to the former German islands now under Japanese administration. Other provisions in the pending Convention with Japan were: The United States to have the benefit of the provisions set forth in the Mandate; Article 5, relating to missionaries, to embrace nationals of the United States; the educational and charitable activities of the missionaries to be safeguarded by the insertion of Article 8 of the British “B” Mandate for East Africa; vested American property rights to be maintained and respected; the administration of the islands by Japan to be subject to the Convention between Japan and the United States; the terms of the Mandate, recited in the Convention, not to be changed without the consent of the United States; and a copy duplicate²¹ of the annual report made by Japan to the Council of the League of Nations to be sent to the United States. He had also asked that the nationals and vessels of the United States should have free access to the waters of the Islands in question, but this suggestion had later been dropped. Although Japan had not definitely agreed to recognize the validity, in the mandated islands, of its treaties now in force with the United States, he hoped that this recognition would soon be given and that a treaty as outlined would soon be signed.

As to the monopolization of the natural resources of a mandate, to which reference had been made in the note to Great Britain, this issue was largely academic so far as related to the islands administered by Japan, due to the paucity of their economic resources. But as to the islands south of the Equator, the issue was not altogether academic. Further, the United States had no treaty with Australia or New Zealand, so that in the islands which they administered it had no assurance of equality of commercial opportunity unless this right should be stipulated in a new treaty.

There was also the pending issue as to the continuing validity of the Samoan Tripartite Convention of 1899. After reading the provision in the Treaty against discrimination as between the signatory Powers, the Secretary said that although Germany’s part in the islands had passed, at the close of the war, to the Five Allied and Associated Powers, the United States believed that it had not lost its own rights under the Treaty as against Great Britain. The clause providing against discrimination had been violated by the Samoa Customs Order of 1920, which established a preferential rate of 7½% in favor of British imports. Against this order the United States had protested on the grounds that it violated both the Treaty of 1899 and the general obligations of a mandatory.²²

The granting of monopolistic concessions and the general monopolization of natural resources in a mandate were topics to be considered in the islands south of the Equator. Reference was made to conditions in Nauru, which had been debated at some length in the British House of Commons. There were also other points raised by certain actions of Australia and New Zealand. If the four Powers should make the proposed agreement regarding the Islands of the Pacific, in which they refer to their respective rights in these islands, each Power surely ought to make clear just what it considered its rights to be. The United States had held that it could not treat of its one-fifth undivided interest in the mandates,—as it was in the habit of regarding it,—otherwise than by treaty. In the whole matter, the utmost candor was needed. Speaking in this spirit, he felt that to straighten out the question of title in the mandates there should be a convention which should secure for the United States equal rights in the mandated islands with the members of the League of Nations, and, further, such reasonable provisions as those regarding the rights of missionaries, the monopolization of the natural resources of the territory, and most favored nation treatment. “We are ready for such a treaty”, the Secretary added. But if it was not expedient to proceed at once to the negotiation of a treaty, it would seem advisable to have an exchange of notes, in which Great Britain should take cognizance of the reservations made by the United States as to its rights, as it regarded them, in connection with the Islands in question.

There was a further reason which made a definite statement on this issue highly desirable, if the pending Treaty with Japan should be completed as anticipated and presented to the Senate. It would then be apparent that Japan had agreed to many provisions, due to the extension of existing American treaties to the islands, to which Australia and New Zealand would not agree. This situation would naturally raise questions in the Senate, and possibly create difficulty, if the position of the United States should not be made clear in some definite way.

In summary the Secretary said that the situation of the United States was simply this: We are not in the League; the League has granted a mandate to various Powers for various territories; we did not agree to the allocation; we do not now recognize these mandates; we desire no territory for ourselves, nor do we wish to change the allocation of the mandates; we wish simply the same rights as others in these territories, and to be protected against discrimination by appropriate conventions.

Mr. Balfour: He understood perfectly the general situation presented, although in many ways it was complex, especially since Australia and New Zealand were independent in certain respects. The United States had an absolute right to state that the proposed Quadruple Treaty would not affect any rights which it now claimed. The pending Treaty must not be allowed to injure the rights of the United States or of Australia, New Zealand, or Great Britain. A treaty, dealing with the problems involved in the mandated territories south of the Equator might well take some time to negotiate, due to the need of considerable discussion with Australia and New Zealand. A note, he suggested, would be a better means by which each Power could save every right it believed that it possessed.

Secretary Hughes: An exchange of notes would probably be the best method. To save time, the United States might present a note in which it stated what it regarded as its existing rights, and Great Britain might reply as it deemed advisable. The discussion of the issue regarding the islands south of the Equator had thus far been somewhat unilateral, since the notes of the United States on this subject had not been answered by Great Britain.

It was his wish to conduct the negotiations regarding the mandates south of the Equator in a way which would be most agreeable to the British Mandatories. He believed Japan had asked for the open door in the “C” Mandates and had formally protested against the present terms. He would be happy to avoid the embarrassment to Australia and New Zealand which might well result from a joint discussion in which the Japanese and American positions would be similar.

Mr. Balfour: Would it be desirable to make a public statement of the pending Treaty and the suggested reservations?

Secretary Hughes: He suggested that it would be best to make the Four Power Treaty public as soon as possible; and to state, at the same time, that negotiations with Japan were pending regarding the former German islands north of the Equator, and that the United States had made reservations as to its rights in the mandated islands south of the Equator. The Secretary raised the query, however, whether it was desirable to announce the Four Power Treaty without a previous acceptance by Japan of the naval ratio.²³ A public announcement of this Treaty alone might be helpful in inducing the Japanese to feel that there was no ground left for holding out against the ratio; but it was possible that such action might have an opposite effect.

Mr. MacMurray: In reply to a question from the Secretary, he stated that he believed no harm would result from the announcement of the Four Power Treaty in advance of an acceptance of the naval ratio.

Secretary Hughes: The Four Power Treaty would seem to deprive Japan of any excuse for standing out longer for a higher naval ratio. If the American people should feel that Japan had improperly refused to agree to a fair naval ratio, they would vote for the building of a navy of any size asked for. He suggested that as soon as it was possible to agree on the terms of the Treaty, it would be best to have a Plenary Session and announce the completed Treaty in the most public way possible.

Mr. Balfour: What harm could come from the announcement of the Treaty by itself? It would stop damaging rumors, which would be of some advantage. It would probably add to Japan’s feeling of security; … All arguments led to the desirability of completing the agreement on the Four Power Treaty as soon as possible, and announcing it publicly at the earliest possible time.

Secretary Hughes: He said that he believed the suggestions made should be followed, and, if plans could be completed in time, a Plenary Session be called for tomorrow afternoon. In view of the early convening of a later meeting, the Secretary presented some of the modifications which had been suggested in the proposed Four Power Treaty, after which the meeting broke up at four o’clock.²⁴

16. See telegram no. 61, Apr. 2, 1921, to the Chargé in Japan, Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. ii, p. 279.
17. See telegram no. 448, Aug. 4, 1921, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, ibid., p. 106.
18. William M. Malloy (ed.), Treaties, Conventions, etc., between the United States and Other Powers, 1776–1909 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. ii, p. 1595.
19. For treaty of Feb. 11, 1922, see vol. ii, p. 600.
20. Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. i, p. 1028.
21. The substitution of the word “duplicate” for “copy”, which appeared on the original, was made by Secretary Hughes.
22. Correspondence relating to this protest not printed.
23. For papers concerning limitation of naval armament, see pp. 53 ff.
24. The following notation is attached to this memorandum: “Sir Maurice Hankey has read the draft, and states that he has no corrections to make. G. H. B. 12/21/21.”