723.2515/1341
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Chilean Ambassador (Mathieu), June 29, 1922
The Chilean Ambassador called with the memorandum which the Secretary had sent him the day before. The Ambassador said he had gone over the matter with his delegates and they had found certain difficulties. He then went on to explain that the suggestions made by the Secretary, as the Ambassador had understood them, had been submitted to his Government, and that his Government had accepted them, and that it was very awkward for him to submit any additional suggestions; that there were certain questions which occasioned them a great deal of trouble. He said that Senor Aldunate had drawn up a memorandum of his comments on the Secretary’s suggestions. The Ambassador handed the Secretary a copy of this memorandum.23 The Ambassador said that Senor Izquierdo had also made a memorandum of his comments,24 but that it was in Spanish and that he would have it translated and sent to the Secretary. The Ambassador then said that he and the delegates had prepared a form of protocol expressing what they understood to be the points agreed upon.
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[Page 488]The Secretary then took up the draft of the protocol as annexed.25 He pointed out that the recital defined the purpose of the present Conference just as the Secretary had suggested. Also that it defined the questions to be submitted in the language suggested by the Secretary. So far there was no disagreement with the points made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Secretary’s memorandum.
The Secretary then called attention to the provisions of the protocol that the Government of the United States should be the arbitrator. He said that he had not discussed the question who should be the arbitrator. The Ambassador said that this was assumed by both parties. They agreed that the United States should be the sole arbitrator. The Secretary said he was not prepared to commit his Government to that at present; that he desired to see what the provision would be, and that possibly it might be thought better to have a jurist or a board of jurists act as arbitrators instead of the Government of the United States, but that he would reserve any suggestion upon this point until further progress had been made with respect to the terms of the agreement.
Then going to the second page of the protocol, the Secretary noted that in paragraph (C) it was provided “if, however, the arbitrator should decide that a plebiscite shall not be held”, etc., which indicated that this question was to be submitted to the arbitrator for decision; this being so, the Secretary asked why it was not so stated directly as the Secretary had suggested. The Ambassador said that they did not wish to intimate that there was any doubt on the part of Chile on this question. The Secretary again pointed out that the submission of a question to arbitration would not express any doubt on the part of either party as to how the question should be decided, but simply that there was a controversy to be decided.
The Ambassador said, however, that the question was not one of substance, but one merely of form of words. The Secretary said he thought the provision of the protocol meant that the question whether a plebiscite should or should not be held should be submitted to arbitration and that he was not insistent upon any form of words. He said, however, that it was important that there should be no opportunity to argue before the arbitrator that Chile had not submitted this question. The Secretary pointed out that while the Ambassador did not make such a point the Secretary and Ambassador and others now engaged in the negotiations might pass away and the question would have to be determined by the record and that the record should be clear that the Chilean Government had bound itself to make this submission; otherwise there was no use of discussing [Page 489] the matter. The Secretary repeated that he did not care what form of words was used so long as the point was brought out.
The Secretary then said that he noted in paragraph (B) of the second page of the protocol that the expression was used “with respect to the form in which the plebiscite shall be conducted.” This was apparently in lieu of the Secretary’s suggestion that the arbitrator should determine “completely the conditions of the plebiscite, as well as the manner of holding the same.” The Ambassador said that this expression “the form” was taken from the Treaty. The Secretary said that he understood that but that it left an ambiguity as to just what was intended. The Secretary said it should be clearly understood that if the arbitrator decided that a plebiscite should be held, then everything relating to that plebiscite, that is, how it should be conducted, who should conduct it; what voters should vote; what their qualifications should be, how the voters should be registered, and, in short, every step should be determined by the arbitrator. The Secretary pointed out that if this were not the case and anything was left which the arbitrator was not competent to determine they were back in the former controversy which had lasted for years. The Ambassador finally said that they did not mean to detract from the power of the arbitrator; that they had taken the expression from the Treaty but they were perfectly willing that the word “conditions” should be used. The Secretary made it clear that he did not favor any arbitration done unless this was committed fully to the decision of the arbitrator. The Ambassador did not contest the point.
Coming to the final paragraph as to what should be done in the event of a decision that the plebiscite should not be held, the Secretary said that it was undoubtedly true the Governments of Chile and Peru should proceed promptly toward a settlement of this question by direct negotiation. So far, this was in accord with the Secretary’s suggestion, but it then became important for the reasons he had already stated to the Ambassador and which he repeated that there should be no question but that Chile would be bound to enter into negotiations. The Secretary pointed out that if they simply agreed to negotiate it would mean that Peru would address a note to the Chilean Government; that Chile would reply in three months, six months or a year, when it pleased; then Peru would address another note, and that sort of thing might continue for years. If a treaty was to be negotiated, the parties appointed commissioners. At present the advisable method was through a conference of delegates. If the parties wish to reach an agreement they adopted the means to enable them to reach an agreement; if Chile refused to adopt such means it would indicate that she did not propose to reach [Page 490] an agreement. Peru was naturally fearful that Chile, being in possession, would take exactly that course. The Secretary felt that it was quite reasonable that they should agree to adopt the means that were proper and usual in order to reach an agreement. The Secretary said that so far as he was concerned he did not care whether the conference was held here or at any other place,—the important point was that they should agree to confer.
The Ambassador said that the difficulty was that they feared that if they made such an agreement the conference would be used to force them into an arbitration as to the disposition of the territory. The Secretary said he did not see how that view could be taken; they could not be forced into anything; that they would agree to what they thought was the advisable course. Of course, they would have to act in the light of the opinion of the world, but that would be much more friendly disposed if they were in conference endeavoring to reach an agreement instead of holding aloof and refusing to confer. The Secretary said undoubtedly he anticipated there would be a reasonable agreement reached; otherwise he would not take the time to discuss the matter, but there was no basis for the suggestion that there would be an effort to compel an arbitration. The Secretary said that if he were disposed to any effort of that sort it would be made now when Peru had proposed the arbitration. The Secretary said that he felt that the case was not one for arbitration; that indeed it would be difficult to find an arbitrator who would be willing to take the responsibility of dealing with the territory when he had no principle whatever to guide him. The most that any third party could do would be to help the parties make an amicable adjustment and this was friendly offices, and not arbitration. The Secretary said that if the plebiscite were not held the parties would have to find some means of adjustment and that this was a political question, a question of expediency, statesmanship, and he had always felt was not a question for arbitration which had to proceed along some defined lines of supposed juridical principles.
The Secretary said that the whole point was whether Chile would take the position that after submitting to arbitration the question whether a plebiscite should or should not be held and upon the decision of the arbitrator that a plebiscite should not be held, in that case she would not be willing to enter into negotiations in the manner best adapted to secure an agreement. The Secretary did not see how Chile could take such a position and he therefore hoped that the suggestion would not be regarded as creating a difficulty.
The Secretary pointed out that when Peru had originally sought to treat the Treaty of Ancon as a nullity and to raise the question of the restoration of Tarapacá, the Secretary had made representations that this course should not be taken and would not have the [Page 491] sympathy of the United States and that Peru had abandoned it.26 The Secretary said that Peru had made no agreement and had not yet indicated her acceptance of the suggestion that had been made and the Secretary was simply trying to find a basis for a reasonable agreement to prevent a failure of the conference. The Secretary said he had noted that the Ambassador had stated that he had submitted to his Government the suggestions that had originally been made by the Secretary and that these had been accepted without modification. The Secretary said that while he appreciated this attitude of the Chilean Government, which was most gratifying, still, it could not have controlling significance. The Secretary had carefully avoided laying down a plan as an ultimatum to be accepted by both parties,—he was in the position of a friend making suggestions. If these suggestions met with other suggestions, new points could, of course, be presented in the light of the counter suggestions in order that some harmonious disposition of the controversy should be made. Therefore, when Peru had suggested that they had no assurance that Chile would enter into negotiations, the Secretary, not departing from the substance of his suggestions, but merely suggesting a method of procedure for carrying them into effect had said that he would be willing to suggest that the parties should agree that a conference should be held for the purpose of conducting the negotiations.
The Ambassador asked how the matter should be left and the Secretary said he would be glad to receive the memorandum of Senor Izquierdo; that after considering it he would ascertain whether the Peruvian delegates had heard from their Government; the Secretary hardly thought it worth while to take up the matter with the Peruvians until they had further instructions; when advised that they had received these instructions the Secretary would have a preliminary interview with them as he had had with the Chilean Ambassador, and that he would ask the respective Ambassadors and respective Delegates to meet together to see if their views could not be harmonized.
The matter was so left.