723.2515/1338
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Peruvian Ambassador (Pezet) and the Peruvian Delegates (Porras, Velarde), June 27, 1922
Ambassador Pezet said that he had communicated to his Government the suggestions made by the Secretary to the Ambassador for the settlement of the controversy but that it had developed there were some questions of interpretation of what the Secretary said and he thought it advisable to have an interview upon this subject. The Ambassador produced a memorandum (which he did not leave with the Secretary) stating what he had communicated to his Government with respect to the Secretary’s suggestions. It appeared from the Ambassador’s statement that this communication followed what the Secretary had suggested so far as the recital of the purpose of the present conference and the definition of the scope of the proposed submission to arbitration were concerned, but when it came to the statement of what should follow a decision by the arbitrator, in case the arbitrator decided that a plebiscite should not be had, it appeared that the Ambassador had indicated to his Government not simply that there should be direct negotiations between Chile and Peru in that event, but that this might lead to an arbitration. The thought was apparently carried as a part of the Secretary’s [Page 482] suggestion. The Secretary at once stated that he had not suggested that there should be an arbitration in this event—quite the contrary. Peru had suggested that there should be an arbitration in that event and this might be regarded as a fair and generous proposition on the part of Peru, but because of the lack of any established principles which could govern a decision of the broad question as to the disposition of the territory in case there were no plebiscite the Secretary did not think that the demand for the arbitration of such a question could be insisted upon; hence he had suggested the only alternative that it should be the subject of direct negotiation in the endeavor to have a settlement. The Secretary had indeed said that in such an event he thought the United States Government either alone or with others would be willing in a manner acceptable to both Chile and Peru to use friendly offices to aid in the adjustment of the matter. Friendly offices were quite distinct from arbitration and instead of suggesting an arbitration in that event the Secretary had recognized that it could not be insisted upon. Hence, the Secretary felt that the Ambassador had given an impression to his Government which was not justified. The Secretary then reviewed the whole situation repeating his suggestions as he had made them to Ambassador Pezet originally. The Secretary asked Mr. Phillips19 to come in, so that he might hear the discussion as much that the Secretary said was translated into Spanish for [by?] the Ambassador for the benefit of the delegates. The point was emphasized by Dr. Porras that in case they were left to direct negotiations in the event that a plebiscite were not held Chile would remain in possession of the territory. The Ambassador pointed out what he had learned was the statement made by the Chilean Government on this point in which it appeared that it had been said:
“Our view is that when it is stated that a decision of the arbitrator against the holding of the plebiscite ‘shall not modify the actual status of the territory under discussion’ it is thereby understood that we preserve our sovereignty over and possession over [of] the territory in accordance with the Treaty of 1883, which Treaty remains in full force and effect.”20
The Secretary said that he had said nothing about “sovereignty” over the territory, and this seemed to be an effort on the part of Chile to put a gloss upon the suggestion which was like the effort which the Peruvian Ambassador had made at the other end of the line and that each party was coloring a little what the Secretary had said. The Secretary pointed out that of course if it were decided [Page 483] by the arbitrator that a plebiscite could not be held the territory would remain in the possession of Chile, but this would be a temporary possession and the question ought not to be in any way embarrassed by the question of sovereignty. The Ambassador and Dr. Porras suggested that it might be well in that event to have a third party take a mandate of the territory pending the determination of the question of its disposition. The Secretary said that this was fair enough theoretically but as a practical matter it would take them as long to provide for such a mandate as it would to settle the controversy; that the Secretary was anxious to bring them to a point of agreement, so that the conference should not be in vain, but that if such a mandate should be insisted upon it would probably prevent any agreement whatever being reached. The Secretary pointed out that it would be a notable achievement for Peru to have Chile agree that the question whether a plebiscite should or should not be held should be submitted to arbitration; that it was worth while having a decision on that point. The Secretary said that if they did not reach an agreement Chile would not only retain possession but her points as well, whereas under the proposed arrangement the question in controversy as to the plebiscite would be determined and then there would be a new basis for discussion. If it were decided that there should be a plebiscite then it would be held and the question finally disposed of. If it should be decided that there should not be a plebiscite then the territory would not belong either to Chile or Peru except that it would temporarily remain under the administration of Chile until a settlement were reached and that in that event the whole question of the plebiscite being out of the way Chile would be bound in good faith to endeavor to effect a settlement and the opinion of the world would require a settlement.
The Ambassador emphasized the point that they had no assurance that Chile would enter into negotiations. The Secretary replied that Chile would be bound in good faith to enter into negotiations. The Ambassador pointed out that this might take some time, as they would be free to protract negotiations. The Secretary said that this was true but that it was an inevitable consequence of the necessity for referring the matter to negotiation. The Secretary pointed out that if they reached no agreement at all and the conference failed they would be no better off whereas if they made the submission to arbitration they would at least have so much decided and be in a better position in case the plebiscite were not held to arrange for some practicable method of disposing of the territory. In response to further observations as to the lack of assurance that Chile would enter into negotiations the Secretary said that it was entirely fair that they should agree either in their [Page 484] protocol or by their notes, as they might find convenient, that they should enter promptly into negotiations within a time fixed; further, the Secretary said that he was quite willing to make the suggestion that the negotiations should be promptly conducted that both parties should agree in the event stated to send delegates to a conference for the purpose of effecting a settlement and that this conference might be held in Washington. It was understood that the Ambassador and the delegates would take the matter up further with the Peruvian Government.