723.2515/1336
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Peruvian Ambassador (Pezet), June 21, 1922
The Peruvian Ambassador called at the request of the Secretary. The Secretary referred to the interview with the Ambassador on June seventh at which the Ambassador left with the Secretary a memorandum18 with respect to the state of the conference, of negotiations and the attitudes of Peru and Chile, respectively. The [Page 477] Secretary said that a memorandum covering the same matters had been left with him by the Chilean Ambassador.
The Secretary said that he desired to furnish any assistance within his power and to this end thought it advisable that he should speak in an entirely personal and informal way. The Secretary said that he had given the matter very close study, endeavoring in the first place to appreciate the points of absolute difference and the area within which there could be discussion with a prospect of agreement. For example, when Peru took the position that the Treaty of Ancon should be regarded as a nullity and Tarapaca returned to Peru, it was at once apparent that if this position were maintained nothing could come of the negotiations; that this meant an entire failure of the conference. On the other hand, the Secretary was impressed with the fact that the Chilean position that there was nothing to determine but the method of holding the plebiscite under Article 3 of the Treaty could not be maintained; he assumed that if this position were maintained nothing could come of the conference. The Secretary said that he had carefully considered the proposition made by Peru that the question should be submitted to arbitration, whether under existing conditions a plebiscite should be had and, if so, under what conditions. He thought this entirely reasonable, that this had relation to the actual question in controversy. The Secretary said that he also appreciated the friendly spirit that had led Peru to propose further that if the arbitrator should decide that a plebiscite under existing conditions should not be had the arbitrator should then proceed to decide as to the disposition of the territory in question. The Secretary said that this was a reasonable position from the standpoint of Peru for entertaining the view that the plebiscite should not be had Peru naturally looked to the ultimate solution of the problem as to the disposition of the territory, and that, of course, it was extremely desirable, if possible, that the whole controversy in the supposed contingency should be ended. The Secretary pointed out that, however desirable such a solution from a practical standpoint would be, there were theoretical objections that could be raised to an arbitration having so broad a scope. It could be pointed out that never had an arbitrator been vested with any such broad authority; that there was no juridical authority that could determine the disposition of the territory; that the arbitrator would be left to his own will without any standard which could be invoked; and that while it could be supposed that the arbitrator would act with good judgment and a sense of equity it might easily be rejected [objected?] by a country which was asked to assent to an arbitration that it could not take the chance of an arbitrary or capricious decision and submit a matter to arbitration when there were no principles of decision which would apply.
[Page 478]The Secretary pointed out that if it were impossible to reach an agreement in the conference it was extremely important that the failure should not be ascribed to the making of a demand which could not be theoretically justified and that if Peru insisted upon such a broad submission to arbitration in the supposed contingency of the arbitrator’s holding that a plebiscite should not be had it would be a comparatively easy matter for Chile to justify her refusal and decide that she could not be asked to subscribe to such a broad submission. It would be easy for Chile, if the government desired to refuse such a settlement, to maintain her position before the world, and while it was important that the whole controversy should be solved, and while an agreement might be made for the disposition of the territory, if the plebiscite could be had, it was a different thing to insist as a sine qua non that this matter should be left to an arbitrator. The Secretary said also that it would be to the advantage of Peru and to both countries not to attempt so much, or to insist upon so much as to cause a failure of the entire negotiations.
The Secretary said that he had taken as a basis for considering [consideration?] what he understood had been a tentative arrangement suggested in interviews between Dr. Porras and Dr. Izquierdo. The Secretary read the recital of the purpose of the conference as follows:
“For the purpose of determining the conditions for the fulfilment of the unfulfilled clauses of the Treaty of Ancon.”
He said that he understood that this was objected to by Peru and he appreciated fully the grounds for that objection for the recital was inadequate and seemed to indicate that the purpose of the conference was merely to determine the conditions of the plebiscite. The Secretary suggested that in lieu of this recital the following should be used:
“For the purpose of considering the settlement of the long-standing controversy with respect to the unfulfilled provisions of the Treaty of Ancon.”
The Secretary said that this followed the language of the invitation. The Secretary said that he understood that Peru objected also to Article (a) of paragraph 1 of the Porras-Izquierdo proposal which was as follows:
“The difficulties relating to the fulfillment of Article 3 of the Treaty.”
The objection, the Secretary thought, was well taken. He suggested the following substitute:
“The difficulties arising out of the unfulfilled provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of Ancon.”
The Secretary said that this embraced the question whether under existing conditions a plebiscite should be had and if so the terms and conditions of the plebiscite. It should also be understood that the arbitrator should not be empowered, in case it were decided that the plebiscite should not be held, to go on and dispose of the territory in any manner he saw fit. This understanding could be reached by an exchange of notes. In this contingency the matter of the disposition of the territory would be open to direct negotiations. The Secretary added that speaking for himself he believed that the United States would be very glad to use its good offices either alone or in conjunction with Argentina and Brazil in a manner acceptable to both Peru and Chile to aid in bringing about a proper disposition of the territory in the contingency supposed.
The Ambassador thanked the Secretary and reviewed in a general way the history of the negotiations as stated in the memorandum which he left with the Secretary on June 7. He also emphasized the importance of having the entire controversy settled and said if it were held that a plebiscite should not be had and the matter was taken up by direct negotiations he feared that the negotiations would be prolonged and that no result would be accomplished; that he thought what was needed was pressure by the United States to induce a complete settlement at this time. The Secretary said that it would be a great victory for Peru to have Chile agree to submit to arbitration the question whether a plebiscite should be had; that Chile had never up to this time indicated her willingness to arbitrate a question of this sort; that this was the initial problem; that if Peru in her desire to get more should make impossible such a disposition of the controversy she would gain nothing by it. On the other hand, if the United States used its influence in suggesting that Chile should submit to arbitration the broad question of the disposition of the territory, in the event that a plebiscite could not be had, it would take a position that it would be difficult to defend and [it would be] quite easy for Chile to resist an appeal to the public opinion of the world as, for the reasons already stated, no country could be required to give such a broad submission to arbitration when no principles could be invoked.
The Secretary said that the Ambassador should remember that in case it were held by a combined decision that the plebiscite should not be had an entirely new situation would arise; that up to date Chile had retained possession under the Treaty and the discussion had been about a plebiscite; but that if it were decided that finally a plebiscite should not be had no nation could afford to merely make arbitrary disposition of the territory and refuse to enter into negotiations with respect to its decision; that the elimination of the discussion [Page 480] as to the provisions of the Treaty with respect to the plebiscite would be an enormous gain either by having the plebiscite held in case the arbitrator decided in its favor or through having it determined that there should be no plebiscite would [and?] would require the nations to negotiate with respect to territory belonging to neither of them.
The Secretary said that while he quite agreed with the Ambassador that the whole controversy should be disposed of at this time, still, it must be remembered that this could not be accomplished except by agreement and that it would be foolish to prevent any agreement being obtained by asking too much; that one step should be taken at a time and that the clear step now to be taken was the disposition of the controversy over the plebiscite. The Secretary said he would be very glad if the parties were able to agree upon something further. The Secretary called attention to the fact that this was not the beginning of the conference; that if it were, the Secretary would advise both parties most strongly to conclude the matter and leave nothing open to further negotiation. But the Secretary was advised that after weeks of effort they had made no progress whatever and that no propositions had been accepted; that he had to consider the matter in this phase; the Secretary suggested that he wished to make suggestions which could not be opposed because of their inherently reasonable character; that he did not think that Chile should oppose the submission to arbitration of the question whether a plebiscite should be had, but that if more were asked good grounds for opposition could be found.
The Ambassador suggested that the conference ought to be held in existence until the main questions were determined, so that negotiations could be immediately resumed.
The Secretary suggested that it would be entirely possible to propose that in case it were decided by the arbitrator that a plebiscite should not be had, that the parties should promise to enter into direct negotiations within a given period, and that it might be possible within that time to send their delegates to the conference in Washingon for that purpose. The Secretary stated that he felt that in that event negotiations would be necessary and that neither party could afford to refuse them. The Ambassador said he would have to consult his Government.