The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had called merely to present a
proposed statement which he desired to make public, with respect to the
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in case the Secretary had no
objection; that his Government had instructed him not to publish it if
there was objection. The Ambassador then handed the attached statement
to the Secretary who read it. The Secretary said that he would not
undertake to interpose any objection to the publication of the
statement; he would like to have it clearly understood that the
statement if made public by the Ambassador was to be made exclusively on
his own responsibility and not with the concurrence of this Government;
this Government did not desire to make any statement regarding the
publication or to assume any responsibility whatever in the matter. With
this understanding the Secretary had no objection.
[Annex]
Statement by the Japanese Ambassador (Shidehara)55
Negotiations looking to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
have not yet begun. In the meantime, a campaign seems to be actively
at work misrepresenting the possible effect of the Alliance upon the
United States. By no stretch of the imagination can it be honestly
stated that the Alliance was ever designed or remotely intended as
an instrument of hostility or even defense against the United
States.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in its history for nearly twenty years,
has twice been renewed. In each case, the fundamental policy
underlying it has remained unchanged. It aims permanently to
preserve and to consolidate the general peace of the Far East. The
original Agreement of 1902, in line with that policy, was calculated
[Page 317]
to localize any war
which might be forced upon either Contracting Party in defense of
its defined interests or vital security. It was made when China was
under menace of foreign aggression; and the United States, showing
the utmost friendliness towards both parties to the Alliance, viewed
the compact with sympathy and approval.
In 1905, when the Alliance was renewed and revised to meet the
changed conditions that followed the Russo-Japanese war, no thought
occurred to the statesmen of either country that the United States
might possibly become a potential enemy of either, and for that
reason, and that alone, no provision was inserted taking so remote a
contingency into consideration.
The Alliance was again revised in 1911, and Article IV of that
Agreement contains the following provision:
“Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of
general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that
nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting
Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom
such treaty of arbitration is in force.”
This provision, in its relation to the United States, has often been
made the subject of conflicting interpretations. To a practical
mind, however, the circumstances which led up to its inclusion
should at once serve to remove all doubt regarding its significance.
The idea of revising the Alliance in 1911 was conceived primarily
with the object of facilitating the negotiations which were known to
be then in progress between London and Washington for the conclusion
of a general arbitration treaty. Neither Japan nor Great Britain has
ever contemplated, under the Alliance, any casus
foederis prejudicial or inimical to the interests of the
United States; and any plan designed to remove the possibility of an
armed conflict between the United States and Great Britain was of
course agreeable to Japan. It was in pursuance of this policy that
the quoted provision of Article IV was adopted.
The same policy inspires Japan as strongly today as ever before. It
has not, in any degree, been affected by the fact that the
Anglo-American general arbitration treaty56 failed to secure the
approval of the United States Senate. Nor is it practically
necessary to carry on the legal analysis of the question as to
whether the Peace Commission Treaty, signed and ratified by the
United States and Great Britain in 1914,57 should be construed as a general arbitration
treaty within the meaning of Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese
Agreement. For, apart from that question, it was already well
understood at the
[Page 318]
time of
negotiating the existing Agreement that the Alliance should in no
case be directed against the United States.
In explanation of Japan’s attitude, Count Uchida, the Japanese
Foreign Minister, made the following statement to the Budget
Committee of the Japanese House of Representatives on February 4,
1921.
“As far as I understand, when Article 4 of the treaty
(Anglo-Japanese Alliance) was inserted, the United States was
specifically in mind, and therefore, as a practical matter, the
question whether the general arbitration treaty mentioned in
Article 4 has been ratified by the United States Senate or not
makes no particular difference. In other words, looking at the
matter from a broad point of view, we can safely say that
already at the time of the conclusion of the treaty
(Anglo-Japanese Alliance) it was understood that there should be
no application of this treaty to the United States.”
Japan is naturally anxious to strengthen the ties of friendship and
loyal co-operation between herself and the British Empire, which she
regards as of the utmost importance to the stability of the Far
East. At the same time, it is the firm and fixed determination of
Japan to permit nothing to hamper her traditional relations of good
will and good understanding with the United States. She is satisfied
that these two affiliations are in no way incompatible, but, on the
contrary, complementary and even essential to each other.
Charges have sometimes been made that the Alliance tends to encourage
aggressive designs on the part of Japan in China. If this were the
case, it would be contrary to the preamble of the Agreement, which
provides for,
“The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in
China by insuring the independence and integrity of the
Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for
the commerce and industry of all nations in China.”
Japan fully realizes that any such venture of aggression would be not
only hopeless of attainment but destructive of her own security and
welfare. She sincerely wishes for China an early achievement of
peace, unity and stable government. She desires to cultivate her
relations with that country along the path of mutual respect and
helpfulness. Her vast commercial interests alone, if for no other
consideration, point unmistakably to the wisdom of such a policy.
This is a basic principle of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In no
adverse direction has the Alliance ever exerted its influence.
