Accordingly, a meeting was held today in the Astoria, attended by Mr.
Hoover, Professor
Attolico and myself. Monsieur Clémentel was
invited but was prevented from coming. At that meeting it was agreed
that Mr. Hoover should send
immediately the following reply to Nansen’s question at the end of the Lenin telegram:
We further agreed upon the memorandum of which I also send you a copy.
Will you please inform the Supreme Council.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum on the Nansen Proposal
Lenin’s reply to Nansen really amounts to this:
“I shall be very glad to accept supplies but not to cease from
fighting, though I would be prepared to enter into negotiations for
a general Russian peace.”
It is now for the Associated Governments to take the next step, and
before deciding what that step should be they must make up their
minds what is to be their policy in Russia.
It seems to me they have two courses open to them: They may either
decide that so long as the Bolshevik Government is in power there is
no hope for Russian peace, and that therefore the first thing to do
is to smash the Bolsheviks. If this is to be their line they must
strain every nerve to support Koltchak, Denikin, the Letts, the Esthonians, the Poles, and
even the Finns in attacking Russia. They must furnish them with
supplies and money and instructors, and do everything to make their
coming campaign against the Bolsheviks successful. They must also
break off all relations direct and indirect with the Bolsheviks, and
advise Nansen to say that in
view of Lenin’s response his
scheme for relief is at an end, and that nothing further of that
sort can be looked for by the Russian Government. That is one
policy. It may be the right one, but it undoubtedly involves much
further bloodshed and destruction of material wealth.
The other policy would be to ask the military authorities to define
as nearly as they can what is the position of the various forces
fighting in Russia. As soon as the line dividing the combatants has
thus been determined, each and all of them should be admonished to
retire, say, 10 kilometres on their own side of the line, and to
refrain from all future hostilities. They would be told that
international commissaries would be sent to the various fronts to
see that these directions were obeyed. If, and so far as, they were
obeyed, the Associated Powers would do their utmost to supply to the
various Governments concerned food and clothing and other
necessaries. If some refuse and some accept, those who accept should
be supported. Those who refused would be deprived of all assistance.
The Governments should further be informed that the Associated
Powers or the Council of the League of Nations would immediately
take into consideration the whole Russian problem. Their first step
would be to call upon all sections of the Russian people, or any
part of them who express their adherence to this policy, to elect by
free and universal suffrage, under the supervision of the League of
Nations, a constituent assembly for the purpose of determining the
future constitution of the Russian Government.
[Page 117]
In the meantime Nansen would be advised to say that
so long as the Soviet Government declined to abstain from fighting
he was powerless to help them.
This policy is in accordance with the general principle underlying
the Covenant of the League of Nations—namely, that national
grievances must not be settled by resort to arms unless every other
possible means of settling them has been first tried. It does not in
any way prejudge the rights of any Russian quarrels, but it proceeds
upon the principle that in any case peace is to the interest of all
concerned.
I believe that either of these policies has a fair chance of success,
and may be defended by powerful arguments. What is not defensible is
a combination of the two: a suggestion that Lenin must cease fighting while we
are supplying arms and equipment to Denikin and Koltchak; or, conversely, that Koltchak and Denikin should be encouraged to
wage war against Lenin while
we are negotiating with the latter to give him economic assistance.
Compromises of this kind can only lead to a prolongation of
hostilities in Russia, and the spreading in that country of the
belief that the Associated Powers cannot be trusted.
May 16, 1919.
[For the report of the discussion by the Council of Four of the
Soviet reply to the Nansen
proposal, see Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
États-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20, 1919, at 11 a.m., p. 351.]
