Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia

861.77/1056a: Circular Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Atherton)²³

Washington, August 30, 1919, 4 p.m.

Following is the text of a note which you will please leave with the Minister of Foreign Affairs at once:

“Excellency: Under special instructions from my Government, I am directed to call Your Excellency’s attention to the developments which have attended the joint efforts of Japan and the United States to render assistance to Russia first, through the sending of their military forces and, second, through the adoption of the Siberian railway plan in conjunction with the other Allied Governments.

You will recall the circumstances which attended the joint decision of our two Governments in regard to the sending of military forces. The purpose of the expedition was fully expressed, on the part of the United States, in an Aide Memoire handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington July 17, 1918,²⁵ and, subsequently, in an official statement given to the press by the Acting Secretary of State.²⁶ In both of these statements of policy it was made clear first, that military action in Siberia was admissible, as the Government of the United States saw the circumstances at the time, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance.

At the same time, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, on behalf of his Government, submitted to the Secretary of State a declaration of purpose on the part of Japan²⁷ which was fully consonant with the purpose of this Government and which was based upon a sentiment of sincere friendship towards the Russian people.

As time passed it became more and more evident that the restoration of railway traffic in Siberia was not only a vital element in such military assistance to the Russians and Czechs as had already been afforded, but equally so in connection with any economic assistance in Siberia, such as was contemplated by this Government and expressed in an Aide Memoire to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington August 10 [3?] 1918.²⁸

My Government has instructed me to reiterate to Your Excellency the gratification with which, consequently, it received the plan for supervising the Siberian railways, which was proposed by the Government of Japan and which so fully accorded with the purpose of the United States as outlined at some length in a copy of a circular telegram²⁹ which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington September 14, 1918. As Your Excellency will recall, the plan proposed by Japan³⁰ was supplemented by a memorandum submitted by Ambassador Morris³¹ and fully concurred in by the Japanese Foreign Office.

The plan provides that the general supervision of the railways shall be exercised by a special Inter-Allied Committee—the Committee which is now actually established at Vladivostok. It further stipulates that a Technical Board and an Allied Military Transportation Board shall be placed under the control of the Committee. The duties of these two boards and also of the Committee are outlined quite simply and clearly. Under the plan, the protection of the railways is placed under the Allied military forces.

The memorandum supplementing the plan, in addition to fixing an understanding as to the membership of the Inter-Allied Committee and the two boards under its control, and also giving assurance for effective use of the services of Mr. John F. Stevens, provides that the plan itself shall be interpreted as a sincere effort to operate the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways in the interest of the Russian people with a view to their ultimate return to those in interest without impairing any existing rights. It furthermore stipulates, without any possibility of misinterpretation, that in entrusting to Mr. Stevens as President of the Technical Board, the technical operation of these railways, it is to be understood that the Governments of Japan and the United States are prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective.

The Government of the United States views the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways as the one element most necessary to economic and political prosperity in Siberia today; as the fundamental condition precedent to the restoration of normal economic life and the reestablishment of political stability. Without it, it does not seem possible that there can be the slightest improvement in the present distressing conditions. Clothes, medical supplies and goods cannot be shipped into Siberia nor can the produce of the country itself be shipped out. The railways are the only avenues of communication. Consequently, my Government considers as of the utmost importance any developments which may tend to block them.

The developments to which I am directed to call Your Excellency’s attention have to do with the radical difference of interpretation, with its consequent difficulties of friendly cooperation, which have been placed upon the duties required of the Allied military forces in protecting the railways and also in giving to Mr. Stevens the authority and support necessary to make his efforts effective. As you are aware, the United States understands the Allied military forces are not only obligated to protect the railways, free from interruption, but also wherever they may be in control to forward the operation of the general plan. This is especially true as regards the duties of the United States and Japan in their mutual obligations to give to Mr. Stevens the degree of authority and support necessary to make fully effective the efforts of himself and, consequently, of the Allied Engineers under his direction. The Engineers are to be protected as a vital element in the protection of the railways.

On the other hand the Imperial Government seems to understand that the protection of the railways, so far as it may concern Japanese troops, is limited strictly to safeguarding railway property and keeping the line open and entails no obligation whatever for cooperation on the part of Japanese forces in furthering the general operation of the plan itself. To illustrate one of the phases of this question, allow me to recall to Your Excellency the instructions which the Japanese military representative at Omsk has now received to the effect that any disagreement between a Russian under the authority of the Omsk Government and a National of any country engaged in the operation or protection of the railways, must be a matter for discussion between the Omsk Government and the Government of the other persons involved. In practice this understanding has resulted in a definite refusal on the part of Japanese military commanders to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors in the territory controlled by General Semenoff.

Such an understanding seems to the United States to be wholly inadmissible. As Your Excellency is aware, the Omsk Government is not recognized by the United States nor is my Government advised that recognition has been accorded it by Japan. Furthermore, the Omsk Government is not referred to in the plan proposed by Japan and it is only by a later development of circumstance that the Russian Chairman has any connection with Admiral Kolchak. But quite aside from any suggestion to abandon the definite character of the plan by injecting into it new elements of authority, it is as well known to the Government of Japan as to that of the United States that the Government of Admiral Kolchak is wholly favorable to the Allied operation of the railways and has only recently testified to this attitude conclusively by ordering Russian railway authorities to waive all existing Russian legal restrictions or regulations which might otherwise interfere with our present efforts. Hostile actions of Russians acting in the name of the Omsk authorities can, therefore, only be in disobedience to express instructions. Nevertheless, Japanese military commanders have allowed conditions to arise in sections of the railways guarded by Japan which have threatened the withdrawal of Allied engineers, because of the refusal of these commanders to protect the lives and property of the engineers in the performance of the duties imposed upon them by the plan proposed by Japan.

Consequently, the continued disposition, now apparent as a definite policy, on the part of Japan through its military commanders in Siberia, to refuse the support of its military forces in making effective in practice the declared purposes of the agreement, has been viewed by my Government with grave concern, especially so as the United States has hitherto been confident in the hope that a consistent policy of frankness might lead to a clear and thorough accord on all questions in which the United States and Japan are both obligated to assume responsibilities.

The United States Government feels it can not be held responsible for that for which it is not in fact responsible. The entire plan was predicated on the cooperation of the two governments. With the failure of the Japanese officials to lend their cooperation in such an elemental manner a situation is created which the Government of the United States must immediately consider from the point of view of fixing the responsibility for the failure of the enterprise which has been the cause of so much labor and from which so much of benefit was to be expected for the Russian people.

It is, nevertheless, in a spirit of sincere friendship that the Government of the United States desires me to bring to Your Excellency’s attention the fact that it is now confronted with the necessity of deciding, after repeated and frank efforts to arrive at a mutual understanding of purpose as regards an international undertaking which was accepted only after searching discussion and consideration, whether the only course practicable for the United States to pursue is an entire withdrawal from all further efforts to cooperate in Siberia, to be followed, if need be, by a public statement of the reasons for such action, since it might be misunderstood if no explanation is made.

I am directed to add that the Government of the United States has a clear appreciation of the consequences of such action, especially as it is burdened with a deep sense of obligation towards Russia, whose people contributed such a vital share in the triumph of the Allied and Associated Governments over the Central Powers. Moreover, my Government is firmly convinced that the future welfare of all Governments is to be based upon a community of interest which is about to replace permanently the former balances of power and other bargains of self-interest and aggrandizement on the part of one nation or group of nations at the expense of others. With the deepest regret my Government finds that the attitude of Japan in this matter raises the question as to whether this view of international relations is shared by the Imperial Government.

At the same time, I am to assure you that this perfectly clear and frank statement of the circumstances of the case, as the Government of the United States sees them, and of the only course of action which seems logically to follow, are presented in the firm belief that the traditional friendship of our two countries will assure a thorough understanding on the part of Japan.

In conclusion allow me to add for Your Excellency’s information that copies of this note are being communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and China and to the Russian Ambassador at Washington.”

Lansing

23. See last paragraph for names of countries to which this telegram was also sent.
25. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. ii, pp. 287–290.
26. Ibid., pp. 328–329.
27. Ibid., pp. 324–325.
28. Ibid., pp. 328–329.
29. Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 249–252 and 253–254.
30. Ante, p. 239.
31. See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Jan. 9, 12 p.m, p. 236.