Paris Peace Conference 861 L.00/40
Memorandum by Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., of the Russian Section, Commission to Negotiate Peace
Memorandum: Luncheon with S. E. Morison, J. V. Fuller, and myself,62 and Mr. Mostowski, Prof. Waldemar, Mr. Ycas and Mgr. Olsauskis-Olsevski.63
At luncheon to-day I attempted to persuade the four Lithuanians who were present that it would be desirable for them to accept the Prinkipo Conference. Monsignor Olsauskis-Olsevski was violently opposed.
Prof. Waldemar said that their position was that they had neither accepted nor refused this invitation and that their only objection to refusing was that in its present form the invitation would seem to involve the compromise by this acceptance of their aspirations towards independence. I said that in my opinion no such implication could be given, or in any event would be made. He also said said that he did not believe it was possible that the Bolshevists would consent to an armistice which would make easier the position of the Baltic States. I said that, speaking personally, I could not see how the United States Government could request an armistice for, or favorable to, governments which did not accept that invitation, but that I was strongly of the belief that in case the Baltic Governments did accept, the United States would endeavor immediately to secure an armistice and if possible, withdrawal of Bolshevist forces from these countries. Waldemar left the subject by saying that the question was by no means decided, and that he hoped some solution could be reached.
Mr. Ycas, I found flatly favorable to the Prinkipo Conference. When the invitation was issued he telegraphed from Switzerland in favor of acceptance and he offered to bring me a copy of the telegram on his return from his projected visit to Switzerland.
[Page 73]He further said that the Lithuanian delegates had been empowered to accept such an invitation, and as proof showed me his mandate, which I examined. It certainly gives power to conduct negotiations at Prinkipo. He added that he hoped to persuade Waldemar; and also that there were three delegates from Berlin, Dr. Runickis, Prof. Capinskas, and Dr. Bizauskas, who are at the Lithuanian Embassy in Berlin, 69 Augsberger Str., who could be reached by telegraph in care of Adlon, General Harries. He said that he would telegraph for their immediate return to Paris to consider this question, saying that when they arrived, the majority of the Lithuanian government would be in favor of accepting the invitation, and he asked me to telegraph on our side. I said that I could not speak for the Commission, but that it was possible that the Government might see fit to make a statement to the Lithuanian Government on this question, and I said that we should perhaps be able to secure as preliminary to the Prinkipo Conference some sort of armistice, possibly providing for withdrawal from the Baltic States, and that, in any event, I could not see that they had anything to lose by accepting.
Ycas was Minister of Finance [sic] in the ministry of Prince Lvov and Kerensky, and he was of the Duma Committee, which visited the French, British, and Italian fronts in 1916. Next to Mgr. Olsauskis-Olsevski, I should say that he was the strongest member of the Lithuanian party.
Waldemar told me that the withdrawal of the Germans through within their own limits left the country substantially at the mercy of the Bolshevist troops. He thought that three thousand men from the Allies would be sufficient to relieve the country. He said that they had 12,000 men but needed money.