861.00/5264: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received September 24, 8:23 a.m.]
Your July 11th, 3 [6] p.m.66 and September 5, 5 p.m.67 Although the military situation at Omsk appears for the moment less acute, the general conditions as I view them remain unchanged. The Czechs are increasingly restless and more openly antagonistic to the Kolchak government. Recently they have been encouraging disaffected groups to take over local administration, call some form of representative assembly and organize a new government. The activities of the Zemstvos in Vladivostok as reported to the Department by Smith are illustrative of this general movement. Such a movement has little prospect of success and it is more likely that the Czechs will move eastward in which event Kolchak will probably lose control of the region from Irkutsk to Omsk. The faction [action?] of the Czechs will be the determining factor in western Siberia.
The outstanding fact in eastern Siberia is the formal recognition by Kolchak of both Kalmikoff and Semenoff. As it is impossible for our agencies to cooperate with these Atamans we now find ourselves in disagreement not only with the Japanese policy but also with the official representatives of the Kolchak government in Eastern Siberia. We thus have the doubly anomalous situation that the Czechs by their presence are responsible for the continued existence of a Government against which they are now intriguing while we are endeavoring to find means of cooperation with a Government many of whose representatives are openly hostile. The Japanese Government apparently fears increasing disorder and is sending troops to strengthen its forces in the Usuri and Amur districts. I am still of the opinion that Kolchak has not sufficient strength or popular support to control these conditions without Allied assistance [Page 433] of the character suggested in my reports from Omsk. As such assistance is impracticable I now submit for the consideration of the Department my conclusions as to our immediate policy. The political conditions continue so uncertain and unsettled that for the time being it would seem necessary to treat them as of secondary importance and concentrate our efforts toward the economic relief of the population. We cannot afford to remain in Siberia this winter without some attempt to relieve the terrible want and suffering which is inevitable.
The essential conditions of this relief are;
- 1.
- An agreement with the Japanese Government on the method of guarding the operation of the railways and in regard to the treatment of Semenoff and Kalmikoff. I am conferring upon these questions with Matsudaira and the Japanese military authorities here. General Oi, the new commander, professes concurrence in our Government’s views and willingness to issue an order modifying Otani’s instructions. I have asked Stevens to join me and it is possible that he and Oi may be able to reach a practicable working agreement. Such results would greatly simplify the issue raised by the Department’s recent note68 which I am informed has created considerable irritation and the answer to which is being delayed until my return to Tokyo.
- 2.
- If this agreement can be reached we should continue the Railway Service Corps with such changes in personnel and organization as Mr. Stevens may suggest. An additional emergency Allied credit of $20,000,000 would in my judgment more than cover all the financial requirements. This would not be needed before January the first.
- 3.
- An Allied credit of $75,000,000 for the purchase of commodities required. As the Allies are not in a position to give Kolchak the military support necessary to strengthen his government and release it from the military authorities now controlling it, I do not see how we can give it recognition and grant the credits to it. Would it be feasible temporarily to place the port of Vladivostok under an Allied economic commission, grant the credits directly to this commission for allotment and give it authority to supervise distribution in Siberia of the goods purchased? Such a suggestion may seem extreme but we must face the facts that no government now exercises any real authority in Siberia. The population is exhausted, local administration is corrupt and inefficient, pestilence threatens. I think that we should make every effort to revive economic life and render it possible for the population to go to work. [Page 434] Otherwise I fear that the country will fall into political chaos and become a field of international intrigue if not conflict.
- 4.
- This or any economic plan would require that we continue our military forces at their present strength to be used not only in guarding sections of the railway but also in protecting economic and Red Cross activities. In addition I hope that our Government will approve General Graves’ request in his telegram to the War Department, number 468, for one battalion of field or mountain artillery. These are needed if our forces are to be secure against possible attacks by Cossack armored trams [trains?]. I also believe that it would be an advantage if the War Department would assign on General Graves’ staff a brigadier general, perhaps one of the younger men who has had foreign service and could assist General Graves in his contacts with Allied military representatives.
- 5.
- I submit that we should in any event continue as long as possible the Red Cross work. Compared to the need its budget is inadequate and its activity consequently limited but it still remains our most valuable constructive work. I understand from Doctor Teusler that the War Department is asking Congressional authority to transfer to the Red Cross for work in Siberia the material, supplies, and instruments no longer required by our own army. It would be difficult to overstate the need of such supplies.
- 6.
- In regard to military supplies to the Kolchak government I refer to General Graves’ telegram to the War Department, number 467,69 reporting his action in reference to rifles, and to your September 18, 6 p.m.,70 just received. General Graves has simply delayed delivery until he can devise some method of guarding the rifles and ammunition as far as Irkutsk so that they will not fall into hostile hands. I entirely concur in the Department’s conclusions that the contract should be carried out.
Replying to your September 19, 5 p.m.71 I am planning to leave for Tokyo this week. I have remained longer than I expected in order to attend the conferences between Oi and Stevens.