861.01/134: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received September 23, 8:27 a.m.]
From [Harris at] Omsk.
386, September 19, 5 p.m. Referring to my September 12, 4 p.m. [noon?].59 I have held to the opinion that Mr. Morris has been greatly misquoted in this matter but the following telegrams received from O’Reilly, British Deputy Commissioner and successor to Sir Charles Eliot, to British Consul Hodgson in Omsk lead me to believe that the Ambassador has changed his mind since leaving Omsk. On September 11th O’Reilly telegraphed Hodgson concerning the new revolutionary movement in the Far East in substance as follows:
Ambassador Morris, recently arrived here, has received encouraging impression as to the new movement. He states that to make Kolchak government effective barrier to Bolshevism would require impracticable amount of assistance. He therefore regards new movement as preferable and is prepared to recommend that if securely [Page 428] established it should at once be recognized and assisted economically. Morris says that he has advised his visitors that in the event of their success they should retain men of capacity who have been serving Russia capably in present administration. Morris evidently expects and hopes that the new movement will succeed.
On September 14th O’Reilly again telegraphs Hodgson as follows:
Morris has stated that his favorable inclination to the movement should not be understood as final, as he is still making inquiry as to its strength and influence. He is convinced, however, that the present government has not got a friend from Omsk to Vladivostok and if it falls, as it apparently must, it would be well that it should be succeeded by a regime well organized in advance and capable of taking over the power without [sic] the least possible disturbances.
I am informed that O’Reilly has forwarded these two telegrams to London Foreign Office.
If this represents Ambassador Morris’ true views the change is incomprehensible to me. On August 11th, 8 a.m., I telegraphed Secretary of State60 that I was fully in accord with the views and recommendations of the Ambassador as expressed in his August 11, 11 a.m.61 and August 12, 5 a.m.62 As sincerely as I favored his recommendations in these two telegrams, I desire to go on record as being absolutely and unalterably opposed to the views set forth in Mr. O’Reilly’s communications to Mr. Hodgson if such represent the Ambassador’s present view of the situation.
I suggest in this connection that the Department refer to my March 5, 8 p.m.,63 wherein I have fully set forth my views concerning the Social Revolutionary parties in Siberia and especially what I thought of the Left wing which at the present time, together with all the disgruntled elements in eastern Siberia, is attempting to form a government which may eventually receive support of the Allies. In my judgement this movement can have but one result, namely, to undermine and overthrow by its machinations in the rear of the Kolchak government and army the influence and prestige of this government and army at most crucial moment of its history, when they are fighting a life and death battle with Bolshevism not very far from the city of Omsk. In my judgement no such party formed in eastern Siberia can exist, and should it come into power for a short time, it will only exist long enough to open the floodgates of Bolshevism which will immediately spread from Omsk eastward to Vladivostok. There is no difference in fundamental principles between the Left [Page 429] Social Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviki. While Kolchak and his government are sadly lacking in many things which make for perfection, yet I assure the Department that we are standing today face to face with but one solution of this question, namely, it is Kolchak or Bolshevism. If Kolchak falls the political intrigues which will follow this will offer opportunities and advantages that both Germany and Japan are looking for.
In my best judgement, substantiated by the experience of two years on the spot, and having been in the closest touch with all the political parties and governments which have come and gone in Siberia, I recommend that the United States Government together with our Allies meet this question fairly and squarely by recognizing Kolchak before the whole world as a de facto Government and give him all possible support which lies in our power.
In his darkest hour of need I recommend that President Wilson act upon Ambassador Morris’ suggestion in his August 12, 5 a.m.,64 and send a purely personal message to Admiral Kolchak expressing confidence in his motives and purposes and appreciation of the serious difficulties which confront him and the hope that he may meet them successfully thereby permitting our Government to assist the Russian people in a larger way to establish the liberal institutions for which these people are struggling.
The attention and encouragement which the foreign representatives in Vladivostok appear to be giving this new movement is [are] creating a deplorable impression in Omsk and no more unfortunate moment could have been chosen for this than at the time when Kolchak is at the front successfully opposing the Bolsheviki.
French Minister for Foreign Affairs Pichon has telegraphed Billsmeri [De Martel?] that the French representatives in Siberia should not countenance any opposition to Kolchak and should give him loyal support.
Russian, Czech, and British military staffs inform me that the situation at the front is favorable and that the Siberian Army on the whole is making progress and doing something more than holding its own. The first army on the north is improving its situation and even advancing while the central and southern armies are also advancing. As much as it is possible to judge of the present situation I am inclined to the belief that Omsk will not be captured and that the city and the front will be held through the winter. This would certainly be the case if this government could but receive the promised military supplies which it is anxiously awaiting from abroad.
[Page 430]I desire to state further that I have been opposed from the beginning to the evacuation of the American Red Cross nurses from Omsk. I gave a passive consent to their evacuation from this city upon the representations of Colonel Emerson that in all probability the railway fleet passing through Omsk from the west would so congest traffic that it would be impossible for them to move. I was not convinced at the time that this would be the case but was not in a position to refute it. The evacuation of our Red Cross nurses from Novonikolaievsk and Tomsk was done contrary to my instructions. It was always my plan to keep these Red Cross nurses in our hospitals where they could render the maximum service to the Russian wounded, taking upon myself the responsibility of getting them out at the proper time. I have had every facility for doing this and it would succeed equally as well as the precautionary measures which I took which rendered it possible for these nurses to get out of Cheliabinsk, Kurgan, Ekaterinburg and Tiumen at the proper time. For two months now these hospitals and especially the ones in Omsk, Novonikolaievsk, Tomsk have lost the services of these trained nurses and the medicines and equipment which the Red Cross trains were weekly bringing to this front. Frankly stated, such action is paramount to criminality, and the impression created against us here, in this particular respect, is something akin to contempt. A copy of this telegram sent Ambassador Morris. Harris.