Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/4
Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 9th, 1919, at 4 p.m.
C. F. 4
- Present.—United States of America, President Wilson.—British Empire, The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P., Prime Minister.—France, M. Clemenceau.—Italy, M. Orlando.—Secretaries—Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B; Count Aldrovandi.—Interpreter,—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
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Policy in Russia
3. President Wilson presented a military problem to his colleagues. The United States, he said, as agreed between the Allied and Associated Powers some time back, had been trying to send supplies to the Civilian population of Siberia from Vladivostock. By agreement between the Allies and a Mr. Stevens, who, long ago in the days of the old regime had been in Siberia, had become the head of a somewhat inconvenient Commission to run the railroads of Siberia. The United States had agreed to police the railroads as far west as Irkutsk.70 The position was that the United States Government did not believe in Koltchak. The British and French military representatives in Siberia, however, were supporting him. Koltchak had become irritated by the presence on the railway of United States soldiers, whom he regarded as neutrals. Moreover, the impression had got abroad among the peasants of Siberia that the United States was the standard of a free Government which they ought to imitate. When they saw the attitude of neutrality taken up by the United States soldiers, they thought there must be something wrong with the Government of Koltchak. Further, the Cossacks were out of sympathy with the United States soldiers and he suspected that the Japanese would be glad to have a collision between the Cossacks and American soldiers. As a consequence of this state of affairs the United States Government found itself faced with the two following alternatives:
- 1.
- To take sides with Koltchak and send much stronger forces to Siberia.
- 2.
- To withdraw.
If the former alternative were adopted and the United States increased their forces it was certain that the Japanese would increase [Page 346] theirs still more. The original agreement had been that the Japanese and the United States should send roughly equivalent forces. When the United States sent 9,000 men the Japanese sent 12,000 men. He had not objected to this slight discrepancy, but the numbers of Japanese had subsequently gone up to 70,000, which had afterwards been reduced to a nominal 30,000. This, however, left a great disproportion. If the United States troops continued merely to guard the railway and to maintain, as it were, a neutral position, he was advised that collisions were bound to occur. If United States soldiers were attacked, it could not be expected that they would do nothing. If they were withdrawn, the field would be left to the Japanese and Koltchak, who was supported by the Allies.
He then read a series of telegrams from General Graves commanding the United States forces in Siberia, bearing out the above summary of the position, and pointing out that if the present policy were continued, there would almost certainly be a collision between the United States troops and Russian troops.
Mr. Lloyd George said that this strengthened his view as to the need of arriving at a policy in regard to Russia. Koltchak was advancing Eastward [Westward] at a very remarkable rate. He was in a position either to move Northwards and join hands with the forces based on Archangel, or to march on Moscow.
President Wilson said he had always been of opinion that the proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves.
Mr. Lloyd George asked that before a decision should be taken, the Council should hear M. Tehaikowsky.
President Wilson agreed.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that President Wilson should send a reply to General Graves asking him to take no action for the moment, as the whole problem was being considered by the Allied and Associated Powers.
President Wilson said the risk of this was that there might be a collision between the United States and Russian troops. He suggested that the Allied and Associated Powers should simultaneously ask Koltchak what his programme was.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested he might be asked two definite questions:
- (1)
- Will you allow the peasants to retain the land or do you propose to restore the old seigneurial rights?
- (2)
- Are you prepared to revive the Constituent Assembly?
President Wilson in regard to the first point, said that a few days ago he had asked a very Russophile friend whether the peasants had [Page 347] really got the land out of all the chaos in Russia. His friend had replied that they had only got it in a very inequitable way, each man having seized the land nearest to him. The difficulty would not only be to distribute the land to the peasants, but to systematise the existing distribution involving in some cases dispossession of individuals and groups.
(After some further discussion during which Mr. Lloyd George produced a map showing the great advance that Koltchak’s troops had made, it was agreed that M. Tchaikowsky should be heard on the following day at noon.71)
Mr. Lloyd George undertook that Mr. Philip Kerr, who knew his address, should summon him.
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