861.00/5366: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State
[Received October 10, 4:50 p.m.]
4598. Reference your 3238. Meeting Allied representatives held October 6th. It developed this meeting that final adjustment, as regards distribution of expense for proposed movement, would take some days. Allies in entire accord with principle of immediate return of troops from Siberia but not enthusiastic about advancing their proportionate share of credit. In view Department’s desire to expedite, movement, Logan made following proposal, viz: that repatriation Czecho-Slovakian, Yugo-Slavian, Polish and Roumanian troops in Siberia be commenced at once by the American Government who would handle movement up to total amount of tonnage it had available for this purpose and up to amount of credits our Government was prepared to advance to different Governments concerned. Logan gave no information as to total amount of finance our Government was prepared to advance as he considered it best to leave this to later negotiations. He, however, said that we would provide our share. Logan pointed out that the proposed movement would be understood to be [purely] an American effort and would be in entire charge of General Hines from port of embarkation, Vladivostok, to port of debarkation at Trieste for Czecho-Slovakian and Yugo-Slavian troops, Danzig for Polish troops and Constanza for Roumanian [Page 304] troops. General shortage railway equipment in Europe requires water movement these troops up to these ports. Logan said he would propose to his Government that it should fix the proportionate number of troops of each nationality which America would finance and that the American Government would officially advise Governments of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Servia and Roumania of the proportion of the movement the American Government was individually prepared to finance and that these latter governments must look to the English and French for their credits and shipping for the balance of the movement. Logan said that the expense of the return movement of these troops, in the view of the American Government, involved a distinct and separate financial question wholly disassociated with [from] any other outstanding financial question, as for example, America’s share, if any, in cost of past maintenance these troops in Siberia, etc.
French and British suggest cheapest movement would be all water via Panama Canal. Logan replied that so far as British and French share of movement, America of course had nothing to do with route selected, but so far as America was concerned in the movement which she was exclusively financing, that routing, whether by Panama Canal or by rail across the United States, was technical matter for our own authorities to determine in the best interest of our Government. This was agreed to.
It was also agreed that General Janin, French commander in Siberia, would arrange movement these forces to Vladivostok for embarkation in consultation with agent of General Hines stationed at Vladivostok. In view of political importance in assuring same treatment to all friendly nationals who have military forces in Siberia, Logan specifically reserved for Hines’ agent at Vladivostok final determination as to number of troops of the various nationals which should be brought out of Siberia in this American movement. This was agreed to and French wrote [will instruct] Janin accordingly. British representative stated that following ships now engaged in movement American troops were already earmarked for repatriation British forces in various parts of the world and would not be available for handling any troops whatsoever from Siberia, viz: Cap Finisterre, Great Waldeisce [Graf Waldersee], Imperator, Cleveland, Kaiserin Aug[uste] Victoria, Patricia, Pretoria, Prim Friedrich, Wilhelm, Santa Elena, and Zeppelin. We do not know what, if any, effect this will have on Hines’ plans and simply give list for what it is worth.
In accordance with foregoing proposal there is no reason in our minds why repatriation these troops from Siberia by America should not be immediately started as the problem is now purely a technical shipping one from America’s point of view with only limiting factors [Page 305] as to number of each nationality to be transported dependent upon availability of tonnage and proportionate burden of credits America is to carry. French and British estimate that following figures are approximate number of troops of various nationals now in Siberia to be repatriated: Czecho-Slovaks 55,000, Poles 11,000, Yugo-Slavs 4,000 and Roumanians 2,000.
For use in further financial negotiations thereafter would like to [request you] ascertain from Hines and cable approximate per capita cost for return these troops from Vladivostok to Danzig, Trieste and Constanza by both Panama Canal route and rail movement [route] across the United States, also approximate number of troops that can be embarked per week at Vladivostok by America with her own shipping. Proposed plan has distinct advantage in providing for immediate starting of this movement without waiting final financial adjustment and in no way prejudices our position that appropriate share of expense for complete movement must be borne by England and France. If foregoing plan is adopted we will officially inform governments of Czecho-Slovak, Poland, Italy,17 Serbia and Roumania that the movement is to be started at once under exclusively American auspices and with exclusively American credits which will provide at least for the repatriation by American credits of one third of their respective forces. We will request them at same time to use their influence directly with England and France to secure credits and shipping for the balance of the movement, the burden of which should be properly carried by these latter countries. In all probability we will be forced into contributing a larger share of credit than that indicated. However this can only be determined after further notice [negotiation]. The effect of the proposed arrangement will be distinctly advantageous to American prestige.
Reference your 330318 and 3317.18 We fully appreciate importance repatriation enemy prisoners of war of all [now in] Siberia but for political and sentimental reasons already given upon which action of Supreme Council reported our cable 452219 was based, believe that no enemy prisoners should be repatriated until after repatriation friendly troops has commenced. If these views are in accord with Department’s we will not suggest any modification in Supreme Council decision until after Hines has made some movement [friendly] troops.
Request early advice from Department as to approval or modification proposed plan. If Department approves it will be understood [Page 306] that movement on this basis is to be commenced at once. In this latter event request quick advice from Department as to probable date first embarkation troops at Vladivostok and approximate weekly figures thereafter from this same port as this information should be communicated to interested nationals and as this information will also have splendid effect in these latter countries. The foregoing modifies somewhat our views expressed in our 4522 of October 4th. Request however replies to questions contained in our 4522.