Paris Peace Conference 861.00/217: Telegram
The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments39
To the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of North America.
The Russian Soviet Government has had cognisance, by means of press wireless, of an invitation purporting to be issued by the Entente Powers to all existing Governments in Russia, to send delegates to a Conference at the Island of Prinkipo.
Having received no invitation addressed to itself, and learning (again by means of press communications) that the absence of any reply on its part has been interpreted as a refusal of such invitation, the Russian Soviet Government wishes to prevent any misapprehension regarding its line of action.
In view, also, of the false interpretation systematically given to its actions by the foreign press, the Russian Soviet Government takes this opportunity of outlining its attitude clearly and frankly.
Notwithstanding its increasingly favourable position from both the military and the internal points of view, the Russian Soviet Government attaches such great value to the conclusion of an agreement which would bring hostilities to an end, that it is ready immediately to enter into negotiations for this purpose, and even—as it has often said—to purchase such agreement at the price of important sacrifices, with the express reservation that the future development of the Soviet Republic [will not be menaced. In view of the fact that the power of resistance of the enemies which Soviet Russia has to fight depends exclusively on the aid which they receive from the Entente Powers, and that these are, therefore, its only real adversaries, the Russian Soviet Government] sets forth below, [Page 40] for the benefit of the Entente Powers, the points regarding which it might consider such sacrifices possible, with the object of settling all differences with them.
In view of the special importance which not only the press, but also the representatives of the Entente Governments, attach in their oft-repeated statements to the question of loans, the Soviet Government declares itself, in the first place, willing to meet the demands of the Entente Powers on this point. It does not refuse [to recognize its financial obligations to its creditors who are subjects of the Entente Powers, leaving the precise formulation of the manner in which this point is to be enforced to the special treaties, the elaboration of which is to be one of the tasks of the proposed negotiations.
Secondly, in view of the difficult financial position of the Russian Soviet Republic and the unsatisfactory condition of its credit abroad, the Russian Soviet Government offers to guarantee the payment of interest on its loans by a certain amount of raw materials, which should be determined through a special agreement.]
[Thirdly,] in view of the great inclination which foreign capital has always displayed to exploit Russia’s natural resources for its own advantage, the Russian Soviet Government is disposed to grant mining, timber, and other concessions to nationals of the Entente Powers in accordance with strictly regulated conditions, so that no economic or social hardship might be inflicted on Soviet Russia by reason of the stipulations of such concessions.
The fourth point regarding which negotiations might, in the opinion of the Russian Soviet Government, take place with the Entente Powers, is that of cession of territory, the Russian Soviet Government not having determined to exclude from such negotiations at all costs the consideration of the possible annexation of Russian territory by the Entente Powers.
The Russian Soviet Government adds that it would consider as annexation the maintenance within the regions in question—forming part of the territory of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Poland and Finland—of armed forces of the Entente, or maintained at the expense of the Entente, or enjoying the military, technical, financial, or other support of the said Powers.
As regards points 2 to 4, the importance of the concessions referred to by the Russian Soviet Government will depend on its military situation with regard to the Entente Powers—which situation is at present improving from day to day.
On the northern front, the Soviet troops have just re-taken the town of Shenkursk.
On the eastern front, having temporarily lost Perm, they have recovered Perufa [sic], Ufa, Sterlitamak, Belebey, Orenburg and [Page 41] Uralsk. The railway connections with Central Asia are now in their hands.
On the southern front, they have recently taken the important railway stations of Povorino, Alexikovo, Uriupino, Talovaya, Kalach, and Boguchar, which have brought the railway lines of that region into their power. On the south-west, the Ukrainian Soviet troops, debouching from Lugansk, are threatening the rear of Krasnoff’s armies.
In the Ukraine, the national Soviet troops have taken Harkoff [Kharkov], Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Kremenchug, Chernigoff, Ovruch, as well as [many other less important cities. White Russia, Lithuania and Lettonia are almost entirely in the hands of] the Soviet [troops] of these republics, with the large towns of Minsk, Vilna, Riga, Dvinsk, Mitau, Vindau and others. The remarkable consolidation of the internal situation of Soviet Russia has been demonstrated by the negotiations begun with the Soviet Government by the members of the former Constituent Assembly, whose representatives Rakitnikoff (Chairman of Congress), Sviatitsky (Secretary), Volsky, Shmeleff, Burevoff [Burevoi?] Chernenkoff, and Antonoff, all members of the Central Committee of the [Social] Revolutionary Party, arrived in Moscow yesterday, 3rd February.
These well-known Social Revolutionists declared most strongly against Entente intervention in Russia. The improved relations between the Soviet Government and those elements of Russian society hitherto hostile to it are characterised by the changed attitude of the Mensheviki, a meeting of which party likewise protested against Entente intervention, and whose organ “Vpered” appears freely in Moscow.
The general relaxation of tension in the interior shows itself in the abolition of special District Commissions.
Finally, the lies in the foreign press concerning alleged disturbances in Petrograd and elsewhere are pure inventions.
While repeating once more that the situation in which it now finds itself must necessarily influence the extent of the sacrifices it is prepared to make, the Russian Soviet Government still adheres to its proposal to negotiate on the basis of the points enumerated above.
As regards the frequent complaints in the press of Entente countries concerning its international revolutionary propaganda, the Russian Soviet Government, whilst pointing out that it cannot limit the freedom of the revolutionary press, declares its readiness to include in a general agreement with the Entente Powers the undertaking not to intervene in their internal affairs.
On these general lines, the Russian Soviet Government is prepared to open negotiations immediately on the Island of Prinkipo [Page 42] or elsewhere, either with all the Entente Powers or with any of them separately, or with any political groups in Russia, in accordance with the request of the Entente Powers.
The [Soviet] Government [requests the] Entente Powers to inform it without delay of the place to which its representatives shall betake themselves, also the date of the meeting and the proposed route.
- The English text in the files has a notation indicating that it is a translation of a text printed in Le Matin, Feb. 7, 1919. The bracketed passages have been added from the text printed in the Nation, Jan. 17, 1920, vol. 110, p. 88. A footnote in the Nation states: “The peace offers of the Russian Soviet Government published in this issue are an official compilation made by the Russian Soviet Bureau in New York.”↩