763.72119/5407: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received June 21, 6:28 a.m.]
2659. The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at their meeting on June 7 [17] considered the following [note] from the Supreme Economic Council on the subject of the blockade of Hungary and Bolshevist Russia.
- “1. The Supreme Economic Council submit the question as to whether after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary.
- “2. As regards Hungary, the Council were unanimously of opinion that no special difficulty arose. It has already been decided by the Council of Four that commercial relations shall be resumed with Hungary as soon as a settled government is brought into existence in that country. Should this not occur before the final acceptance of the terms of peace by Germany, (at which date it has also been decided that the blockade of Germany shall be completely raised,) then there will be no legal or technical difficulties which would prevent the Associated Powers, if so minded, from [maintaining] a ‘Blockade’ against Hungary with which they continue to be in a state of war. On this point the Council beg to refer to their note which is being placed before the Council of Heads of States regarding the undertaking proposed to be secured from Austria prior to the conclusion of peace with that country.
- “3. The Council consider that in the absence of the legal declaration of a state of war between the Associated Powers and the Bolshevist Government there are grave legal and technical obstacles to the maintenance of restrictions upon commercial intercourse with Bolshevist Russia after the acceptance of the peace terms by Germany.
- “4. At present such restrictions are in fact maintained—
- (a)
- as regards subjects of the Associated Powers, by legislation under the war powers laws of the various governments. These will lapse, unless especially extended, with the termination of the state of war, and it is felt that there would be great difficulty in securing from the respective legislative bodies the special legislation necessary to enable theoretical [the] restrictions to be continued in force solely against Bolshevist Russia.
- (b)
- as regards neutral countries, by the various agreements together with subsidiary undertakings which have been secured, with special reference to Bolshevist Russia, from the respective neutral governments. These agreements determine upon the termination of a state of war with the Central Powers and indeed it is felt that the Associated Powers would be morally bound to regard them as being determined upon the acceptance of the peace terms, though no doubt legally it could be contended that they continue until the actual proclamation of the end of a state [of] war.
- “5. The Council are unanimous in calling attention to the fact that, assuming the desire and intention on the part of the states bordering upon Western Russia, e.g., Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Roumania, to continue to preserve restrictions upon commercial relations with Bolshevist Russia, and assuming a similar announced [desire and] intention on the part of the Governments of the northern territories, Admiral Kolchak, and General Denikin, there only remain in fact two possible points of entry for commodities into Bolshevist Russia—(a) Petrograd, and (b) certain Black Sea ports, notably Odessa. If Petrograd falls at an early date only the Black Sea problem remains.
- “6. Until, however, the Black Sea littoral passes from the control of the Bolsheviks, this problem will present very grave and technical difficulties. In the absence of existence of a state of war, there would be great difficulty in arresting the passage of vessels to [and] from ports in the hands of the Bolsheviki. The suggestion [Page 151] has been made that, e.g., the Roumanian Government might be induced to proclaim a formal blockade of such ports, but it would seem probable that other powers would have difficulty in recognizing such a blockade as effective within canons of international law.
- “7. The Council consider that it is very desirable to avoid any measure which might give rise to an understanding either in Russia or in the countries surrounding it that the Associated Powers would be disposed to propose [favor] the resumption of trade with the Bolshevist in the meantime [régime—] the only intermediary through which it is possible for trade to be carried on with the population under the régime. The Council accordingly recommend that [the] abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption such trade. The French and Belgian delegates are of opinion that a notice might be published indicating that commercial relations would be resumed with Russia when a sufficiently free and stable government should be established. There would be no question however of the raising of a blockade which does not technically exist. An unofficial hint in the same sense could be given the [neutral countries.]
- “8. The Council recognizing that serious political issues are involved, submit the question for the earnest and immediate consideration of the Council of the Heads of States.”
The Council decided that after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia or Hungary. In addition the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. It was further decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to examine as to whether, consistent with the above decisions, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevist Russia.