Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/20
Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace15
Subject: Interview with Minister Dietrich—Baden—The Rhine.
My only point of comparison with Bavarian conditions during my stay in Germany was afforded by a visit to the Grand Duchy of Baden, where I went on invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dietrich [Page 80] on my return journey to Switzerland. It filled me with a feeling of contrast, rather than of similarity. Dietrich pointed out to me that Baden particularism was very different from that of Bavaria. Indeed he insisted that I should not take Bavaria as a whole, but should distinguish the Frankian and the Alemanic regions. In the case of Baden, the people felt themselves Southern Germans and had a certain antipathy for Prussian ways. They did not want to be submerged in the Prussian uniformity. But it did not take the form of separatist tendencies. History had its part in this; for Baden was an outlying province, which had again and again been overrun by the western enemy and could not stand upon its own feet, but had to have the protection of the Empire. In southern Baden also discipline had never relaxed as in Bavaria. Food conditions were also tolerable. However, Baden had certain preeminent needs which were special to it and which had perhaps not obtained full recognition as yet in Germany. So long as Alsace remained German and the Rhine was flanked on both sides by German states, a definite German policy for the upper Rhine was possible. Now that Alsace promised to become French, there was a Baden policy for the upper Rhine, which he would like to make known and which corresponded to the interests of the seafaring nations and contrasted somewhat with that which he could conceive to lie in the special interests of Alsace. He said that public opinion was greatly exercised in Baden over the intention of France to extend her supremacy to the Baden shore of the Rhine, bringing the entire river under her control. Statistics would show that the loss of navigation on the Rhine would spell almost annihilation to Baden. But even were this blow to be avoided, the interests of Alsace in the navigation of the river above Strasbourg were non-existent or even negative, whilst for Baden they were paramount. Both states had interests in the water power; but Baden wanted a solution which would save navigation, allowing cargo boats up to 2000 tons to reach Basle and even eventually the Lake of Constance. This was also a vital interest of Switzerland and of England, Belgium, Holland and perhaps America. This was a feature where Baden felt she must raise her voice and where she was desirous [of?] pointing the matter out to well-disposed Entente personages.
But there was another aspect of the matter, which had not yet received due consideration. Baden had of course her worries over the coming indemnities. She also faced a grave crisis of unemployment. Now the problem of the utilisation of the upper Rhine opened possibilities in both regards. Baden could undertake at once the construction of the necessary waterworks, which would give employment to many hands. She could then contribute this outlay in part at least to the war indemnity by turning over to France a disproportionate [Page 81] amount of the electric energy acquired and by giving over to all users the waterways resulting from a rational disposition of the locks and canals.
Dietrich spoke bitterly of the break-down of the German rationing system, which had been due to an excess of reglementation, against which he had always warned. Today it was a mere farce.
In Baden I found a mentality distinctly different from what I saw in Bavaria. In Munich I soon acquired a sense of just what one could say without making a faux pas. In Baden, I found the need of a revision of this sentiment.
- Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 282, March 27; received March 29.↩