Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/69

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

1.
There is enclosed herewith copy of Memorandum which was submitted this date for consideration by the Interallied Military Mission and which it was decided to hold in reserve pending notification of the reply of the Roumanians to the last ultimatum of the Supreme Council.29
2.
There are almost daily occurrences which might be construed as Roumanian hostility towards Americans, but which I think are really [Page 665] due to ignorance or stupidity. There is enclosed herewith copy of another letter30 I have just sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief in regard to one of such occurrences.
3.
On the 29th of August the Roumanian Plenipotentiary, Mr. Diamandi, went to see Admiral Troubridge, of whom previous mention has been made as being the British Naval Officer in Command of the Danube, and after the usual preamble told him in the course of the conversation that the Roumanians had now abandoned the idea of establishing a Dual Empire by uniting Hungary and Roumania, thereby admitting that they had been working along those lines.
4.
Referring to the Roumanian ultimatum to the Friedrich Government, contained in my code telegram Number 34,30 this was again the work of that Ardeli whom I have previously mentioned as having been the former Roumanian Minister to Hungary. He arrived here about the same time as M. Diamandi and on account of his acquaintance with prominent Hungarians, they have been using him to turn out these various ultimata, knowing well that they could deny them as being official, and yet at the same time in the eyes of the Hungarians they would have an official aspect.
5.
Yesterday I telegraphed in code, Number 37,31 that Friedrich, the Prime Minister, had told one of my agents that he expected to make peace with Roumania inside of 48 or 72 hours, giving as his reason that Hungary was absolutely prostrate, completely at the mercy of her enemies, and that the Entente was unable to control the situation or even to alleviate conditions. A few hours after sending this by code I learned that Friedrich had been to see Admiral Troubridge and repeated to him practically the same conversation that he had with my agent.
6.
As I understand the situation, there is no reason to sympathize with Hungary because when left to her own devices she was doing to herself through Bolshevism what the Roumanians are doing through an invading enemy. From what experience I have had here I should say that, given the same opportunity and the same motive as the Roumanians, the Hungarians would lie just as fluently as the former. On the other hand, I have yet to find in a single case I have investigated of Roumanian looting, any exaggeration in the Hungarian reports.
7.
The tendency of the present Government under Friedrich is most reactionary in character. For a while they contented themselves with beating the Jews in the streets, but during the last few days we have reliable information that many prominent and wealthy men [Page 666] have been hung or shot in outlying towns. Friedrich’s powerful minority which now controls the country, threatens to start a reign of terror not greatly dissimilar to that of Bela Kun.
8.
The Archduke Josef in a recent talk with General Mombelli stated that in Hungary 80% of the people wanted the re-establishment of a Monarchy, that of those 80% a large number wanted to [sic] return of King Karl, and then modestly added that, however, a majority of the 80% wanted him (Josef) to be their King.
9.
The Roumanians continue their looting and sacking of the country and we have had no intimation from any of them that their Government has yet received the Peace Conference’s last ultimatum. I am telegraphing today33 my opinion that it might hearten the Hungarians somewhat if they were given the text of that ultimatum so that they could understand that they were not entirely forgotten and abandoned. As matters now stand, the Mission can accomplish nothing in carrying out its instructions until the Roumanians make a complete change of front.
10.
It is my opinion that all this Roumanian pretense of enmity towards the Archduke and Friedrich is simply to disguise the fact that they know that through either of them they can practically do whatever they see fit. I am not sure that Friedrich is not in their pay although I have nothing but my own suspicions to go by. As previously stated in one of my reports, even the Roumanians sometimes inadvertently admit that two nations represented on this Mission are playing politics with them. Both the French and Italian representatives are on most amicable and cordial relations with me, but I think they put on too strong a camouflage of frankness in regard to certain matters to cover what they are doing along other lines. Of course it is apparent that the Italians would like to form a chain of nations cutting off the Jugo-Slavs. What the French are after is not so apparent unless it is commercial concessions and trade. Nobody seems to be able to think of any economic pressure that could be brought upon Roumania. She puts forward a strong plea of poverty, but on the other hand she will have replaced from Hungary everything she lost through the invasion of her own country, and then some, and in addition, I understand, she is having a banner crop.
11.
Word has reached me that Lovacsy, who was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, has made up another Cabinet and proposes to try some time today, or very shortly, to oust the Friedrich Ministry.
12.
In a few days I shall be obliged to return all of my officers and all but six of my men to Paris for demobilization. This will leave me badly handicapped. Many of the men are desirous of enlisting in the regular service. All of the officers desire to remain if they can do [Page 667] so, and 2nd Lieut. L. M. Hamilton desires a provisional regular army commission.
13.
As the courier is waiting, this has been dashed off in a hurry and I realize, is very disconnected and rambling.
H. H. Bandholtz
[Enclosure]

Memorandum to the Interallied Military Mission

Subject: Results accomplished by Mission since its organization.

1. This is the eighteenth day since the entire membership of the Mission has been present in Budapest, and unfortunately it must be said that but for one or two negligible exceptions practically nothing has been accomplished by the Mission as regards the carrying out of the instructions given it by the Supreme Council. As this has been entirely due to the action of the Roumanian officials in practically ignoring the Mission, in declining to accept the Mission’s instructions as authoritative, in utterly disregarding most of the Mission’s requests, or may be due to procrastination, it is believed that the time has come when the facts should be presented to the Supreme Council. In substantiation of the foregoing there is presented in chronological order the more important requests made by the Mission to the Roumanian Government and in a parallel column the action taken on same:

[Page 669] [Page 670]
REQUESTS MADE ON THE ROUMANIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF BY THE INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION ACTION TAKEN BY THE ROUMANIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON REQUESTS OF THE INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION
August 12th. The Roumanian Commander-in-Chief by letter was requested to cease requisitioning and removing Hungarian property. No acknowledgement was ever made of the receipt of this letter.
August 13th. General Holban the Roumanian Commander of the City of Budapest at a session of the Mission promised to divide the country about Budapest into requisition zones which could be clearly identified, same to be in sectors radiating from Budapest, and every other sector to be exempt from Military requisition. On the 10th of August, General Holban having been sent for, appeared before the Mission with a map which was not arranged at all as he had promised, and which he could not at all explain. He finally admitted that he could not have a map made that could cover the requisition question.
August 15th. General Holban appeared before the Mission arid in reply to question stated that he had in the city of Budapest 15,000 Roumanian troops, of which number 10,000 were in the city proper and 5,000 in the outskirts. He was requested to reverse [Page 668] this order and place 5,000 in the city proper and 10,000 in the outskirts, which he promised to do. He was also asked to immediately proceed with the organization for Budapest of a Municipal Police Force of 6,000 men, which he promised to do. General Holban when he appeared before the Mission on August 19th, stated that he had only 5,000 men in the entire city of Budapest, including its outskirts; this in direct refutation of his previous statement of 15,000. Under the circumstances he agreed to immediately organize 4,000 police for Budapest and report daily progress. On August 26th General Holban reported by letter that they were recruiting only thirty to forty police a day, and it would take four weeks to organize the police force.
August 16th. On this date a communication was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Forces, of which the following is the substance:—
As authorized by its instructions from the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, the Interallied Military Mission for Hungary requests that the following action be taken by the Roumanian Government:
1.
(a) Cease at once requisitioning or taking possession of any supplies or property of whatever nature, except in zones authorized by this Mission, and then only of such supplies as may be necessary for the Roumanian Army, and that this Mission be informed as to the kind of supplies which will be considered necessary.
(b) The Roumanian Commander in Chief to furnish without delay a map clearly showing the requisition zones and also indicating thereon the disposition of his troops.
(c) Return at once to its owners all private property now in the possession of the Roumanians such as automobiles, horses, carriages, or any other property of which the ownership is vested in individuals.
(d) To arrange for the gradual return to the Hungarian Government of the railroad, post and telegraph systems.
(e) Make no further requisitions of buildings, stores or real property, and evacuate as rapidly as possible all schools, colleges and buildings of like character.
(f) Cease at once all shipments of rolling stock or Hungarian property of any kind whatsoever, to or towards Roumania, and stop and return to Budapest any rolling stock or property already enroute or held at outside stations.
(g) Limit supervision over public or private affairs in the city to such extent as may be approved by this Mission.
2.
The Roumanian Government to furnish this Mission not later than August thirty first a complete list of all war material, railway or agricultural material, live stock, or property of any kind whatsoever that has been taken possession of in Hungary by Roumanian Forces.
On August 16th, M. Diamandi, accompanied by General Mardarescu, appeared before the Mission and stated that they were authorized by their Government to recognize the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary as the authorized representative of the Supreme Council and that they were prepared to carry out its instructions.
On August 23rd, M. Diamandi appeared before the Mission and replied for the Roumanian Government to the letter of August 16th, in which he justified Roumanian seizures, demanded a right on the part of the Roumanians to requisition 30% of all property in Hungary, and to seize all stuff which the Roumanians recognized as having been taken from Roumania; wanted to know who would protect Roumania in case they evacuated Hungary and left the property behind, and in general turned down all of the requests of the Mission of August 16th, stating that he could answer no questions in addition to what he had, and that all such would have to be sent to Bucharest for instructions.
August 16th. General Mardarescu, being present at a session of the Mission, was asked to cease operations in Hungary west of the Danube and withdraw his troops except at Budapest, to the east side of the Danube. General Mardarescu when present at the session of the Mission on the 16th stated that he had sent no troops west of the Danube except contact patrols which he deemed necessary for the security of his force. It is known positively that the General’s statement was not true.
August 17th. A letter was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief requesting that he send a daily report of the progress made in complying with the requests of the Mission contained in letter of the 16. Only one reply was ever received to the Mission’s letter of August 16th and this covered only two of the eight points, and in both cases begged the issue, and was in fact a non-compliance with the request.
August 18th. A communication was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief, requesting that a Roumanian Liaison officer be in attendance at the Royal Palace during the hours of session of the Mission in case his services might be required. For two or three days there was a Roumanian Liaison Officer in attendance at the Palace, but he never arrived until after 11: A.M., and on the date of this Memorandum did not show up at all, and towards the last was reporting at 12: Noon, and immediately departing in case there was nothing for him.
August 18th. A letter was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief asking him to attend the session of the Mission on the 19th, or send an officer qualified to answer all questions relative to the Mission’s letter of the 16th, and in particular in regard to the requisitioning of telegraph and telephone instruments and material from the Directory of Posts and Telegraphs. General Holban, on August 19th, appeared before the Mission in response to the request for attendance of an authorized representative of the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief. General Holban stated, however, that he was authorized to cover only two points; namely the questions of the food supply in the city of Budapest, and the organization of the Municipal Police Force. General Holban was then requested to advise the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief that the Mission desired on the following day to see some Roumanian representative who could cover all the points of the Mission’s letter of the 16th. On August 20th, M. Diamandi, accompanied by Generals Mardarescu and Rudeanu, appeared before the Mission, and General Mardarescu, after much dodging of the issue, promised faithfully to comply with the requests contained in the Mission’s letter of the 16th. He stated furthermore that his force had made no requisitions that were not necessary for his Army in the field. This is known to be entirely contrary to fact. M. Diamandi also at this time demanded that whenever the Mission have interview on any importance subject with a Hungarian official, that a Roumanian officer be present at the time.
August 19th. A communication was sent to General Holban requesting information as to reported Bolshevist propaganda in Budapest Factories. No answer ever received.
August 21st. A communication was sent to General Holban requesting that he report daily through the Roumanian Liaison Officer attached to this Mission, progress in police reorganization. This was done only once.
August 21st. General Rudeanu, being present at a session of the Mission, was asked to explain the necessity for the arrest and internment of Hungarian officers. General Rudeanu replied that he would have the matter investigated, and that there was no internment, but that they simply had to report once a week. The Mission has never received any information as to the result of General Rudeanu’s investigation and it is known that Hungarian officials are still being arrested and interned away from their homes.
August 28rd. A communication was sent to General Holban, informing him that the Mission was of the opinion that the Police Force of Budapest should consist of 6,000 men and be organized as rapidly as possible. Receipt of this communication was never acknowledged.
August 28rd. M. Diamandi and General Mardarescu were told that there was no longer any need for the Roumanians to make extraordinary requisitions for their army in Hungary, because they had already been here twenty days and the situation must have returned to normal. Requisitions of all kinds of property have continued without cessation.
August 25th. A communication was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief stating that in the opinion of the Mission there was no necessity for Roumanian Forces to continue west of the Danube, and requesting information as [to?] what was proposed to be done by the Roumanian authorities in regard to this matter. No attention ever paid to the communication of the 25th relative to Roumanian troops west of the Danube.
August 27th. A communication was sent to General Rudeanu to the effect that it was necessary to have in Hungary an army in addition to the police, that the nucleus for such an army was with Admiral Horthy, that an army could be organized only in territory not occupied by Roumanians, that the Roumanian internment of Hungarian officers was interfering with the organization of the army, that this question was not only important, but urgent, that it would undoubtedly so appear to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief, and that his opinion on each point was requested. August 29th. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged by General Rudeanu who stated that the present Roumanian line west of the Danube (which extends nearly to Austrian territory) would not be extended, but that it was necessary for the protection of the Roumanian army; that the question of the Hungarian Army should be discussed by the Mission with Roumanian representatives and that when these matters were cleared up the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief would take suitable action as regards personnel and arms.

2. It will be seen from the foregoing that this mission has been unable to make any progress whatever in the performance of the duties expressly assigned to it by the Supreme Council. It is difficult to [Page 671] understand what motive can inspire the Roumanian Government in following its long continued line of conduct, but whether same is due to deliberate intent, to inefficiency of subordinates, or to any other cause, the result is the same. It is recommended that the Military Mission seriously study this matter and consider whether or not it should at an early date telegraph the Supreme Council to the effect that it is the unanimous opinion of the members that a continuation of the Mission at Budapest can result in nothing but humiliation and in a loss of prestige for our Governments.

  1. For text of telegram from the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government, August 25, see appendix C to HD–38, vol. vii, p. 857.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Ante, p. 664.
  5. No. 40, not printed.