Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/663
Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State54
Subject: Possible intervention in Austria.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my Despatch No. 163 of November 26, 1919, which was a memorandum of a conference with the State Chancellor, Dr. Renner, on that date. At the same time I would refer to my telegram of the same date55 which briefly reported the conversation with the State Chancellor, and toward the end mentioned the impression that prevailed in circles that should be well-informed and for the most part have been reliable in the past, that the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs, the one from an unfriendly and selfish purpose and the other through an understanding with the Italians, were prepared to go to the extent of wholly breaking up Austria. The attitude of the Czecho-Slovaks on the coal question, their ambition to make Prague the successor of Vienna as the great city of Southern Central Europe, and the failure of the Jugo-Slavs to furnish the food which Austria had expected naturally led those who were in direct touch with the destructive effect of the absence of coal [Page 593] and food upon Austria, to seek for reasons for these attitudes. It was remembered that in Czecho-Slovakia the French for the moment exercise the greatest influence, and that the French policy since the war’s close has been based upon the belief that the safety of France in the future is dependent wholly upon the weakening of her former opponents. It was also remembered that the Czechs themselves have been particularly bitter toward Austria, and have apparently felt that the more difficult the revival of Austria was made, the better would be the Czechish opportunity to obtain a predominant influence in Southern Central Europe. The very policies pursued at the Peace Conference by the Czechs, and the difficulties since the completion of the Peace Treaty made by Czecho-Slovakia in the matter of the delivery of coal, coincide with the practice of keeping Austria weak. Again, with disorder in Austria, the excuse to intervene would be obtained. Intervention would mean predominance, and in the future permit a greater or lesser degree of control of the destinies of that country. A weakened Austria might also appear to those who pursue a shortsighted policy, to secure Czecho-Slovakia from danger from the South, a danger which to the West and North she must continually face at the hands of Germany. Therefore, if the lower part of this nut-cracker were to lose its temper the danger of being crushed by the Germanic race would be materially lessened, and the influence which Austria by reason of being Germanic must exercise to keep the Germans in Czecho-Slovakia unsettled, would be materially decreased.
Much curiosity has been aroused in Vienna by the acquiescent attitude of Jugo-Slavia during the last few weeks when D’Annunzio has been so energetically and vociferously occupying Fiume and Dalmatia, in view of the fact that only a few months ago the Jugo-Slovaks were almost at grips with the Italians over this very question. It is exceedingly strange that Jugo-Slavia has not taken steps to counteract the activities of D’Annunzio which it is apparent are tacitly supported by State unless internal troubles in Jugo-Slavia keep her inactive.
It is not forgotten that the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs have desired some direct connection one with the other through, for example, a corridor between Austria and Hungry. It has been suggested that Italy may have promised Jugo-Slavia compensation in Carinthia and in Styria particularly near Marbourg as well as the town of Gratz.
Recent developments in Hungary have made it apparent that the peasants are in favor of a monarchy probably of a limited character. Having been under Michael Karolyi and Bela Kuhn, and with the view thus created as to what constitutes a republican government, their preference for a monarchy is not surprising. The Hungarians have been bitter at the loss of the three Western counties of Hungary that the Peace Conference transferred to Austria, and they have done [Page 594] all that is possible to counteract the desire of the West-Hungarians to become Austrians. A republican Austria, particularly a government that is supposed to be very radical, is not agreeable to the monarchists in Hungary. Again there is a very strong monarchistic sentiment among the peasants of Austria, the bourgeoisie of Vienna, and the artistic and musical circles which have not been happy under the republic. These, together with the ex-officers of the Austrian army, would rejoice in a monarchy for Austria. This situation might very well encourage the Hungarians with their well-organized army under Admiral Horthy, to seek the first excuse to come to Vienna with the pretext of preserving order. A fortnight or so ago reports in detail reached this Mission of Hungary’s plans to enter Vienna with the pretense of establishing order but really to overthrow the present government, of all of which the Department was informed by telegraph.56 It can thus be seen that if the city of Vienna progresses from a condition of insufficient food and of cold and cheerless homes to one of actual starvation and freezing, with a consequent plundering of shops, warehouses and homes by thousands of people, which even the well-organized police could not control, the excuse would be presented to the Czechs who have a strong force only an hour and a half away in Pressburg, and to the Hungarians whose border is only 40 kilometers away and there might be a race for Vienna, which, though greatly impoverished, is still a prize.
The above is not based on absolutely authentic information, but suggests possibilities that may approach the probable.
I have [etc.]