Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/460
Professor A. C.
Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace
No. 267
Vienna, May 8, 1919.
[Received May
10.]
Sirs: I have the honor to report that on
Saturday morning I was informed by Colonel Cunningham, British
Attaché here, that he had been told by M. Allizé, the French Chargé,
that he had received instructions from Paris to invite the Hungarian
Government to send representatives to Versailles. M. Allizé, whom I
saw that evening, confirmed the information, but, having no means of
his own for direct communication, the message to Bela Kun was to be
conveyed by an English officer who left for Budapest that night. At
the time of sending my reports on Monday I supposed that the message
had been delivered. Yesterday morning I learned from Colonel
Cunningham that the invitation had been held up while fresh
instructions were requested from Paris and that these cancelling the
previous order arrived half an hour before it was to go into effect.
Meanwhile, news that Hungary was to be invited appeared in the
newspapers here and in Budapest in the form of a Reuter and one or
two other telegrams. In Vienna they attracted but little attention,
doubtless because they were not believed. In Budapest they were
immediately heralded and produced a temporary elation.
Although I have been in frequent telephonic communication with
Professor Brown and have also been in touch with him by courier, I
have not attempted to direct his movements, believing that he was
the best judge of the situation. Feeling strongly that everything
must be done to prevent massacre and that too hasty an advance of
the Roumanian troops might precipitate this, he determined to try to
learn their intentions and to explain the situation to those in
command. He first attempted to get in touch with them at Szolnok but
failing there he went with Lieutenant Weiss to Szegedin and entered
the French lines. From there he proceeded to Belgrade, sending back
word through Lieutenant Weiss that Lieutenant Osborn and the yeoman
with him should come to Vienna. I judge that he regarded the
situation in Budapest as so critical that he wished to reduce the
number of Americans there. I do not know whether he expects to
return directly to Budapest or is coming here. I enclose an
interesting report which Lieutenant Osborn has made out for me, and
also a copy of the stiff terms which the Roumanians delivered to the
Hungarians24 as an answer to the request for the cessation of
hostilities.
The situation is most confused and hard to judge accurately, and I am
the more uncertain about it as some time has elapsed since I have
[Page 456]
had any considerable
confidential communication from Professor Brown. As far as I can
make out the government of Bela Kun is in a position where it could
oppose little resistance to an armed advance upon Budapest. It is
said that his intention is if need be to evacuate the city and
withdraw towards the southwest. It is impossible to say whether his
retirement and foreign occupation would or would not be followed by
a massacre of some kind. The massacre is certainly possible and
general disorder is at least likely, but in such situations an
accident may turn the scale one way or the other and confident
predictions are futile.
If foreign troops do not advance on Budapest the government which at
this moment is very shaky may be able to hold its own. I believe
that the invitation to send representatives to Paris if delivered
would have greatly helped its prestige and strengthened its
position. As it is it is still losing ground, though there is no
telling what may succeed it. It is impossible to determine just how
much truth and how much exaggeration there are in the current
stories as to the reign of terror that now exists in Hungary,
especially in regard to the treatment of the prisoners or hostages.
Every sort of wild rumor is current among the refugees here, often
with no foundation. I have believed so far that the situation was
much less bad than most of the accounts one heard would indicate,
but it is bad enough and the strain of uncertainty great upon all
parties. An attempt on the part of a body of refugees to cross the
border and start an insurrection has just failed rather
ignominiously. There are reports of uprisings in various parts of
Hungary but they are hard to verify. The one thing that would
quickly clear the situation would be an advance of foreign troops on
Budapest. Without it we may expect to wait some time longer before
reaching a solution.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure 1]
Lieutenant W. H.
Osborn to Professor A. C.
Coolidge
Subject: General report on situation in
Hungary.
1. I shall report first on the general condition in Budapest. The
government is still exercising complete control in the city,
where perfect calm and order prevails. Strict measures are being
taken to prevent either counter-revolution or extreme action on
the part of the terrorists. All cafes are to be closed at 8:00
P.M., all people off the streets at nine, no groups of more than
three people are allowed to walk or meet together, either on the
streets or in private houses. The arresting of political
prisoners has been continuing. The government’s
[Page 457]
promise to release all men over
sixty or all sick prisoners has apparently been carried out in
some cases but not in all. The prisoners are not being cared for
with any great tenderness, but except in a very few instances
there seems to have been no systematic brutality shown towards
them. The policy of keeping watch over suspected bourgeoisie by means of detectives is
also being largely used. An order has been issued disbanding all
terror troops, known as “Lenin Boys”. There is, however, a great
deal of difficulty in carrying through this order. Apparently
some of the terror troops in the provinces have already
committed murders, and a certain amount of killing of
hostages—especially in the village of Kishkurfelgyhasi where Dr.
Navay was killed. As a result of some of these unauthorized
executions an order was published by Böhm, forbidding the
execution of any people without proper trial, and condemning any
executions that had so occurred. In the last two days the
mobilization for the army has been greatly speeded up. Almost
all the workmen have been called to arms except those who are
working in munitions factories or those factories providing army
supplies. A number of factories which were actually in operation
have been closed down in the last few days and the workmen sent
to the front. Especially stringent orders have been issued for
former officers to report for mobilization. It seems, however,
that a large number of these officers, instead of being given
commands and sent to the front, have been confined to quarters
in their barracks as semi-prisoners. The members of the Soviet
fit for service have been mobilized. There is a possible
significance in this, as it was these men who voted that the
government should fight to the end last Friday and some people
feel that the government wishes to get these gentlemen out of
the city in order to give it freer action. There has been a
general requisitioning of blankets and any other available army
supplies in the city. The general attitude of the workmen
mobilized is certainly not enthusiastic, although they are being
shipped out of the city to the front in great numbers and
without any disturbances.
The food situation in Budapest is very bad. It is almost
impossible for anybody but active soldiers and certain classes
of workmen to obtain meat cards, and the queues of people at the
meat markets are very long. Flour is very coarse, only a small
ration of fat is issued, and there is very serious shortage of
milk. The peasants are refusing to send food into the city and
the general feeling is that the government has overestimated the
amount of food supplies that it has on hand. The chief
difficulty in the situation lies in the complete uncertainty
which the enemy advance has caused. It is the announced policy
of the government that they accept all the nationalistic claims
of the Czechs and the Roumanians, and that all they wish to do
is to hold a small piece of territory which they may use to work
out their communistic
[Page 458]
schemes and as a base for further propaganda. At the same time
the government is using every possible armed opposition to
prevent the further advance of the Roumanians, and by so doing
has made strong appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of the
people. To add to this the Roumanian answer to the Hungarian
request for an armistice, instead of simply stating as had been
expected that they would refuse to deal with the Soviet
Government showed them perfectly willing to deal with the Soviet
Government, but asked for terms which were absolutely
unacceptable either to Bolsheviks or to patriotic Hungarians.
The result is that the state of mind of the average Hungarian
seems to be about as follows: “Shall I oppose the government
when Hungary is being overrun, and so weaken it further in the
face of a hopeless situation, or shall I help the government
hold what territory it can and, if finally the Entente declares
a definite policy and reasonable boundaries for Hungary, then
work for the overthrow of the Communistic regime?”. This seems
to be the very general dilemma among a great many conservative
people with whom we have talked. Dr. Weiss reports a
conversation with the stationmaster of the town of
Kishkurfellgyhasi, who said that he was the captain of a large
band of White Guards in that town but that as long as the
situation remained as hopeless as it was he had no intention of
opposing the Bolsheviks and would use his White Guard only to
maintain order in the town in case the government was
overthrown, but that of course if Hungarian boundaries were
restored he would do what he could to overthrow the Communist
government. The peasants are outspokenly opposed to the present
regime. So are the majority of the more stable classes of
workmen, and of course all the former bourgeois elements. But
all these elements are at a loss as to what they should turn to,
and the result is that there seems to be a general passive
acquiescence in the action of the Bolshevik government. In the
meantime the Bolshevik government is the only factor which is
holding down the extremists. I think there is no doubt that Bela
Kun, Kunfi and the majority of the government leaders are at
heart Communists who want to carry out their system but if
possible without bloodshed. But at the same time it is becoming
increasingly difficult for them to hold the extremists in
check.
The attitude of Professor Brown in this situation is as follows:
As long as the Entente has not given out any definite policy,
either of intervention or of defining the boundaries, he feels
that the only possible way to avoid bloodshed in the city is to
encourage as far as possible the moderate tendencies of the
present government until some decision is reached. For this
reason he undertook to go to Szolnok with a verbal message from
Bela Kun to the Roumanians, redefining
[Page 459]
his attitude. At the same time Professor
Brown hoped to be able to carry out some form of mediation
whereby if the Roumanians were going to continue their advance
they could give guarantees which would enable Bela Kun to keep
order in the city until they arrived. At the same time that
Professor Brown went to Szolnok Bela Kun asked Prince Borghese
to carry a written message to the Czechs similar to the one sent
President Masaryk a few days earlier. Prince Borghese, however,
declined to do this, stating that he did not feel that the
message of Bela Kun represented the sentiments of Hungary and as
such he felt no right to take it to the Czechs. Professor Brown
being unable to cross the lines at Szolnok returned to Budapest,
and the next day went to Szegedin in order to get in touch with
the French, show to them the situation in Budapest and attempt
to find some means of handling the situation. From Szegedin he
was referred to the French Supreme Command in Belgrade, and I
have not yet heard the results of his mission.
The Italian Mission has been increased by the arrival of a
lieutenant-colonel, a major, two captains and a considerable
staff of secretaries and orderlies. They have taken over the
whole second floor of the Ritz Hotel and have at their disposal
several automobiles. On Saturday the Italian colonel held a
conference with Bela Kun, at which he proposed that the Czechs
should enter the city of Budapest and Bela Kun should turn over
the government. Bela Kun turned down this proposition, but at
the same time did not entirely close negotiations with the
Italians. The Italians have apparently not tried to work
together with the British and American missions in Budapest but
are pursuing their own policy. It looks as if they were
attempting to fish in troubled waters and were taking advantage
of the Entente’s lack of policy in regard to Hungary in order to
strengthen their own position there.
To sum up, it seems that energetic intervention in the city by
either Czechs, Roumanians, or preferably French or British
troops could be effective without much difficulty. With the
situation as it is, however, there seems very little hope of
obtaining any suitable form of government as long as the greater
part of the territory inhabited purely by Hungarians is held
either by the Roumanians or Czechs. It is hard to tell whether,
if the boundaries of Hungary were defined on approximately the
present lines, the Bolshevik Government would submit to the
situation without fighting; or whether they would attempt to
drive back the Roumanians and Czechs. The morale of the people
is very low, and there seems a general feeling of hopelessness
on the part of the Hungarians as to how they should unscramble
the egg until they have definite assurance as to where they
stand.
[Page 460]
[Enclosure 2]
Professor Philip M.
Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge
Subject: Interview with Bela Kun.
The question came up of my going to Szeged in order to go through
the lines into territory occupied by the French. I said that I
was quite ready to go, but I desired to inform myself first of
all as to the actual situation here. Kun informed me that he was
going up to Komoron tomorrow in order to meet the Czecho-Slovak
Minister of War, an old acquaintance of his, who has always been
a Socialist. He was going to talk over the situation with
him.
I then asked him concerning the object of the Italian Mission to
Budapest, because I hardly felt in a position to question them
on the subject. He stated that they had come from General Segre
with the proposition that his government should resign, and hand
the town over to Czecho-Slovak troops under the command of
Italian officers. I asked him on what ground they based the
proposition. He said that he was a good deal in the dark, but
that he had the impression that they were acting on their own
initiative, and not as representing the Allies. He said that the
question seemed to be involved with Jugo-Slavia and
Czecho-Slovakia, with Hungary as the football. I then asked him
whether they mentioned the armistice as a basis for
intervention, because they might of course, allege the right to
occupy the country under the terms of the armistice; and he said
they did not. He expressed considerable mystification over the
whole proposition. He said that he had informed them that no
government could possibly exist here for a moment if it invited
intervention of that sort.
I then asked him whether the door was closed on further
negotiations. His reply was somewhat evasive, to the effect that
he would refer the matter back to his colleagues (which he
probably had already done); and that the Italians were quite
free on their part to talk with anybody they wanted to here on
the subject; that as matters stood now, he had no intention of
carrying on further discussions. Later on, however, in our
conversation, he alluded to a possibility of some conversations
tomorrow with the Italians.
He stated that he had the intention of resisting by force of arms
as long as possible any attempt to occupy the city. He gave me,
however, the impression that the door was not absolutely closed
on further negotiations with the Italians.
Kun asked me if I had heard what had happened to their ambassador
in Vienna, and went on to state that Dr. Bolgar had been
arrested by counter-revolutionists in the embassy, then
imprisoned in the cell of a Franciscan monastery, where he lay
for two days on the floor. “This gives you an idea of conditions
in Vienna,” he said; “we ought to
[Page 461]
be thankful that Dr. Bauer is not a
Bolshevist.” I asked whether Dr. Bolgar had been released, and
he said yes, after considerable negotiations that he was back in
the Embassy. I then asked him if the rumour was true that they
had found a considerable quantity of money in the Embassy, and
he said, with some embarrassment, that as a matter of fact a
Commission from this government happened to be in Vienna for the
purpose of purchasing rice and potatoes and other provisions
from the Italians; and that they had with them for this purpose
the money that was found in the Embassy. The money was to be
used in purchasing Italian liras. I asked him whether the money
had been returned, and he replied that he understood that it had
not been returned, and that it had been handed over to Colonel
Cunningham, that a British correspondent by the name of Bartlett
had been instrumental in taking this money from the Embassy. I
remarked that the whole proceeding was very extraordinary.
Reverting to the question of my going to Szeged, I stated that I
would be ready to go tomorrow morning, and Bela Kun suggested
that I should be accompanied by a Hungarian. I replied that of
course if it were agreeable to the French to have a Hungarian go
through with me, I would have no objection, particularly if it
were someone such as Mr. Zerkowitz. Kun hesitated and said
finally he would probably need Mr. Zerkowitz tomorrow as an
interpreter with the Italians. I then said that unless there was
some particular reason for insisting on it, perhaps on the
whole, it would be better for me to go unaccompanied rather than
to give my mission the character of a Hungarian mission. Kun
said that all that would be desired was that someone should
accompany me up to the line of demarcation, and he indicated
someone named Braun from the library. I then stated that of
course it must be clearly understood that I went in no official
capacity, and merely for purposes of information, and I desired
especially to avoid any appearance of being what some had
intimated as an emissary of this Government; but if I were to be
of any service at all at this time, I must not be considered as
a partisan of either side. Kun replied that he hoped that I
would give information as well as take. I said certainly, that I
would acquaint them with the situation here as well as ascertain
what the situation was on the other side.
The conversation then turned to the subject of the general
political situation here, how uncertain it was. He commented on
the fact that he could not fathom the purpose of the Entente and
said that if things went badly here, that the responsibility
would all be on the Entente and not on him, that he had done
everything in his power to avoid bloodshed and acts of
terrorism. I then observed that as Bela Kun was not to be
considered as an egotist, he would hardly care to put himself in
the position of placing all the blame on the Entente, and not
admitting the possibility of having made mistakes himself. He
did
[Page 462]
not make any
definite reply to this observation. Alluding to the proposed
plan to resist to the end, I stated that whatever might happen
at this present moment, we must judge things not by the day but
by generations; that what was true in Socialism would ultimately
triumph, that we must not be too impatient. He agreed to this
and said that we must try to look at things from a high
plane.
After discussing some details about arrangements for the train,
our interview came to an end.
