Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/424
Professor A. C.
Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace
No. 253
Vienna, May 1, 1919.
[Received May
3.]
Sirs: I have the honor to enclose herewith
a copy of the official part of a letter which I have just received
from Professor Philip M. Brown at Budapest. The letter seems to me
of much interest and offers a picture from a point of view which we
should otherwise lack. Professor
[Page 448]
Brown is evidently doing most important work
under trying circumstances. I have reason to think that his presence
at his post at this moment exercises a most valuable restraining
influence on the government and has been beneficial to many
unfortunate people. I believe he handles the difficult situation
admirably.
On the other hand, while admitting the truth of his statements, I
cannot concur with all of his conclusions. Granting that Bela Kun
and those close to him deserve the credit which Professor Brown
ascribes to them and granting that if they were to be overthrown
there might be pillage and massacre, even this is not enough to
settle the question of what would be the wisest policy for the
Allied and Associated Powers to follow at the present juncture.
Professor Brown’s evidence is almost entirely from one, interested
side, and the fact that Bela Kun is wise enough, not only to
maintain law and order but also to wish to establish decently
civilized conditions, does not prove that he and his partisans are
really moving to the right as far as their fundamental principles
are concerned. I must admit too, that the idea of a “transitional”
government groping towards something better appears to me a little
nebulous. But even disregarding all such doubts, there are other
considerations to be taken into account, and to be given even more
weight than those mentioned by Professor Brown.
The question as to how the Allies should treat the government of Bela
Kun is of importance not only to Hungary. It also will affect
Austria, Bohemia, Germany, Poland, and indirectly at least the whole
world. To give public recognition and encouragement to the man whose
name stands next to that of Lenin and Trotsky as the apostle of
international Bolshevism and class warfare is a grave matter. To
invite him to come on a special mission to treat as an equal with
representatives of the Allied Powers, and perhaps to serve as an
intermediary between them and Lenin would vastly enhance his present
importance as well as tend to stabilize his government and what it
stands for in Hungary. This would be going a great deal further than
General Smuts’ propositions, which were that Hungary should merely
appear as one of several interested states in a general meeting, and
there is no doubt that the mission of General Smuts did much to
strengthen the hands and enhance the prestige of Bela Kun. At the
same time it weakened the position of the government here, which had
been telling its people that a Bolshevist revolution would mean the
end of the Allied food supply which alone saved Vienna from
starvation. Since then, in spite of the Smuts’ Mission, the
statement has been repeated and it has been explicitly and
officially confirmed by the English and French representatives here,
whose utterances on the subject have never been repudiated. The
belief in its truth has unquestionably been an influence for the
maintenance of order. Conversely, every encouragement given to the
[Page 449]
present Hungarian
regime weakens the hold of the Austrian government on its own more
radical supporters.
In the eyes of the Hungarian Bolshevists few things at this moment
could be more desirable than a revolution here, which would
establish in Vienna a system similar to that of Budapest. It would
be one more great step in the progress of international revolution,
a conquest in itself and one full of menace to the security of
Bohemia, of Poland, of Germany and beyond. On the other hand, the
collapse or overthrow of the government of Bela Kun, whatever his
merits as a statesman, would, provided it were succeeded by a
moderate regime, depress revolutionists and strengthen the forces of
law and order the world over. It is thus evident that the
advisability of recognizing him does not depend solely on the
likelihood of massacres in Budapest, however terrible. Large
considerations have to be taken into account, and these
considerations, whatever may be true tomorrow, are I believe
decisive today against such action as recommended by Professor
Brown. Let me add that my difference of opinion from him in this
regard does not detract from my appreciation of the splendid work he
is doing.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure]
Professor Philip M.
Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge
Budapest, 29 April,
1919.
Dear Coolidge: I am taking advantage of
a special train leaving for Vienna this afternoon to send
Captain Scully back with this personal compte
rendu. He can also obtain fresh supplies of provisions
for our immediate needs.
The political situation is as follows: The Roumanian advance has
profoundly discouraged this Government and inflamed the
extremists. The Government for a long while has shown a
disposition to move decidedly to the Bight, as I had occasion to
report in detail previously. One single indication of this
policy was the suppression two weeks ago of the Soldiers’
Councils—an institution of an obvious Bolshevist character. The
extremists were fast losing ground prior to the Roumanian
advance.
Even now, in spite of the frenzied appeals of the extremists, the
Government has thus far succeeded in quietly getting them out of
Budapest and sending them to the front. I have been assured
confidentially that the most extreme leaders will not be allowed
to return as members of the Government.
There was undoubtedly a serious counter-revolutionary plot
involving a very large number of people, including some of the
old
[Page 450]
police force. It
was most unskillfully managed with the result that there have
been many arrests, some just and many unjust. I believe that
only two of the leaders have been shot.
Many of those placed under arrest are prominent persons suspected
of being in sympathy with counter-revolutionary movements.
Certainly many have been most indiscreet in openly showing their
sentiments, and particularly in spreading rumors calculated to
discredit this regime.
Unfortunately, some of the government officials were so
ill-advised as to speak of these detenus
as “hostages”. I immediately let them know that such an idea was
utterly abhorrent, and was at once assured that the Government
had no thought of resorting to such barbarous measures as might
be implied by the use of such an expression. Moreover, they
assured me that many of these suspects would be immediately
released, and that they would endeavor to make use of
surveillance rather than of detention in dealing with political
enemies. I hear this morning that thirty were released in one
bunch and that more will follow.
Allowance, of course, must be made in such times for so-called
“preventive measures”; and it also must be recognized that when
feeling runs so high, the Government is compelled to satisfy the
extremists that the counter-revolutionists are being held
effectively in check. It is a great satisfaction to Freeman and
myself to be able to exert a moderating influence in behalf of
these people.
Public order and security is being maintained most admirably, and
I have yet to hear of any real excesses. Some abuses are
committed, of course, in the carrying out of so radical a
program involving private property rights, but even there, as I
have had occasion to find out by personal investigation of
several cases of American women married to Hungarians, much of
the criticism is grossly exaggerated. Moreover, whenever the
attention of the Government has been drawn to any such
complaints, it has been quick to rectify such abuses. There have
been many severe orders published in order to guard against
same.
It is true that irresponsible zealots among the subordinate
officials are hard to control, but Kun Bela has repeatedly given
good evidence of his own determination to prevent excesses and
abuses. I agree with Freeman that it is a fortunate thing that
Kun Bela is in control of the situation at this time. We see no
other strong man in sight to guarantee any sort of order and
security. And this is why we must lay such strong emphasis on
the impossibility of bringing about a transitional political
transformation without the aid of Kun Bela. If we are to have a
moderate Socialist regime which ultimately may be replaced by
something still more moderate, the help of Kun Bela
[Page 451]
is absolutely required
in the first transitional Government if we wish to avoid
bloodshed.
In order to carry through such a program, it is entirely
necessary to provide for some such conference between
representatives of the Entente and representatives of Hungary as
was suggested by General Smuts. (I believe he favored Paris, but
I think Switzerland more desirable.) I do not need to
reemphasize the great importance of having K. B. go as a member
of the Hungarian delegation. It is perhaps the key to the whole
problem.
In the absence of any agreement among the Entente as to the
policy to be followed here, and in the absence of any authorized
representative of the Entente with full powers to deal with so
extraordinary a situation, there seems to have been no other
course open to Freeman and myself except quietly to use our
influence, when consulted, in this direction. We are encouraging
this Government to purge itself of all Bolshevist taints and to
endeavor to inspire some confidence in the outside world. K. B.
and his associates have given me every evidence of their anxiety
to carry out this program, and are working against great odds in
this sense. Doctor Bolgar has informed me that his collaboration
has been requested. He seems to Freeman and myself to be well
intentioned, though perhaps lacking in force. I told him that
perhaps the fact that he had represented this regime in Vienna
at a time when they were resorting to questionable methods of
propaganda might militate against him in the eyes of the outside
world.
The situation is extraordinarily delicate and dangerous, but I am
confident that we can weather some trying days with proper
cooperation from without. I am convinced that in the present
state of mind of the extremists, military intervention by the
Entente would have bad results here in Budapest. It is not
required so long as K. B. and his associates are induced to
effect the transformation they have in mind. The advance of the
Roumanians as an act not authorized by the Entente may have good
results here in hastening the political changes desired, but if
those changes are satisfactory, it might be desirable to exert
strong influence to persuade the Roumanians to cease their
invasion.
In the meantime, I earnestly hope that you and Gregory will do
all in your power to back us up in this policy which was agreed
on when I returned, and also, if you can do so without violence
to your own judgment, to obtain from Paris an answer on this
proposition for a conference in Switzerland along the lines
already suggested by Smuts and myself. I consider this vital and
urgent, and hope you will by telegraph get an answer at an early
moment. It can do little harm; it may accomplish a great deal of
good, particularly the one definite thing we had most in mind.
As long as K. B. is essential to maintain order and avoid acts
of terrorism, his help in the formation of a transitional
[Page 452]
government is
indispensable. After that, we need have little concern, it seems
to me.
