File No. 861.00/2583
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 27, 9.43 p.m.]
Just after filing my August 26, 4 p.m., the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested a conference and I called upon him late this afternoon. He expressed a fear that my Government did not understand the motives which actuated Japan in moving troops to Manchouli as reported in my telegram of August 13, 9 p.m.; stated that while no formal protest had been filed by the Government of the United States he gathered from suggestions in the reports of Ambassador Ishii that there existed some doubt of the real meaning of this action; and asked whether I had any information on the subject. I replied that I had reported to my Government the statement which he made to me on August 13 and that since then I had received no indication of the Government’s attitude.
He then proceeded to explain to me in detail the conditions which faced the Allies in Siberia; with a carefully prepared map pointed out the various positions of the forces as explained to Major Baldwin at the military conference this morning, and expressed his entire agreement with the conclusions of the General Staff that immediate reinforcements were required to protect the Czech Army from disaster; emphasized the fact that winter was approaching and that speedy action was essential; again called attention to the strategic value Karymskaya; spoke at length of the recent battle with Bolsheviks and German prisoners in the Ussuri region beyond Lake Khanka, which had convinced General Otani that additional troops were required at Vladivostok and for this reason the General had asked for the remainder of the Twelfth Division. In addition to this the Minister for Foreign Affairs understood that all the military authorities at Vladivostok had agreed that additional troops were urgently needed, he himself felt that it was vital to control the junction of the railways at Karymskaya, and explained that the troops now at Manchouli were not equipped for service in Siberia. To meet these requirements the Japanese Government had [Page 357] on the 24th of August started to dispatch the remainder of the Twelfth Division to Vladivostok and were mobilizing the Third Division at Nagoya to be sent by way of Harbin and Manchouli to Karymskaya where he said that they could not arrive before September 15. This action he assured me was adopted as a military necessity and was not viewed by the Government of Japan as contrary to the spirit of the recent understanding with the Government of the United States; but was intended solely to help the Czechs, that was the only motive.
I inquired whether before taking this action he had conferred with you through Ishii, and he replied that on August 22 he had instructed the Japanese Ambassador at Washington to advise you of this decision but that the Ambassador had reserved the right to consider the matter before carrying out the instructions and had so reported to him, and he was therefore unable to say whether Ishii had as yet complied but that he had to-day telegraphed urging him to act promptly.