The following is a paraphrase of a telegram received from H.M.S.
Suffolk:
Allied naval and military representatives held a
conference on board the U.S.S. Brooklyn on July 31, at which the Czech
General explained that the critical position of the
Czechs south of Baikal was due to the fact that the
enemy had recently blown up the tunnel between them and
Irkutsk. The General proposes to proceed immediately via
Harbin to their rescue with his forces, which only
number 4,000 men, this small number making it impossible
for him to take the route line of communication. The
enemy are gathering forces in great numbers, and the
large enemy force by which Semenov was badly defeated are in a
strong position to the westward of Manchuria Station.
The enemy are forcing the Cossacks to join the war
prisoners, and news is being circulated that the Czech
forces are small and that the Allies will not support
them. It will only be possible for the Czech General to
leave a small defensive force on the Ussuri front. The
present situation both for the Allies and the Czechs is
a dangerous one. The Czech General estimates that 6,000
Allied troops would be necessary to strengthen the force
for the defence of the Nikolsk front, and that 20,000
would be necessary in addition to his small force to
relieve the Czechs at Baikal, also that a further 20,000
will be required to send forward to the Ussuri front,
and to overcome the enemy in the Amur Province, where
Von Taube has established his
headquarters at Blagoveshchensk. The Czech General
considers that the British flag should be shown on the
Ussuri front and he therefore requests that the half
battalion of British troops arriving August 3 be sent
direct there. The battalion of French troops which are
due here on August 6 will be sent on to the Ussuri front
on arrival. It was unanimously agreed at the conference
that two divisions of Allied troops should be sent to
support the Czechs immediately, and that the remainder
should follow on afterwards.
A telegram from the French Minister at Tokyo was read by
General Paris, in which it was
explained that at a meeting on July 29 at which the
immediate dispatch of Japanese troops was recommended,
all the Allied representatives agreed, with the
exception of the United States representative, who
considered that no help was required by the
Czechs.
