Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II

File No. 861.00/1653

The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State

[April 25, 1918]

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary by the Ambassador on April 25, 1918:]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington

April 25, 1918.

The British War Cabinet have now further considered the general military problem before the Allies, and have reached the conclusion that it is essential to treat Europe and Asia, for the purposes of strategy, though not of command, as a single front. The transfer of German divisions from east to west is still continuing and, under present conditions, can be further continued, and it is imperative to stop this movement if it can possibly be done.

Germany can now draw food and raw materials from Asia, and in these conditions, even if our defensive is successful, there is little chance that we could make a successful offensive. In the present state of affairs we cannot hope for a favourable change in internal conditions in Germany and for this reason also it is important that pressure should be brought on the Central powers from the east.

It must further be remembered that Germany is now trying to sow disorder throughout the east, and that German argents are already attempting to cause trouble in Afghanistan, Persia and Turkestan. This movement will have important effects unless it can be checked.

It thus becomes of the greatest urgency to reestablish an Allied front in Russia, and the only hope of doing this appears to be by producing a national revival of Russia, such as that which was seen in the time of Napoleon. Russia has an immense supply of soldiers trained to arms, and with experience of modern warfare, including capable generals, and if the necessary spirit could be aroused, an effective army could in a short time be produced, and supplied from the stores now at Russian ports. The Germans would then be compelled either to withdraw or strengthen their forces in Russia.

The British Government considers that it is necessary for the Allies to unite in order to bring about a Russian national revival, and in order to adopt a policy of freeing Russia from foreign control by means of Allied intervention. The Allies must, of course, avoid taking sides in Russian politics, and, if the Bolshevist government will cooperate in resisting Germany, it seems necessary to act with them as the de facto Russian Government. Trotsky, at least, has for some time shown signs of recognizing that cooperation with the Allies is the only hope of freeing Russia from the Germans, and, whatever his motives, he has taken steps against anti-Ally newspapers and has asked for cooperation at Murmansk, and on other matters. He has now definitely asked for a statement of the help which the Allies could give, and of the guarantee which they would furnish, and says that he considers an agreement desirable if the conditions are satisfactory. The British Government are of opinion that the Allies should avail themselves of this opportunity to offer Allied intervention against Germany, accompanied by a suitable declaration of disinterestedness and by proper guarantees as to the evacuation of Russian territory. If such an offer was accepted the whole position might be transformed, and if it was refused, the position of the Bolshevist government would at least be defined.

Japan would clearly have to furnish the greater part of any considerable military force which might be used, but it is desirable that all the Allies should participate.

The intervention of Japan alone clearly might throw a large proportion of the Russian population on to the side of Germany, and we can therefore only offer an intervention by all the Allies, Japan providing the greatest military strength. The British Government would be ready to make a naval demonstration at Murmansk and elsewhere, which would provide rallying points for anti-German forces and hold the ports as bases. The British could also give assistance to the Russian forces in Transcaucasia if communication through Persia can be established, which will depend largely on the cooperation of the Bolshevists in that region. The important step to be taken would, however, be an advance through Siberia by a force predominantly Japanese and American. The Allied character of this force would have to be furnished mainly from the United States, though British and probably also French and Italian detachments could accompany it. The American contingent might be composed mainly of technical corps, especially mechanical transports, signal units, railway troops, and medical units, and also one complete division. This force would probably have little or no fighting for some time after landing, and the American division, if sent, could finish training in Siberia. A great quantity of war material now at the ports would be made available for refitting the Russian army.

The British War Cabinet are anxious to learn whether the President would be disposed to agree to the following course of action:

1. Great Britain and the United States to make a simultaneous proposal to the Bolshevist government for intervention by the Allies on the lines indicated, an undertaking to be given for the withdrawal of all Allied forces at the conclusion of hostilities.

2. An American force, composed as described above, to be sent to the Far East.

If this general policy is acceptable, the question of approaching the Japanese Government remains. Japan would under this scheme intervene in Siberia as part of a joint intervention by the Allies … and it would probably be necessary for her to use her troops, in conjunction with Russian and Allied forces, in European Russia as well as in Asia. The British Government consider that Japan should, in return, have the military command of the expedition, though a mission from each Allied country, including a strong propaganda detachment, would he attached. It also seems desirable that the proposal should be made to the Japanese at an early date and pressed on the ground that the proposed course of action is necessary for a victory of the Allied cause. It would be difficult for the Japanese Government to refuse this scheme if pressed on these grounds.

The suggested plan is one of urgent importance. The proposals outlined above are in no way intended as an alternative to sending American infantry to Europe, the need for which is constantly increasing. The problem of Russia is one of pressing urgency and in the present situation it is essential to bring pressure against Germany in the East, without delay. If this cannot be done, it is difficult to see how the blockade can be made effective or how peace is to be reached through a conclusive defeat of the enemy’s forces.

Before consulting the other Allied powers the British Government think the most important step is to ascertain whether the President concurs in these proposals, for without his concurrence the British Government would not care to proceed further with them.