File No. 861.00/1571
The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8.53 p.m.]
Referring to my cable of April 8, 6 p.m. The American Government in holding back in the matter of intervention in Siberia is [justified] by recent reports from there, particularly British military attaché and Major Fitzwilliam, British Army. Following is a summary of the situation as it appears from here:
There is no evidence of a concerted plan on the part of Germans to control Siberia through the prisoners nor could such an attempt succeed. Earlier reports about armed prisoners were exaggerated; most of these reports came from one source in Irkutsk. A great many Austrian prisoners have become international socialists, joined Bolsheviks and thrown in their lot with Russians. Most German prisoners desire to return to Europe. In case of need Bolsheviks will make use of the technical knowledge of German officers, but the latter could not control unless the Russian people should be driven into the arms of Germany through some fatal mistake.
Intervention can do good only if understood and supported by the [omission] from there. Intervention in support of a group superimposed from above would badly upset things for the Allies. Semenov has no backing in Russia though at present [omission] by Kuroki, Japanese officer. Any advance would put him in a helpless condition dependent entirely upon outside force. Extent of Ussuri Cossack organization not known here but other Cossacks generally stand with [Page 118] the workmen. Only reactionaries want intervention at all costs even in the last resort by Japan alone. The so-called Siberian autonomous government organized at Tomsk, members of which addressed President Wilson from Vladivostok by telegraph April 6, might possibly get sufficient backing in Siberia to warrant Allied support.
It is believed that the Allies, particularly the United States, still have it in their power to take action which will save Russia and Siberia from German dominion and keep up spirit of other Slavic nationalities in Europe; economic rather than military action will now accomplish this. Russian population needs clothes and manufactured goods; workmen need food held by peasants. The immediate creation of a Russian trading corporation, backed by the governments, which would import needed goods from the United States and Japan and would exchange for grain and supply same in cities, all through local Russian and Siberian committees, absolutely on condition that order be first restored so that beneficial use of materials assured—this policy if announced to people will gain their immediate adhesion. Restoration of railway traffic policing by local guards with only potential support by international force. If the policy of economic support to Siberia and restoration of traffic is put in the foreground, it is believed that other matters will take care of themselves Should intervention come first there is danger that it will be understood to be in favor of reaction and capitalism and will alienate the people permanently. The financial support required for the economic program would be much smaller than military action would require; it would give far greater assurance of ultimate effective military action against Germany. Economic support as primary action, military assistance in the background made effective where local anarchy requires, would appear safe policy.