File No. 861.00/1589
The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 13, 10.47 a.m.]
81. Referring to my 79. Military attaché just received following from Riggs: [Page 114]
The Anglo-Japanese landing at Vladivostok has made a great impression. The government, although it considered something like this likely, is surprised and threatened with loss of influence. Under certain influences it might be brought to a declaration of war on Japan. Military representatives saw Soviet government to-day and after long and violent discussions certain conditions which the Allied Governments should examine before an agreement could be reached on the question of Allied intervention in Siberia were brought up. The conditions read:
- (1)
- Promise not to interfere in the interior politics of Russia as was done with the Ukraine, the Don, and elsewhere;
- (2)
- Loyal collaboration with the Soviet even without recognition and limited to military questions;
- (3)
- Not an exclusively Japanese intervention but an Allied one;
- (4)
- Definite and prearranged determination of the territorial economic price to be paid Japan;
- (5)
- If this intervention is to serve the interests of both Russia and the Allies it would appear legitimate that the latter examine the possibility of territorial and economic concessions in their Far Eastern possessions.
The Allied military have the impression that this last point could easily be contested.
The situation is so tense that the Allied military judge it necessary to communicate to their governments that a clear, neutral, and prompt reply only will permit the negotiations which have been commenced to continue, whereas a delay may force Soviet to the last extremities. It would appear advantageous that the powers telegraph at once that they are willing to examine these propositions.
And Soviet government also asks urgent written replies addressed to the People’s Commissaire for Foreign Affairs stipulating that they will be kept secret and submitted to the Council of People’s Commissaires. It would be very advantageous if the replies were identical.
In any case the delay necessary to arrive at an agreement is to be reduced as much as possible for it retards the intervention and consequently lengthens the time in which the enemy disposes of all of his force on the eastern front.
The Allied military representatives consider that Russian opposition to inter-Allied intervention in the Far East would in a very large measure diminish the utility of intervention. Therefore, judge an understanding with the Soviet as very necessary.
Identical notes to the American, English, French, Italian Governments and Ambassadors.
Following are the military representatives, Moscow: French, General Lavergne; Italian, General Romei; British, Captain Garstin; and [American] Riggs. Siberian Central Soviet Committee has issued address charging Japanese-British landing welcomed by counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie to overturn Soviet. Maintenance [Page 115] of control concerns Soviet leaders more than German resistance or welfare of Russia. I think efforts to organize army will prove futile and that Soviet could offer no resistance to Allied intervention, nor do I believe they would form German alliance as realization such would be fatal to their domination and would greatly impede progress of world-wide social revolution. However, we can far better afford to permit Soviet-German alliance than Japanese-German cooperation. Suppose Allies will confer before categorically replying to Soviet.