Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 2, The World War, Volume I
File No. 860c.01/55
The Ambassador in France ( Sharp) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of a communication which has recently been handed to me by Mr. R. Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee having its headquarters at Paris. Of Mr. Dmowski and his associates I have made brief mention in my telegrams Nos. 2591 of October 11 and 2622 of October 19, 1917.1
[Page 786]Without at this time commenting upon the contents of this communication, it is clearly obvious, both from the matter contained in my telegrams to which reference has been made, and this communication itself, that Mr. Dmowski has not lost sight of the interests of Poland either during or after the war. His views, however, are interesting as coming from one who is very familiar with the political history of Europe, and his observations entitled to careful, consideration.
I have [etc.]
The President of the Polish National Committee ( Dmowski) to the Ambassador in France ( Sharp)
Mr. Ambassador: The Polish National Committee considers its duty to bring before the Government of the United States of America its considerations on certain means of struggle against the Central powers which, we believe, might contribute to make that struggle more efficient.
In spite of the successful military operations on the western front and in Asia Minor the cause of the Allies is threatened at present rather seriously (1) by the Italian defeat, (2) by the course of the events in Russia.
These two failures show clearly the importance of the political offensive of Germany in her struggle against the Allies. The German success on the Italian front was due to a certain extent to the pacifist propaganda of German agents in Italy and they are also the German political intrigues in Russia which brought about the disorganization of her Army and which drive her now towards peace. It may be added that the political offensive of the Central Empires is felt in all Allied countries where it provokes strong pacifist tendencies among certain elements.
The weakness of the Allies against the Central powers consists above all in the fact that the struggle of the Allies is limited to the military and economic offensive whereas in the political domain they remain rather on the defensive. They fight their own pacifists and they deny to have any aggressive tendencies: up till now they have not attempted, except in Arabia, to attack the weak points of the enemy. The Central Empires, however, possess certain political sides which might be assailed with success and against which no serious attempt has been made.
Germany on her national territory presents a strong body which can not be easily attacked from the political point of view. Truly, [Page 787] she has her internal difficulties but these develop independently, and there is little chance for the Allies to influence their course.
The political ground upon which a successful assault of the Allies might be made is that of Austria-Hungary and of Poland.
The relations between the Germans and the Magyars on one side and the remaining nationalities of Austria-Hungary on the other, became more than ever strained in the time of war. In certain regions of the Monarchy, for instance, in Bohemia, there exists a state of fermentation which may turn out very easily into a revolution. If we bear in mind that in the Austro-Hungarian Army, formed upon a territorial basis, regiments are to a great extent racially homogeneous (which fact the authorities try to attenuate in the time of war) we may easily imagine that revolutionary outbursts among various nationalities of the Empire would find an inevitable echo in the Army which might lead to its disorganisation.
The principal reason which keeps those movements in check is the conviction that the Allies do not intend to break up the Hapsburg Monarchy, and that the races subject to-day to the Germans and Magyars, are condemned to remain under their domination after the war. In these conditions, the political leaders of the oppressed nationalities find impossible to start a determined struggle against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
If these nationalities had the certainty that the victorious Allies would bring them freedom, that the Poles, the Italians, the Serbs and the Roumanians, at present Austrian and Hungarian subjects, would be incorporated into Poland, Italy, Serbia and Roumania, that the Czechs would obtain their political independence—the anti-German and anti-Hungarian movement among these races would certainly take such proportions that it might paralyse to a great extent Austria-Hungary’s activity in this war.
The second weak point that may be successfully attacked by the Allies is the Polish problem. Russia being disorganised by the revolution, Germany’s powerful adversary in the east being thus considerably impaired, this problem became one of foremost importance. After the war the only serious opponent to Germany in the east may be the Polish state if it is placed in conditions which enable it to check the expansion of its western neighbor. These conditions are: (1) the overthrow of the German domination on the territory which separates Poland from the Baltic by the incorporation into Poland of all Polish territories which belong now to Germany, the mouths of the Vistula and of the Niemen included; (2) the overthrow of the German domination over the nationalities of Central Europe, which means the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
[Page 788]If these two objects are not attained, Poland, after the war, would in fact become a German dependency, and an anti-German policy would become for the Poles impossible.
The peace terms formulated by the “Soviet” of Petrograd for the next Allies’ conference demand among others the evacuation by the Germans of all territory belonging formerly to Russia, which means also the evacuation of the Kingdom of Poland. Maintaining thus in fact the partition of Poland, the “Soviet” offers to Russian Poland the right of “self-definition.” One could hardly find a more repelling threat for the Poles than to open the largest part of Poland to the revolutionary experiments of the “Soviet.”
The Central Empires will not certainly fail to exploit this for blackmailing the Poles by presenting them with an alternative: either to get back to Russia, or to accept a solution of the Polish problem proposed by the German and Austrian Governments.
This last solution, as it may be concluded from the news on the recent pourparlers between Berlin and Vienna, will take the form of placing the Kingdom of Poland under the scepter of the Austrian Emperor.
Should it be achieved, should the Emperor of Austria become during the war King of Poland, he would consider his right to raise a Polish army and to make use of it in this war. At any rate, should this solution be a final one, the Central Empires would have the guarantee that in the next war all Poland would be forced to fight on their side. Such a prospect is for the Poles a desperate one. Circumstances, however, combine up to now to deprive them of a hope for any other definite future.
In this way the Germans, by their initiative and unceasing activity, bring forth against the Allies a dangerous political offensive on the ground of the Polish problem.
This situation might be essentially changed, should the Allies decide to attack the enemy on the same ground, by pledging themselves to rebuild the Polish state on the whole national territory of Poland, including the provinces which belong to Germany and Austria, with the mouth of the Vistula and Danzig; a state the area and the population of which would be sufficiently large to enable it to successfully oppose Germany in the future.
The Poles would then have the certainty that in the event of the victory of the Allies, they would become independent from Germany, and in that certainty they would find strength to resist German intrigues and even make the greatest sacrifices.
The Polish National Committee, being in constant contact with the political organisations in Poland and cooperating with them in their struggle against the intrigues of the Central Empires, has lately received reports clearly expressing that the whole country [Page 789] expects an act by which the Allies would manifest their unshakable decision to assure the complete independence of a united Poland.
The success of the German political offensive within the Allied countries is emphatically demonstrated by the fact that the Central Empires have found in the Austro-Hungarian as well as in the Polish question many upholders who devote their unceasing activities to the object of preventing an attack of the Allies on these two grounds. Some try to prove that it is in the interest of the Allies to save Austria-Hungary, others argue that one must not dream to overthrow the German domination in Danzig, as Germany would never reconcile herself with such a loss. Such theories lead consistently to Poland being left entirely within the sphere of German influence. It is clear that in such a case Russia would become in fact a German hinterland.
With above mentioned activities many associate themselves unconsciously, without realising their ultimate effects. If the resulting hesitation in regard to these two questions is not brought to an end, the Allies will be able to carry on but a military and economical offensive, whereas on political ground they will remain on the defensive till the end of the war. Recent experience gives the best evidence of the danger of such an attitude.
The approaching Inter-Ally Conference which is to deal with the aims of this war gives an opportunity to strike at the enemy a hard political blow which will undoubtedly provoke serious internal complications within the Central Empires and affect seriously their fighting strength.
We take the liberty of submitting to the Government of the United States of America the proposition that the great powers in war against Germany make an agreement which they would include in their war aims.
- 1.
- The reconstitution of an independent Polish state comprising Polish territories which before the war belonged to Russia, Germany and Austria. This Polish state to be in possession of the Polish part of Silesia and of a part of the Baltic coast with the mouths of the Vistula and the Niemen; to have proper extension and a sufficiently large population to enable it to become an efficient factor of European equilibrium.
- 2.
- The emancipation of nationalities in Austria-Hungary which remain actually under German and Magyar supremacy: the incorporation of the Polish, Italian, Serbo-Croatian and Roumanian territories into the national states to which they belong on account of their nationality; the creation of an independent Czechish state comprising Bohemia, Moravia, the Czechish part of Silesia and the northern part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks.
The above agreement to be made public so as to enable all the interested nationalities to have cognizance of it.
[Page 790]In case the questions referred to should be discussed at the approaching conference of the Allies and should the representatives of the Allied powers consider necessary to obtain additional information, the Polish National Committee would be glad to supply such through its delegate.
I am [etc.]