File No. 812.00/12469.
Vice Consul Silliman to the Secretary of State.
Saltillo, July 10, 1914.
No American should have hoped for a more friendly personal reception than that given me by Governor Carranza yesterday afternoon. Mr. Fabela, Acting Minister of Foreign Relations, and Mr. Canova were present. The desire of the Mediators, the views of the Administration, and the seriousness of the situation, as appearing to the sincere friends of Mexico, were in an unofficial and informal way presented to Governor Carranza in the most courteous and impressive manner possible for me. The deepest attention was given.
While appreciating the good offices of the Mediators, and the past and present attitude of the United States, Governor Carranza appears unwilling to make the least change in plans already formed. He will reply to the Mediators that it is the unanimous conclusion of his generals, accepted by him, that there be no conference with the representatives of General Huerta. At my earnest request that he at least convey some expression to the Huertista representatives he stated that he would telegraph Mr. Zubáran at Washington to announce to the Mediators his willingness to treat with the Huertistas, but only on the basis of unconditional surrender. The telegram is of this date and is as follows:
Saltillo, July 10, 1914.
Sr. Lic. Rafael Zubáran Capmany,
Washington, D. C.
Having consulted with the Generals of the Constitutionalist Army which is under my orders as to whether they were of the opinion that I, as Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, should name representatives who would enter into dealings with the representatives of General Huerta for the purpose of designating together a provisional president in order that the present struggle might be terminated, the majority have replied stating that they will not agree to my naming representatives for this purpose. In consequence I instruct you to advise the Ministers of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, in reply52 to their note of June 21 last,53 transmitted by you on the 22d of same month, that, appreciating their proposals that our civil war terminate and thanking them for the interest they have been pleased to show me, it is not possible to send representatives from the First Military Headquarters of the Constitutionalist Army under my charge to deal with the delegates of General Huerta regarding the provisional presidency of the Republic. At the same time express to them in my name that in turn they will please transmit to the delegates of the aforesaid General that the only form acceptable by me to finish our internal struggle is the unconditional surrender of General Victoriano Huerta with the army that sustains him.
Cordially,
The First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army,
V. Carranza.
It was a surprise to learn that no provisional government is deemed desirable. It is not even contemplated. The reforms considered necessary will be made by a government consisting of Governor [Page 563] Carranza in his character as First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army and his associates. It will be a military government and it will continue for such term as is necessary until constitutional order is reestablished throughout the country. When it is considered opportune, elections will be held.
Governor Carranza states that he realizes the advantages that would result from immediate recognition by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States, but that he believes it preferable that recognition come later with himself as First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army and not with him or some other person as provisional president. He says that credit and the confidence of foreign powers will not come with the establishment of a provisional president whose base is unstable but that every one will be able to see a firm foundation for peace in the First Chief sustained by the Mexican people, and that then the foreign powers in a short time will concede as proper and just the recognition of the government.
Governor Carranza does not take into consideration the things attendant upon further continuance fighting until the enemy is annihilated rather than to terminate it, as he says by an arrangement that might result [apparent corruption or omission] in a new and more disastrous revolution, as happened in 1910 in the Treaty of Ciudad Juarez, which placed De la Barra in the provisional presidency, leaving incomplete the revolutionary ideals.