File No. 812.00/23453.
The Special Commissioners to the Secretary of State.
We have just returned from a meeting and while we can report some change in the position of the Mediators we do not know that it means any lessening of the practical difficulty.
We pressed with earnestness the views expressed in your telegram and the danger of mistake in construing Carranza’s letter by newspaper articles.
They replied that their construction was borne out by the words of the Zubáran letter itself.
To this we replied that we found in it no protest; that the American Government construed the letter as indicating Carranza’s willingness to come into the mediation because it was so inclusive of everything in which he was interested and considered the fact that he wished admission to be an evidence of his good faith.
They replied that if there was any doubt as to what the letter meant, the doubt could easily be removed by an explicit statement.
We urged that they must bear in mind Carranza’s position as a leader of a revolutionary army and that they could not expect him to make a statement that would seriously weaken him at home, and that the Mediators had resolved the doubt against Carranza and had indicated an unwillingness to answer his letter or give him an opportunity to say what it meant.
One of them suggested that a reply might be written stating that his letter had been received and found to be susceptible of different constructions and inquiring how they were to understand it, and if he was willing to have all matters mediated.
They said that since the mediation began there had been such a change in affairs as to make an armistice now essential by all the parties to the mediation and that they could not undertake mediation with its consequent delay while Carranza was advancing on one of the parties who had agreed to an armistice. They claimed that the mediation would not only be futile but that they would be put in a ridiculous position if Carranza should take Mexico City while the mediation was in progress and be a party to it.
One of them suggested that the difficulties arising out of delay might be met if Carranza assented to the scope of the mediation and came in with the understanding that it should be completed within a given number of days, during which time an armistice should be declared.
They stated that they desired to be explicitly understood as being willing and anxious to have Carranza a party to the mediation if he would assent to the conditions above referred to.
We said that the American Government was urging the vital importance of having Carranza a party in order to secure the pacification of Mexico; that it considered his presence was so essential to success of mediation that it could consistently and earnestly ask the Mediators to be astute in removing obstacles and devising methods by which Carranza would be brought in as a party and thus bound by the plan that might ultimately be adopted.
[Page 522]The Mediators constantly urged the serious consequence that might arise from delay, and urged that they fear the inevitable result of Carranza being admitted will bring about delay, and they expressed the constant fear that unless matters are speeded Carranza will be in Mexico City before the mediation is completed.
Prompt progress in agreeing upon terms of the mediation may have the advantage of aiding us to secure now assent to terms which would not be acceptable after Carranza had come in. It is possible that it might be advisable for us to agree now on as many details as possible, because Carranza and Huerta might themselves object to some conditions which the United States may regard as essential.
In the light of our meeting this morning we are disposed to think the next step might be to ask the Mediators to promptly write a letter to Zubáran, who could then reply in the light of the facts we have reported.