File No. 812.00/5324.
The American Consul at Chihuahua to the Secretary of State.
Chihuahua, October 16, 1912.
Sir: I have lately had the opportunity to gain an insight into the animus which at present moves the Mexican army and which will, in [Page 851] a large measure, explain the peculiar indifference and lack of spirit in the campaign against the rebels in the north.
In the first place, frankly and without concealment, the army has no love for nor patience with the new regime. General Huerta shared this attitude completely and was in full accord with the army’s feelings until the northern campaign was begun. This officer, then a brigadier, was first put in command of field operations against the Zapatistas in Morelos, and, loyal to the constituted Government and an enemy of rebellion as a means of bettering conditions in the Republic, while still by no means a partisan of the new régime, planned a campaign against the rebels which undoubtedly would have been effective had not Mr. Madero interfered at the moment when victory was within reach and ordered a change in plans which resulted in the escape of the rebels. This interference occurred during the operations in the neighborhood of Cuautla, Morelos, in the past year. As a consequence of Mr. Madero’s interference General Huerta asked to be relieved from command, and was retired to Mexico City, where he remained, sulking and disgruntled, until placated by Mr. Madero and sent to put down the northern rebellion, among the considerations Offered him in connection with the command having been the promise of promotion, free rein in the conduct of the campaign, and, extra-officially, and possibly from the private purse of the Executive, a fixed lump gratuity for the successful conclusion of the campaign. The second of these considerations was practically broken when Villa, the Maderist partisan and ex-bandit, was ordered shot by General Huerta for serious crimes committed during the campaign and for insubordination. Mr. Madero interfered to revoke the order, a stay in the summary execution of the ex-bandit until the matter could be submitted to the President having been secured through the intercession of the President’s two younger brothers, who were serving as volunteer officers under General Huerta. Villa was subsequently ordered to Mexico City, where he yet remains in prison. This episode came near being serious in results and causing an unhealable breach between General Huerta and the President, but the former’s pride was finally placated and the campaign went on. Granting even General Huerta’s full adherence to the Government it is probably true that he, conscious of the army’s attitude, was quite unable to drive his troops more than he did, and we thus find accounted for the perplexing and disappointing inactivity of the Federal army after entering Chihuahua in July. Up to the present time almost the entire campaign has been left to the irregular Government partisans, such as those commanded by Generals Sanjinés and Blanco, and the regular forces have rested completely idle.
Another cause of disgust for the army is that since arriving at Chihuahua General Huerta and the civil authorities have joined in a policy of pacification, undoubtedly in obedience to higher authority, which the officers of the army know to be impracticable and visionary. This lack of firmness in dealing with the situation not only is disappointing to loyalists but earns, as well, the contempt of the erstwhile rebels. General Huerta himself does not appear any longer to have the entire confidence and the cordial respect of his officers which were formerly his. The official personnel of the army, without exception, believe that he degraded himself in submitting to the various slights [Page 852] and affronts to his dignity which were offered by Mr. Madero as described.
I am reminded to say that the Federals have been almost ignored socially since their arrival here, and their position has not been very different from that of a conquering army in a conquered foreign territory. This ostracism is keenly felt by the officers, to whom such treatment is all the more embarrassing because of their realization that they are observing only a perfunctory loyalty to the Government and that only in compliance with a sense of duty and against their own inclinations. The Government adherents are drawn almost exclusively from the middle classes, between whom and the officers there is very little sympathy. The aristocracy, formerly Porfiristas and Orozquistas, at present almost to a man treat them with coldness, and the common people, after the manner of their kind, side’ with the upper classes or remain indifferent.
Reiterated references in certain quarters to American aid to the revolution justify a general denial on my part in so far as local nationals are concerned. If this has been the case on the American side of the border and even in other parts of Mexico, certainly grounds for such a Chargé with respect to Chihuahua do not exist. The writer of this dispatch has come into intimate contact with Americans of all classes, and with a certain few exceptions the sentiment of Americans in this section has been strongly condemnatory of the revolution. I think, however, that under the circumstances they have been singularly guarded in the matter of public expressions of opinion and free from the suspicion of interference in political affairs in any way. It is worthy of note that the exceptions are mostly naturalized citizens, or those whose social and business associations are with other groups of foreigners. The Germans and English have been notably friendly to the revolutionary cause. What is said herein applies only to Americans residing in this district; for others I can not presume to speak.
Among Americans and other foreigners here there is but one opinion, and that is that sooner or later intervention of the United States must come, or, if not actual intervention, at least the open threat of it. They realize that the crafty and able persons who have fought and are still fighting the Government from ambush embrace the greater part of the intellectual and material power of the nation, and, knowing perfectly well the weaknesses of the administration, the teetering loyalty of the army, and counting on the indifference, ignorance, and stupidity of the lower classes, and believing that the United States regards intervention in the light of a true calamity and therefore something to be avoided to the last degree of patient forbearance, they will plot and conspire and secretly further the operations of the semibandits remaining in the field until the country is absolutely ruined. The writer does not rejoice in the conditions that seem to warrant the expression of these views, on the part of his countrymen and other foreigners; in fact, he deplores them heartily and wholly, and has steadily hoped that things would take a different turn.
I have [etc.]